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?Che attached paper was prepared by Professor Vernon W . Ruttan, who 
undertook a s tudy of the review processes in the CGIAR at the joint request 
of TAC and the CGIAR secretariat, This  s tudy was intended as a firs t s tep 
in the reconsideration of these processes in the light of concerns that the 
reviews were tak ing substantial resources, particularly  the time of center 
management and s c ientis ts , without making as much of a contribution to the 
s y s tem as might be possible. 
TAC considered the paper at length in its  4ls t and 42nd meetings, 
and'had the benefit of inputs  from center management and boards, and from 
the CGIAR secretarFat. TAC was of the v iew that a satisfactory plan for 
changes in the approach to reviews would have to go beyond the areas 
covered by Ruttan Fn some respects, notably  in relating the reviews to the 
new resource allocation process. TAC decided to ask  the Group to dis cus s  
the paper at the MDntpellier meeting, s ince preparation of a final proposal 
for changes in the review process could not proceed without inputs  from the 
donors. 
Dis cus s ion c z f the Ruttan paper and of the review process is  c losely  
related to two other items  on the agenda at Montpellier, "TAC's Role in 
Monitoring and Recommending Priorities  for the CGIAR" and the dis cus s ion of 





Center Board Chairpersons 





It is not expected that final conclusions on any points related to 
the review process will be reached at Montpellier. TAC proposes that after 
the Group meeting, a working group of TAC and the CGIAR secretariat should 
prepare a specific proposal incorporating the view of the Group, the center 
boards and center managements, for joint discussion with center directors 
at TAC 43 and consideration by the Group at centers week in October 1987. 
The TAC and the CGIAR secretariat have prepared the following 
questions to stimulate discussion among Group members, with specific 










How do members of the Group respond to the recommendation that 
“center EPRs should focus primarily on strategic rather than on 
operational issues." 
If reviews move towards a greater focus on strategic issues, would 
the clients be satisfied to rely on centers' internal processes to 
assess and maintain the quality and adequacy of research programs 
and staff performance? 
With primary emphasis on strategic reviews, how would the Group be 
reassured that mechanisms are in place for adequate consultatjlon 
between centers and -national systems in the development of strategy 
and the implementation of programs? 
. 
Would donors be prepared to accept an interval of 8 to 10 years 
between external reviews of centers, provided that it was understood 
that interim reviews would be undertaken when circumstances 
suggested that they were necessary? 
What would be the merit of merging external program and external 
management reviews under one leadership? 
To what extent should the external program reviews (as distinct from 
external management reviews) be concerned with assessing the center 
board's performance in providing policy direction for the center? 
Should there be a specific mechanism for reporting highly sensitive 
information gathered in the review process? 
With respect to the time spent on reviews by center staff, are there 
more cost-effective alternatives to the current system? 
In what circumstances and to what extent would donors be prepared to 
forego their individual reviews of restricted core and special 
(extra core) projects? 
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1.0 The Global Setting 
We are, in the closing years of the twentieth century, completing one 
of the most remarkable transitions in the history of agriculture. Prior 
to this century almost all increases in food production were obtained by 
bringing new iand into production, except for limited areas of East Asia, 
the Middle East and Western Europe. By the end of the twentieth century, 
however, almost all of the increase in world food production must come 
from higher yields, that is, from increased output per hectare and per 
animal unit. This transition from dependence on the natural resource base 
to a science based system of agriculture is occurring in most of the world 
within a single century: beginning in the first half of the century in 
presently developed countries and at mid-century in countries in the 
developing world. Many areas, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, are only 
now beginn,ing the transition by pu,tting- into place the essential 
agricultural research and extension capacity. 
In this study I am concerned with the development of the system of 
International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) that are funded by the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) . The 
issue addressed is how to maintain and enhance the quality and the 
productivity of the research programs at the CGIAR Centers. 
In considering the concluding assessments and recommendations, we 
should keep in mind the task that lies ahead for the international 
agricultural research community. That task. is the completion of a global 
agricultural research system. It is essential, by the first decade of the 
next century, that agricultural research capacity be established for each 
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commodity and for'each agricultural production factor or resource input of 
economic significance in each agroclimatic region of the world. 
Unfortunately, fewer than a dozen developing countries have agricultural 
research systems with the capacity to generate the new knowledge and the 
new technology needed to sustain the growth of production that is 
consistent with the growing needs of their countries. Thus, a very 
substantial strengthening of national agricultural research systems must 
take place in other developing countries. 
The "global agricultural research system" discussed in this study, 
should be understood to comprise the systems organized and supported by 
national and provincial (or state) governments, as well as the 
International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs). It includes the 
agricultural research conducted or supported by private organizations as 
well as by public institutions. It should include national research 
institutions in the 'developed market economies and the centrally planned 
economies as well as in the developing countries. Clearly, the need is 
growing for more effective articulation among the several institutional 
levels in the system and between the suppliers and users of the new 
knowledge and new technology. 
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2.0 Governance and Management 
Any attempt to evaluate the methods used by the CGTAb/IAQC system to 
assure the quality of its research proqram and the productivity of its 
research effort nus t consider the principles guiding its system of 
governance and management. The system was established and is funded by a 
consortium of national governments, multilateral development aqencies, and 
. 
private foundations. System policies are formulated and implemented 
through the CGIAR Secretariat and the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). 
Each research Center within the system is an autonomous corporate entity. 
The Center's policy is determined by its Board of Trustees and implemented 
by an administration appointed by and responsible to the Board. This 
unique combination of centralized oversight and decentralized management 
and operation is a notable characteristic of the CGIAR/IARC system. 
The appropriate model for thinking about the relation between the 
Consultative Group, includinq its TAC, and the Centers is not the relation 
between a corporate headquarters and its semi-autonomous operatinq 
divisions. A more appropriate analogy is the partially owned subsidiary of 
a venture capital firm in which the parent corporation is represented on 
the board of directors but does not directly participate in day-to-day 
management. Many major corporations have found it useful to spin-off 
partially owned subsidiaries in order to given then qreater autonomy and 
flexibility. This pattern is most common in research-intensive areas where 
creativity is highly valued. 
Several very good reasons. can be stated for decentralizing 
responsibility in the planning and management of research intensive 
organizations. One is that any system, such as a research orqanization, 
in which there is great uncertainty about the relation between effort and 
3 
outcome is dependent for its success on redundancy, decentralization, and 
feedback in the design of its decision processes and for the success of its 
operations. Our understanding of the importance of redundancy goes back at 
least to Von Neumann's demonstration that a system can be made more 
reliable than any of its parts by adding sufficient redundancy (Van 
Neumann, 1956). Public administrators, who typically prefer neat linear 
organization charts, however, have been slow to absorb the implications of 
Von Neumann's insight for the design and management of research 
institutions. 
A second and related reason is the nature of the information that must 
be brought to bear on the research-planning process. It has become 
increasingly obvious that effective research planning requires the close 
collaboration of natural and social scientists and of agronomists, 
engineers and planners. This is because research resource-allocation 
decisions involve either explicit or implicit judgment of two major 
questions. 
1. What are the possibilities of advancing knowledge or technology if 
resources are allocated to a particular commodity, problem or discipline? 
What is the probability of success if, for example, resources are allocated 
to the transfer, development or enhancement of nitrogen fixing capacity? 
Such guestions can only be answered with any degree of authority by 
researchers on the leading edge of their discipline or of the problems 
being considered. Intuitive judgments of research administrators (even 
research administrators who formerly were scientists), planners and 
economists are rarely adequate to provide answers. 
, 
2. mtwillbe or the new technolouv to 
If efforts to develop nitrogen-fixing capacity in maize, for example, 
are successful, how will the capacity to provide an efficient source of 
plant nutrition compare with the economic and environmental costs of 
other forms of nitrogen fertilizer? Answers to such questions require the 
use of formal economic and social analysis, not intuition. Indeed, 
intuitive insights of research scientists and administrators are no more 
reliable in answering questions like the two posed here than the intuitive 
insights of research planners in evaluating scientific and technical * 
potential. 
Many arguments about priorities in the allocation of research 
resources founder on the failure of participants to clearly recognize the 
distinction between the two preceding questions and the differences 'in 
expertise and judgement that must be brought to bear in seeking responses 
to them. If the answers are to be adequately reflected in the allocation 
of research resources, a continuing dialogue is required among the people 
responsible for setting research policy, making plans and carrying out the 
work. It should be regarded as a strength, rather than a deficiency, of 
the CGIAR system that individual Centers have, after careful consdieration, 
been able to reject what they regarded as inappropriate recommendations by 
EPRs and EMRs (see Appendix 5). 
The appropriate performance test of decentralized responsibility in a 
research system is scientific productivity, successful new product 
development and high private or social rates of return. The recent impact 
study suggests that most CGIAR centers are meeting these tests admirably 
(Anderson, 1985). 
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3.0 Research Policy, Planning and Evaluation 
It has been repeatedly documented that agricultural research is one of 
the more productive investments available to both developed and developing 
nations (Anderson, 1985, pp 12-14; Ruttan, 1982, pp. 241-249). Great 
variation is found, however, in the estimated rates of return of national 
agricultural research systems, research centers, institutes and stations, 
and commodity research proqrans. 
The sources of this variation are not well understood. Obviously, 
part of this variation is due to factors external to the agricultural . 
research institutions. Aqroclimatic environments range in hospitality to 
different agricultural activities. Variability in genetic resource 
endowments differ greatly among plant and animal species. Advances in the 
biological, physical and social sciences occur unevenly across the several 
science disciplines. The economic and social environments that affect 
public and private support for agricultural research and the incentives to 
adopt technology vary among countries and regions. Furthermore, 
differences in research systems are an important source of variation in the 
productivity of the human and physical resources devoted to agricultural 
research. 
Over the last several decades a modest amount of research-based 
literature on the criteria for efficient research resource allocation has 
been published (Ruttan, 1982, pp 262-297). Much less attention has been 
given to the problems of organizing and managing aqricultural research 
institutions and to monitoring the performance of agricultural research 
programs. The newest CGIAR Center, the International Service for National 
Agricultural Research (ISNAR), is just beginning to generate a body of 
information on research organization and management. 
Research management and the monitoring of research performance tend to 
be guided more by rule of thumb, personal insight and idiosyncrasy than by 
firmly established and effective principles. Site reviews offer a standard 
approach to the short run monitoring of research performance. But the 
literature on the research-review processes sparse; it tends to consist, 
with few exceptions, of mimeographed materials for briefinq review panels 
on their responsibilities (Anderson, 1976; Ronninqen, 1979; Ruttan, 1982, 
pp 147-159) rather than a solid body of tested knowledqe. 
The Consultative Group on International Aqricultural Research (CGIAR) 
has been particularly sensitive to the problem of performance monitorinq. 
The donors to the CGIAR system consist of national governments, development 
banks and private foundations; they provide the system with its current 
total budget of almost $200 million. The donor community is strongly 
concerned with assuring its constituency or principals that the resources 
devoted to the international agricultural research system are being used 
effectively. 
The link between research policy, planning and evaluation is an 
intimate one. Within the CGIAR system, research policy is the joint 
responsibility of the Consultative Group and its Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC). The recent TAC Review of CGIAR Priorities and Future 
Strategies , (CGIAR, August, 1985) and the Bellaqio report on "Future 
Strategies for the CGIAR" (CGIAR, February, 1986) are efforts to formulate 
long range CGIAR policy. Clearly, the objectives of research policy have 
been widened substantially since CGIAR was orqanized in 1971. Initially 
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policy statements emphasized the need to expand food-crop production; 
over time, issues such as nutrition, employment generation, environmental 
impact, income generation, and income distribution have been given greater 
weight. 
Research planning often generates great tension among research 
managers and scientists. This tension frequently results from the 
uncertainty about the responsibility for and the outcome of the planning 
process. Within the CGIAR system, responsibility for research planning has 
rested with the Center Boards, management and staff. It cannot be 
emphasized too strongly that research planning is dependent on research 
policy. If explicit policy guides are not available they will remain 
implicit in the planning process. This concern is reflected in the 
importance that the TAC and the CGIAR have given to the development of 
explicit long range plans by the individual Centers. 
The effective monitoring of research or an effective review process 
clearly presumes the existence of an effective research policy and planning 
processes. In the absence of a clear understanding of the policies that 
guide a research system and of the objectives and plans that guide the 
research activities of individual Centers, a review team is analogous to a 
pilot trying to steer a ship without a map, compass or rudder. This does 
not mean that reviews should take either policy or planning as givens. 
Research programs' deficiencies often reflect inappropriate policies or 
plans. 
a 
4.0 Reviewing the IARCs 
Since its organization in 1971 the CGIAR, through its Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC), has instituted a comprehensive review process. 
It includes (a) reviews of Center programs and budgets, (b) external 
program reviews, (c) external management reviews, (d) review of system 
priorities, (e) activity (or Stripe) reviews, and (f) system reviews (see 
Table I and Appendix 5.0). 
The Centers are highly diverse, not only in commodity focus but, also, 
in the source of scientific resources: the location of staff posted 
outside a Center's host country; the emphasis on strategic research, 
* 
applied research and training; the geographic scope; the extent and type of 
their training activities; and the reliance on core and special project 
funding. 
The focus of the TAC. review activities has shifted over time. 
Initially, TAC focused on global agricultural research strategy and gave 
attention to assessing global agricultural research needs, setting 
priorities for the establishment of new International Agricultural Research 
Centers (IARCs), locating the Centers appropriately, and determining the 
mandates of new Centers. When this phase of CGIAR activity came to a 
close, the TAC directed its attention to operational issues. In 1976 it 
initiated a series of External Program Reviews (EPRs) that were designed to 
assess the quality of a Center's research effort and performance in 
addition to the impact of its research activities. 
The need for a system of External Management Reviews (EMR) was 
stressed in the 1981 report of the second system review (Arnold report; 
CGIAR 1982). In 1983 the EPRs were complemented by a series of EMRs that 
were organized by the CGIAR secretariat.. The EMRs typically have been 
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carried out concurrently with the EPRs. EMRs have now been completed at 
all Centers except IRRI and CYMMYT. 
The value of the EPRs and EMRs to the donors to the CGIAR system and 
to the Center Boards and management is widely recognized. The major 
qualification to this generalization is that the program reviews were, at 
times, not so sensitive to managerial deficiencies as, in retrospect, they 
might have been. This defect seems to have been remedied by the initiation 
of the EMRs. 
The system review completed in 1977 (McCalla report; CGIAR, 1977) 
recommended that the quinquennial reviews be "concerned with three 
irincipal tasks: (1) to evaluate the scientific quality of the current 
programs, (2) to comment,on the scope and balance of current programs, and 
(3) to evaluate future plans including the explicit review of center 
proposals to continue projects of long standing " (p 97). 
In the second system review (Arnold report), the proposal was made 
that in addition to the annual external financial audits the review 
procedures in the CGIAR system should be comprised of five elements: 
(i) Internal Reviews of the Institutions, commissioned 
by the Boards of Trustees; 
(ii) Management Reviews of the Institutions, commissioned 
by the CGIAR Secretariat: 
(iii) Commodity and Activity Reviews of the system, 
commissioned by TAC; 
(iv) External Reviews of the Institutions commissioned by TAC, and 
(v) Reviews of the system, commissioned by the CGIAR. 
The second system review (Arnold Report) also noted that a number of 
donors conducted individual reviews. The report recommended that "in order 
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not to present the Institutions with an unreasonable burden of reviews, 
donor agencies should refrain from conducting their own reviews that simply 
duplicate the agreed mechanisms of the system" (p. 81). This 
recommendation has been followed by only a few donors. Indeed, a further 
proliferation of individual donor reviews has occurred since 1982. 
Now there is a broad concensus, both inside and outside the CGIAR 
system, that the system's research performance has more than met the 
expectations of its founders. 
review the recently completed 
Anyone who is willing to take the time to 
impact study, International Agricultural 
Research Centers: Achievements and Potential (Anderson, 1985) cannot avoid 
being impressed by the accomplishments of even the new Centers. Most of 
the Centers in the CGIAR system clearly are now reachina a level of 
maturity that should lead to considerable confidence about both their 
research and managerial capacity, although' all the Centers have not 
achieved comparable levels of capacity and productivity. 
It is apparent, nevertheless, that the system is entering a period 
when CGIAR must again call on its TAC for more frequent advice about the 
strategic issues that the global agricultural research system faces. This 
impression comes across rather clearly from the recently completed TAC 
Review of CGIAR Priorities and Future Strategies (CGIAR/TAC, August 1985) 
and the subsequent discussion at the November 1985 Centers Week, at the 
January 1986 Bellagio meetinq, the March 1986 TAC meeting, and the May 1986 
Group meetings in Ottawa. 
The TAC should aqain play a more active role in assessinq a series of 
global issues that should include (a) the capacity of public and private 
and national and international agricultural commodity-oriented research 
programs to meet national and global food and fiber needs; (b) the demands 
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that will be placgd on production factors and resource inputs (water, plant 
nutrients, soils, atmospheric quality and others); (c) the need for 
research to enhance the capacity of the production factors to sustain 
growth in agricultural production; and (cl) the research policy issues 
that will confront the global system as it continues to develop. The 
policy issues include (i) the enhancement, management and terms of access 
to genetic resources: (ii) the funding of national and international 
agricultural research; (iii) the growth of agricultural output and the 
productivity of agricultural. research; (iv) the interactions among national 
commodity price, trade and research policies; and (VI systems to 
strengthen and collaborate with the weaker components of the global system. 
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5.0 Recommendations 
The perspective outlined above has a number of implications for the 
objectives, frequency and organization of the reviews conducted by CGIAR 
and individual donors. The recommendations in this section are directed to 
the conduct of such reviews. 
ter EPRs shQuld focus arimarilvwstratecricratherthanonnal 
issues 
The EPRs should evaluate the rationale of and the resource implications 
for each Center's long-run strategic plan. This means focusing on (a) the 
appropriateness of the specific research objectives that the Center has set 
for itself; (b) the schedule of anticipated research accomplishments; and (c) 
the staff, facility and financial resources required to achieve the proposed 
objectives. In order for the EPR to effectively focus' its attention on longer 
run strategic issues it may be desirable to schedule the tim ing of EPRs to 
conform to the Center's long-term planning efforts. 
The EPR also should give particular attention to the "fit" between the 
objectives set out in earlier long-run strategic plans and research 
accomplishments and impacts. In order to do so it will be necessary for the 
Centers to maintain an active program of technology assessment and impact 
studies. The linkage of successive reviews of program accomplishment and its 
effects does not presume not deviating from long-term strategic plan 
objectives. There should always be a relatively short feedback loop between 
research findings and research objectives. New evidence can be expected 
continuously to modify research objectives and research resource allocation. 
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Recommendation 2 
Zhe EPR reviewteamser adW.@te internal aro.cees are io 
the &tv of Center research staffs ad of t& 
arch proarams. 
Terms of reference for reviews should be developed to indicate clearly 
the priority to be given to each strategic issue. The EPR review team should 
attend less to evaluating the scientific quality of the research staff and the 
research program and more to making sure that the Center has in place the 
appropriate processes and procedures to assure staff quality and performance. 
These procedures should include effective internal review processes, external 
peer consultations, reviews and evaluations, and a program of seminars and 
symposia. Documentation of the results of such activities should be available 
to the EPR team. 
This recommendation reflects the fact that institute research has become 
more complex. Because it draws on a greater variety and depth of disciplinary 
capacities, a single review team no longer has the range of leading-edge 
disciplinary or professional capacities to adequately perform project and peer 
review functions. Disciplinary and project activity should be reviewed by 
individuals who are at the leading edges of their field of science or 
technology development. They usually will not be the same individuals who are 
best able to evaluate long-range strategies and priorities--to evaluate 
relevance rather than competence. The ideal EPR team should be composed of 
members who are capable of bringing scientific, technical, economic and 
institutional information together to assess Center and system priorities and 
strategies. 
The reaular EPR and EMR review cvcle should be extenaeafrom the orwnt 5-6 
vears to 8-10 year& 
An 8-10 year range should be made the upper limit for EPR and EMR review 
cycles given that the individual Centers with few exceptions have demonstrated 
substantial capacity for research planning and management. Nevertheless, in 
some situations EPRs and/or EMRs may be appropriate on an interim basis or in 
shorter cycles. 
The review schedule not only should be lengthened but also made more 
flexible. The most appropriate time to schedule EPR and EMR reviews is 
when a Center is engaged in a long term planning effort. At this time, 
dialogue with EPR and EMR review teams could be particularly valuable to 
Center management. The review teams would be able to draw on those 'members of 
the Center staff who are thinking about the longer term strategic issues. 
Another appropriate time for an interim review would be 6-12 months after a 
new director-general has assumed office and undertaken intensive review and 
planning activities. Dialogue with an external panel that is experienced in 
research management and strategy could be highly complementary to a new 
director-general's internal review. 
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tion 4 
s . I I provrslon shqyld be made for interim EPR and F,MR reviews when lndlcmrs of 
. I 
~nadeauateresearche~deflclencles, or ldck of Ro-4 m 
A number of mechanisms can be relied on by TAC and the CGIAR to trigger 
the need for an interim EPR or EMR review or a special consultation with the 
TAC or CGIAR Secretariat. The TAC-Center liaison representative, in many 
instances, is the logical person to urge an interim review. A Center Board 
may find it useful to request a review to make additional professional 
capacities available on an institute management or operational issue. 
Sometimes, a Center management may feel that deficiencies in E3oard policy 
direction require a review. Both the EPRs and EMRs should be requested to 
make specific recommendations regarding the need and timing of interim reviews 
or follow-up missions. In the event of serious program or management problems 
or deficiencies a follow-up consultation or review may be high:Ly desirable 
within six months or a year following an external review. When serious 
problems have been identified it should not be necessary for a Center to wait 
until an EPR or EMR has been fully considered by TAC and CGIAR to initiate 
the necessary monitoring of the review recommendations. 
The recommendations for management and program reform in the EPR and EMR 
reports are often diffuse. The oral reports to Center boards and management 
in contrast, tend to be more specific and direct. Some of the more recent 
review reports tend to be more specific about reform priorities--to specify 
which changes are regarded as absolutely essential to the viability of the 
Center. This trend should be reinforced. Assistance agency staff members 
frequently experience considerable difficulty in drawing appropriate 
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implications from review documents if they lack personal knowledge of the 
institute under review. 
The Center EMRs should assess the effectiveness of the Center Board ~2 
I t 3rustees in Drov1h.m policy dkection and in assllring that the Centers are 
tv and relevm 
The first directors and program leaders of the Centers that were 
initially established by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and by the CGIAR 
were powerful research entrepreneurs. Most had the capacity to energize 
Center staff and to provide policy guidance for Center Boards. With the 
expansion in the individual Centers --by several multiples in some cases--over 
the last two decades leadership has tended to. become less collegial and more 
bureaucratic. 
Progress made by the Centers in technology development and the growth 
in capacity experienced by national research institutions should lead to 
change in the Centers' mandates and priorities. The need for greater 
involvement by Center Boards in the development of research policy and in the 
monitoring of research performance has become increasingly apparent. The need 
for Center Boards to play a stronger role is apparent from a'number of EMR 
reports and discussions with EMR team leaders. 
It will be necessary in the future to give more consideration to the 
capacity of Center Board members to think strategically about Center research 
policy and, when necessary, to act more decisively in initiating changes in 
Center programs and management. The expanding role of agricultural research 
in the private sector in many developing countries implies a need for 
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representation from private sector research on Center Boards. A stronger 
Board role in the development of Center strategies and policies should not,' 
however, be allowed to erode the appropriate distinctions between Board and 
management functions. 
i-ion 6 
I I I 2he r-wnsa.h.ktv for EPRs should 
Qe with the CGM, 
The institution of the EMRs has been an important contribution to the 
capacity of the CGIAR to monitor the performances of Centers. Program 
deficiencies identified in an EPR often can be traced to weaknesses in 
managerial practices and methods. There are, however, problems with the 
present system. Despite the advantage of conducting EMRs and EPRs 
simultaneously, there have been cases of inadequate dialogue between the EMR 
and EPR teams. In some cases team perceptions of responsibility (EPR to TAC 
and EMR to CGIAR) have created barriers to team communication and 
cooperation. 
There is some sentiment among donors that these difficulties could be 
resolved by combining the EPRs and EMRs and reporting the combined team 
reviews to the TAC. My recommendation is to continue the two reviews as 
separate activities but to conduct them simultaneously. The results of the 
two reviews should be reported jointly to the Center's management and Board 
and to the TAC. 
As of yet the Centers have not established internal management review 
processes. One of the purposes of a second round of EMRs should be to help 
establish such internal review processes. As internal capacity is 
strengthened the need for detailed examination of management and 
administrative matters by external' panels would be reduced. When a second 
round of EMRs has been completed, it would be useful to examine again whether 
the EMR process has been sufficiently institutionalized to effectively review 
both program and management by a single review team. 
The TAC should give substantial attention to EMR as Well as EPR 
findings. The criteria for the evaluation of management performance and style 
must be found in the accomplishments of the research program; consistency 
with generally recognized management principles is an inadequate criterion. 
The initiation of new program activities and the redirection of existing 
programs often pose difficult managerial and administrative problems. In its 
recommendations to the CGIAR the TAC should consider the recommendations of 
both the EPR and EMR reports. Greater attention to strategic and managerial 
concerns in the review process should be taken-into consideration in making 
appointments to the TAC. 
dation 7 
The staffinu and time regyired for reu cvcle and interim EPR and EMR. 
reviews should be adlusted to reflect the Drecedina review oblectives. 
The EPR reviews should be staffed by individuals who are chosen for 
research strategy and policy rather than primarily for disciplinary capacity. 
The teams should be smaller and the time devoted to the reviews should be 
reduced. The four to six weeks now required for participation on an EMR 
represents an obstacle to participation by many active scientists and research 
administrators. 
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A TAC member always should be on an EPR team so the information and 
experience of the team can be directly accessible to the TAC. A written 
report never can be more than a shadow of what a review team has learned. 
The BMR should always include an experienced international research 
administrator in addition to individuals who are trained or experienced in 
the technical aspects of management. Greater priority should be given to 
including representation from the private sector agricultural research 
community on both EPR and EMR teams although the private sector 
participation may sometimes impose higher costs than public sector 
participation. Consideration should be given to commissioning special 
background or policy studies in those areas where the necessary scientific 
or professional capacities are not readily accessible to or are too 
specialized for an EPR or,EMR team. 
Center Boards and management should take greater responsibility for 
commissioning their own special studies in the area of management methods 
and practice. A few such studies have been commissioned in the past, 
(e.g., in the area of labor relations) in connection with EMRs. If the 
Centers themselves were to take greater responsibility for such studies 
and/or consultations the effectiveness of the EMR process would be 
increased. 
The Group secretariat should consider strengthening its review 
capacity by adding a staff member who has had substantial responsiility for 
and is highly regarded in the area of research manaqement to assist in the 
organization and conduct of EMRs. Such a person might be recruited from 
former Center management staff members. 
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Fe-xmendation a 
C I I I should initiate an exoaded series of ulobal rearch oolicy and 
In the past TAC has conducted reviews of Farming Systems Research, 
Off-Center Activities, and Training (A 5.14-A 5.16). It also conducted a 
study of priorities and future strategies (CGIAR, February 1986). Over the 
next several years the TAC should initiate an expanded set of reviews and 
studies to resolve the major issues of policy and strategy that will be faced 
during the effort to complete the global agricultural research system. 
One set of studies or reviews should focus on system issues: issues that 
concern more than one CGIAR Center. A comprehensive look at global rice 
research needs, capacities and responsibilities is one example; another is a 
fresh assessment of CGIAR responsibilities and potential initiatives for a 
number of commodities, such as oil seeds, that do not fall within the mandate 
of any existing Center. Similar reviews also might be scheduled for other 
commodities (e.g. maize and wheat) that are included in the mandates of more 
than one Center. Other reviews might focus on an activity, resource or 
region. An example of a review with an activity focus might be the 
implications of recent advances in molecular genetics and genetic engineering 
for the organization and staffing of the IARCs and their relations with 
centers of basic research in developed countries. The implications of 
w 
groundwater contamination associated with more intensive farming systems for 
k 
Center research priorities is be an example of a review with a resource focus. 
A review that would combine a geographic and resource focus is the issue of 
research on soil management in the humid and semi-humid areas of Africa. 
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A second set of studies or reviews might deal with changes in the 
relations between the CGIAR system.and the environment in which it operates. 
The role that the C GIAR system should play in relation to the smaller national 
systems --systems that are unlikely ever to develop substantial capacity for 
advancing knowledge or even technology--is one example. The implications for 
Center priorities of the growth of technology development capacity in the 
private sector of developing countries will need to be carefully analyzed, and 
implications for system research priorities of economic growth and economic 
policy for the rates of growth (or decline) in commodity demand will need to 
be carefully examined. 
Such reviews or studies might be conducted in several ways. (a) The 
traditional way is that in which EPR, EMR and Stripe reviews have been 
conducted: A group of experts examine the relevant institutions and programs 
and pool their knowledge and experience to render an informed judgement. (5) 
A second method is to bring the expertise and leadership available within the 
CGIAR Centers together to try to resolve an issue of system priority or 
jurisdiction. The system clearly has much greater capacity now to draw on 
internal resources for such judgments than when the initial Centers were 
established and their mandates developed. (c) Another method is to commission 
independent studies of an issue or a problem to be carried out by an 
individual or a team with particularly relevant expertise. 
In my judgement much greater use should be made of expertise within the 
CGIAR system than has often been made in the past. The CGIAR now has much 
greater capacity than in the past to bring scientific and technical knowledge 
together with economic and institutional analysis in formulating its own 
priorities and strategies and to enhance its efforts to strengthen national 
research systems. This capacity needs to be strengthened. However, where 
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sensitive institutional relations are involved, either within the system or 
between the system and its environment, independent leadership and judgement 
from outside the system usually will be required. 
The next svstem review should focus on issues of svstem orgad7ation. 
. I mtrasv+em re;La+.lons and the r-+la+mns between the CGTAR and nonassocrated 
One objective of the effort should be to incorporate the international 
activities of the "nonassociated centers" with the CGIAR system. The CGIAR 
has not added any new centers since 1980. During the last decade and a half, 
however, there have emerged, outside the Group, a number of additional 
international research or coordinating centers that bear a loose relation to 
the CGIAR system (Table 2). Leadership in the establishment of these 
"nonassociated centers" was often taken by one or more of the CGIAR donor 
organizations. Indeed, these "centers" draw their financial support largely 
from the donors to the CGIAR system. Most participate or hold meetings with 
their donors or potential donors at the Spring and Fall Group meetings. The 
budgets for the "nonassociated centers" now run somewhat above $30 million per 
year. 
Numerous discussions have been held about the appropriate relation of 
the "nonassociated centers" to the Group (CGIAR, 1984). Among the objections 
raised have been the constraints on CGIAR funding; the potential burden on 
administrative capacity of the CGIAR and TAC; and the appropriate organization 
of factor-oriented research. There are several arguments favoring 
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incorporation of a number of the "nonassociated centers" into the Group. By 
and large they are performing research and network functions similar to Group 
sponsored Center activities and which fall within the scope of Group 
priorities. Like Group-sponsored Centers they have the advantage of 
decentralized decision making resulting from corporate autonomy but they lack 
the centralized oversight of the External Program and Management Reviews 
conducted by the TAC and the CGIAR. Many of the smaller donors have indicated 
that the "nonassociated centers" impose a greater administrative burden, 
relative to the size of the financial resources involved, than do the CGIAR 
Centers. 
I do not share the concern that has sometimes been expressed about the 
administrative burden carried by the CGIAR and TAC. In my judgement, the 
system has evolved an administrative and managerial structure that should be 
capable of providing administrative support and oversight for a system with a 
budget running' in the $1.0 billion rather than the $200 million range. 
Although it may be unrealistic to think of support for the system in this 
upper range over the next few years, by the early 199Os, as economic growth 
in the developed world accelerates and current agricultural surpluses erode, 
and as the CGIAR system completes its analysis of global priorities, it would 
not be unrealistic to think of the level of support in the $1.0 billion range. 
Effective internal program review processes are now in place at most of 
the CGIAR Centers (Appendix 4.0). Center staff regard the internal review 
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process as being'particularly effective in evaluating program quality. The 
EPRs and EMRs are regarded as effective in evaluating managerial effectiveness 
and Center strategies. Individual donor reviews are regarded as most 
effective in evaluating off-campus activities--perhaps because these 
activities are often funded by individual donors as restricted core or special 
project activities. 
It is clear that an effective internal program review process greatly 
facilitates the EPR process. In Recommendation 6 it was suggested that the 
next round of EMRs encourage the development of a greater capacity for Center 
organized managerial reviews and consultations. In Recommendations 1 and 2 it 
was suggested that the EPRs should draw more 'heavily on Center-organized 
program and peer reviews thus freeing the TAC to focus more heavily on longer 
range strategic issues in its EPR and other review activities. 
The system of Internal, Program, Management, Commodity, Activity, and 
System reviews conducted by the TAC and the CGIAR on behalf of the donors 
should be adequate to meet most donors' needs for evidence of accountability 
and performance. Individual donors should limit their review activities to 
the restricted core and special project activities for which they provide 
direct financial support. Centers and donors are urged, when project 
contracts are negotiated, to try to agree on procedures that balance the 
need for the assessment of accountability and performance against the costs, 
measured in terms of diversion of management and scientific effort. In many 
cases donors will find that the information provided by the EPRs, the EMRs 
and internal review documents will reduce the need for special project 
reviews. 
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6.0 Issues and Concerns 
A series of issues and concerns that bear on the organization anh 
focus of the CGIAR Center review processes are outlined in this section. 
These issues have been generated from interviews with donor representatives 
Center Boards and management, analyses of review documents, and a survey of 
institute scientific and administrative staff. The concerns discussed here 
have not been fully reflected in the recommendations presented in the 
preceding section. 
Impact of Reviews on Center Programs 
Donors have a strong impression that some Center reviews (FPRs and 
EMRs) have had only a limited effect on either the redirection of Center 
programs or the correction of Center managerial deficiencies. In some 
cases, for example, in the first WARDA review the team (of which I was a 
member) clearly was not sufficiently critical of Center program or 
management deficiences. In other cases criticism appears to have been 
muted because the review team generally supported the Center program. 
Criticism that may have been conveyed orally to Center management and 
Boards was not in the report to the TAC. In additional cases, Center 
Boards and management failed to respond to review team criticisms. In 
still other cases, such as the 1984 IITA review, the EMR team stressed its 
concerns about managerial style and process and about potential abuse of 
managerial authority in its oral report to the Board but muted the 
criticisms in its written report. 
Reqardless of the reasons, the oversight system that failed to achieve 
needed reforms of program and corrections of management deficiences at IITA 
and WARDA and some other Centers must be faulted. There is a widespread 
impression among donors that lack of frankness in EPR and EMR reports could 
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contribute to the'loss of review process credibility. Critics should keep in 
mind, however, that there are serious questions about how explicit the EMR and 
EPR teams should be about such matters. It is important that deficiencies be 
corrected without seriously disrupting ongoing Center programs or generating 
undue anxiety among Center staff. 
The impact of special projects on Center programs have elicited numerous 
expressions of concern. Donors often encourage and Centers often seek special 
projects in support of bilateral or multilateral donor programs. Although few 
people would argue that Center activities should be based on core funds, 
there have been many expressions of fear that a high ratio of special projects 
to core funds would distort or even weaken a Center's research effort. The 
1986 ISNAR EPR recommended that special project funding be limited to 35 
percent of the ISNAR core budget level.. In contrast, a paper presented at the 
Consultative Group Meeting in Ottawa (May 19-23, 1986) on "Broadening Support 
for International Agricultural Research" suggests that the IARCs should be 
more aggressive in seeking nonconventional sources of funding. 
In considering the form in which support is provided to the IARCs, donors 
should be concerned with the fact that special project activity does impose a 
heavier burden on research management than research budgeted under the core 
program. The response to our staff survey elicited numerous comments regarding 
deficiencies in the management of off-campus activities. EMR reviews should 
give special attention to the management of non-core and off-campus 
activities. . 
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There is broad agreement that as LDC national research systems become 
stronger the Centers should move their research focus more "upstream"--toward 
the basic end of the continuum that runs from adaptive to applied, strategic 
and basic research (CGIAR, Future Strategies, 1985a). The distribution of 
effort along the continuum ranges from a high share of total activity at the 
basic end in the case of ILRAD to primary emphasis on applied research at most 
centers. Access to basic research capacity in developed countries has been 
pursuedaggressively by CIP and some other Centers through colaborative 
arrangements with advanced research centers. 
Concern has been expressed that some Centers have neglected to maintain 
either the in-house capacity or build the colaborative relationships necessary 
to give their research staff access to relevant advances in theory and method. 
There is- some support for the idea that the Centers should acquire the 
capacity to act as bridges between the world's most advanced scientific 
institutions and the national research systems in the developing countries in 
transferring the new knowledge and research methodology to LDC national. 
research systems (CGIAR, We Strateaies. 1986). One aspect of a number of 
new emerging biological research techniques is that they promise to 
dramatically reduce the cost of technology development. Another aspect is 
that they may enable the solution of problems for which there is inadequate 
scientific knowledge or research methodology at present. 
If the recommendations to strengthen basic research are implemented, a 
significant change in staff composition at most of the CGIAR Centers is 
implied. To achieve access and serve as a bridge will require Centers to 
develop substantial capacity in frontier science and research methodology. 
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The ability to evaluate the significance of frontier theory and method implies 
the capacity to work at the same level. ' 
A second problem is that some areas of basic or fundamental research are 
of great relevance to tropical agricultural development but very little 
capacity is either available or likely to become available in the developing 
countries most concerned. It is unlikely that this problem will be resolved 
without expanding their capacity for basic research in those areas of science 
that are particularly relevant to the advance of applied research and 
technology development. 
es with Private Sector Research 
In the developed countries over the last several decades, the relation 
between public and private sector agricultural research has been undergoing 
rapid change. The private sector traditionally has played a dominant role in 
research leading to advances in mechanical and chemical technology for 
agriculture. It is now playing an increasingly important role in advancing 
biological technology. 
The last decade and a half has witnessed rapid growth in private sector 
agricultural research in developing countries, particularly in Latin America 
and Asia (Pray, 1985). The private sector is also emerging as a significant 
factor in technology development in a few African countries. 
As private sector research and technology development expands, it will be 
necessary for the TAC, the CGIAR Centers and the Associate Centers to consider 
such developments in establishing priorities for the CGIAR system. There is a 
strong impression, both within and without the CGIAR system, that the Centers 
are less than fully informed about the growth of private sector research and 
technology development in the countries in which they work and that the CGIAR 
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and TAC are even less fully informed. Few private sector scientists or 
research managers have been included on Center Boards or on EPR or EMR review 
teams. 
ure Role of the Technical Advlsorv Committee 
Substantial ambiguity surrounds the appropriate roles and 
responsibilities of the TAC, the TAC secretariat and the CGIAR secretariat. 
If the TAC is to give greater attention to major issues of system and global 
strategy, it will need to devote less attention to the details of the annual 
Center budget submissions. The introduction of a five year assured core 
budget "base" represents a major step in this direction (CGIAR, October 1986). 
If the TAC is to successfully engage itself in issues of system and global 
research strategy and policy, as suggested in Recommendation 8, it will need 
to acquire greater scientific capacity on the TAC secretariat staff. It was 
noted earlier in this study that the greater attention that must be given to 
strategic and managerial issues should be taken into consideration in making 
appointments to the TAC. 
The Stripe review process has provided the TAC with some very useful 
experience in conducting inter-Center reviews. The Study of Training in the 
CGIAR System - 1984 (See appendix 5) is generally regarded as an outstanding 
analysis of training accomplishments and needs. There are indications that 
the Centers have found the study useful and are individually adopting many of 
the study recommendations. The TAC commentary that accompanied the 
transmission of the training study to the CGIAR was, however, quite general. 
It did not make specific suggestions of how to implement its own 
recommendations and the recommendations of the review team. Nor did it 
suggest how the implementation of the recommendations should be monitored. 
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This caution may 'have been due, in part, to sensitivity about autonomy of 
decision making by the Center Boards and management. AS the TAC engages in an 
expanded series of system level strategic reviews it will be necessary to 
articulate the implications of such studies for action at the system and 
Center levels in a manner that have clear policy and management implications. 
I 5 I II Clarification of Prlorltles 
The EMR and EPR teams often have had great difficulty in specifying 
priorities. It is apparent from the review documents. that have been reviewed 
in Appendix 5.0 that the recommendations sometimes reflect negotiated rather 
than adequately reasoned positions. It is difficult for a review team to 
avoid identifying important new initiatives, and it is even more difficult for 
a review team to recommend that major existing activities be discontinued. 
In order to force the EPR teams to give more rigorous attention to 
priorities, a number of donors have suggested that all program recommendations 
assume no budget growth. An alternative is to prepare two 
recommendations-- one that assumes zero budget growth and a second that assumes 
a growth of a specified amount, such as 10 per cent. 
TAC should consider carrying out an approach that would force review 
teams to consider more rigorously the trade-offs between program expansion and 
contraction. A first step might be to make a presentation at a subsequent TAC 
meeting on the effectiveness of methodologies used in other organizations. 
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with the Condllct of.Reviews 
A number of additional concerns have been expressed by donor officials, 
Board members, and Center management and staff about the conduct of EPRs and 
EMRs (See Appendix 4.1 and 4.2 for staff perspectives). These concerns, even 
though in some cases they clearly are not relevant for all reviews, are listed 
here. 
(1) Some reviews have not been sufficiently open. In some cases staff 
members have been urged to avoid discussion of controversial issues. 
Occasionally it has been difficult for review team members to meet 
individually with known dissidents. (2) Review team chairmen and members are 
drawn too often from the "old boy" network of former TAC members, Center 
chairpersons, director generals, and Board members. Particular emphasis must 
be given in the formation of review teams to balancing individuals who are 
knowledgeable about the CGIAR system and those in the CGIAR system who are 
characterized by independent judgement.or even a critical perspective. (31 
The EPR and EMR reports are not sufficiently critical. By "sanitizing" the 
reports they lose credibility. (4) The terms of reference for reviews are 
often too diffuse. Terms of reference should clearly identify priority 
concerns. Now that two rounds of EPRs and one round of EMRs have been 
substantially completed it should be possible for future reviews to focus more 
directly on issues that are critical to the future of the individual Centers 
and of the CGIAR system. 
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34 
Table 3.1 COSTS OF TAC COMXISSIONED REVIEWS 
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11 Excluding CGIAR Secretariat Observer and Panel Secretary 
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z/ Estimated costs 
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87 7,875 15,750 16,479 32,229 
152 11,400 34,200 31,646 65,846 
'/ Excludes CGIAR secretariat observer 
2/ Excludes preparation of background papers for the review. 
These costs amounted to $1,920 for ICRISAT and $9,895 for ILCA. 
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Consultations and Meetings 
Oct. 24-25 Washington, D.C. 
Nov. 2 Rome, Italy 
Mar. 19-22 Rome, Italy 
Mar 24 The Hague 
The Netherlands 
Purpose 
Meeting with Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC) and Center Directors 
and Center Board Chairs to discuss 
study plan and terms of reference. 
Meeting with Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Cons. A. Balboni), University 
(G.T. Segarascia - Mugnozza, President 
University of Tuscia; Prof. Luigi Monti 
Faculty of Agriculture, University of 
Naples) and National Research Coun- 
cil (Prof. Enrico Porceddu) represent- 
, tatives to discuss Italian donor per- 
spective on study. 
Meeting with TAC and Center Board 
Chairmen to discuss detailed study 
plan. Meetings with individual Board 
Chairs to obtain information on 
Board roles and perspectives on 
review process. 
Meeting with Netherland government 
representatives (a) Ir W. van Vuune, 
Senior Research Officer/Coordinator 
International Cooporation Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries(b) 
Ir Thomas J. Wassels, Research and 
Technology Program DPO/OT 
Directorate General for International 
Cooperation Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
(c) Dr. T. M. Warner, Consultant 
April 2 Washington, D.C. Meeting with CGIAR Staff 
Curtis Farrar, Doreen Calvo, Peter 
Greeninq, Selcuk Ozgediz, Donald 
Plucknett, Ravi Tadvalkar 
April 8 Washington, D.C. Meeting with John A. Pino, Agriculture 
and Forestry Development Division, 
Interamerican Development Bank 
April 9 Washinqton, D.C. Meeting with U.S. Aqency for 
International Development: 
Representatives Anson Bertrand, Rob 
Bertran, Dana Dalrymple (Office of 
Agriculture, Bureau for Science and 
Technology), Edward Rice (Bureau for 
Asia & Near East), Dwight Steen (Bureau 
for Latin America), Kenneth Prussner 
(Bureau for Africa), Thomas Lederer 
(Bureau for Program and Policy), Harvey 
Hortik (Agricultural Production 
Division, Bureau for Science and 
Technology), Donald Woodley (Deputy 
Director for Food and'Agriculture, 
Bureau for Science and Technology1 
April 22 Minneapolis, MN 
May 19-23 Ottawa, 
Canada 
May 19 Ottawa, Meeting with Dr. Paul Egger, Swiss 
Canada Development Cooperation Agency. 
Meetinq with Luis Crouch, Member of 
Board of Directors, Instituto Superior 
de Agricultura, Santiago, Dominican 
Republic. Member of ISNAR and IITA 
Boards and chairman, IITA and ICRISAT 
EMRs 
Participant, 1986 Consultative Group 
Meetinq 
May 20 Ottawa, Meeting with Emmanuel Salmon-Legagneur, 
Canada Ministry of Research and technology; 
May 21 Ottawa, 
Canada 
May 22 Ottawa, 
GUY Tim 1 1 e.c..I” Tntarminictavi~l “alru.zyu, -C11CtiLII,&I..LUC-~-..-.- 
Commission for International Research; 
Max Rives, CGIAR Secretariat (formerly 
Institut de la Recherche Aqronomique), 
France. 
Meeting with Timothy Rothermel, United 
Nations Development Program, New York. 
Meeting with Takashi Ueda, Economic 
Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreiqn 
Affairs, Japan; Kenzo Hemmi, Board 
Chairman, International Rice Research 
Institute. 
Meeting with Gregg Spendjian, Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA); 
Hubert G. Zandstra and Geoffrey Hawtin, 
International Development Research 
Center (IDRC), Canada 
Meeting with Rodney C. Hills and R.C. 
Manning, Australian Development 
Assistance Bureau 
Meeting with Theis Truelson, Royal 
Danish Embassy, Ottawa; Harald Hostmark, 
Norwegian Ministry of Development 
Cooperation; Arnos Njos, Agricultural 
University of Norway; Bo M.I. Bengtsson, 
Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation 
with Developing Countries. 
Meetinq with J.C. Davies and A.E. Ray, 
Overseas Development Administration, 
U.K. 
Meeting with L.H.J. Ochtman, TAC 
Secretariat; Robert Herdt, Rockefeller 
Foundation (formerly CGIAR Secretariat.); 
Laurence Stifel, International Institute 











June 13 Frankfurt, 
Germany 
June 23-26 Cali, 
Colombia 
Meeting with William T, Mashler, 
Board Member, International 
Research Institute for Semi-Arid 
Tropics (formerly with the UNDP). 
Meeting with Abbas Kesseba, Inter- 
national Fund for Agricultural Devel- 
opment (IFAD). 
Meeting with Robert Herdt, 
Rockefeller Foundation (formerly CGIAR 
Secretariat). 
Meeting with E. Clemens, 
Jurgen Friedrichsen, Karl Heinz 
Wopers, Martin Bilio, German Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ); 
Wilbert Himmighofen, Ministry for 
Nutrition, Agriculture and Forestry: 
Gerhard Wenzel, Federal Biological 
Research Center, Institute for Genetic 
Resistance; Wolfgange Achtnich, 
University of Gottingen; Jurgen 
Kranz, University of Giessen; Ulrich V. 
Poschinger-Camphausen, German 
Council for Tropical and Subtropical 
Research. 
Meeting with Klaus J. Lampe and Peter 
Muller, German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) 
Meetings with CGIAR Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC) and CGIAR 
Center Director-Generals to present 
and discuss progress on Review 
Process Study. 
4 
October 30 Washington, D.C. Meeting with TAC, Center Director 
-31 . Generals, and Center Chairpersons to 
present and discuss draft findings 
and recommendations. 
In addition to the interviews listed above written comments on the 
September 15, 1986 draft report have been received from a number of 
individuals who have participated or chaired Center reviews. 
October 12, 1986 W. F. Raymond 
United Kingdom 
October 15, 1986 Omond M. Solandt 
Ontario, Canada 
October 15, 1986 Lowell Hardin 
Purdue University 
November 5, 1986 Luis B. Crouch 
Dominican Republic 
November 10, 1986 M. J. Hirst 
United Kingdom 
November 21, 1986 N. W. Simmonds . 
Edinburgh School of Agriculture 
United Kingdom 
November 11, 1986 
November 28, 1986 
November 28, 1986 
December 8, 1986 
December 8, 1986 
. 
December 11, 1986 
Kenzo Hemmi 
University of Tokyo 
Japan 
J. C. ten Houtan 
Waganingen, Netherlands 




Institut de Medecine Tropicale 
"Prince Leopold", Belgium 
Carl Thomsen 
Economic Institute, Veterinary and 
Agricultural University 
Denmark 
Frederick E. Hutchinson 
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CGIAR PLANNING, EVALUATION, ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Long Range Planning and Evaluation 
Every effort should be made to retain the present informs1 
character of the CGIAR and the activities it supports. These charscter- 
istics include: the consultative nature of the CGIAR, membership mainly 
comprised of donors, the right of each donor to designate how its contri- 
bution is to be used, the support of independent research centers and 
related activities, and minimum bureaucratic structure. 
TAC should continue to play a major role in providing the CGIAR 
with advice about future needs as well as evaluating ongoing activities. 
TAC's responsibility should include quinquennial reviews, across center 
analysis of particular topics {stripe analysis), and periodic reassess- 
ment of CGIAR priorities. 
We also conclude that the CGIAR is a highly dynamic entity. The 
centers and related activities supported by the CGIAR will continue to 
mature, national research programs will‘increase their own capacities and 
research needs will change. Therefore, the program and procedures of the 
CGIAR should be reviewed frequently. 
Because of the Jynamic nature of the CGIAR, we have made epeci- 
fit recommendations only Eor the next three to five years. Beyond that 
we present possible criteria to use in making future Judgments and recom- 
mend a mechanism for periodic evaluation. 
The following recommendations provide additional specific , 
mechanisms needed for long range planning and evaluation of the CGIAR. 
Recommendation 14 : We recommend that the CGLb? reuhtd ita over& pro- 
gram and operation every three to five years. Ths CGIAR shouti uppoint 
an ad hoc comnittee to oonduot a review of the substantive program of the 
CGIAR as well a8 review tk?ae poZe8, procedures, and mmgement mech- 
anisms whioh require at"tention. TAC ahodd provide a major input inti 
tfris tong term fort&& look at -the substantive program. 
Recommendation 15 : We reccmmerd continuation of the TAC quinquenntil 
review8 for evaZuation of scientific quaZity, scope, ami balance of cur- 
rent programa, ad to evahate future plana, includGag expticit rev&m 
of center proposaZ8 to continue project8 of tong standing. We a280 
recomnend that the TAC give greater er@zsis to periodic, am088 center 
amzzy8i8 of pmticutar t&C8 is&Pipe anaZysis) (PP. x, xi). 
Evaluation and Long-Range Planning 
The CGIAR has relied on TAC for advice on both the future 
directioar of the CGTAR md for evaluation of ongoing activities. To 
date, TAC ha! dealt predominantly with proposed initiatives in a sequen- . 
tial faahion, however, always within the context of the priorities as 
stated in the TAC priorities paper. Evaluation of ongoing programs has 
begun recently through the initiation of quinquennial reviewe. The basic 
@sue $8 &ether these procedures are sufficient to maintain COnKinuing 
surveillance of future needs and current activitier in an integrated fashion 
within the broader contaxt of food needs. 
If the conclusions of this review about the number and size 
of centera are accepted, then in the future the balance of CGIAR actiy- 
itfee will shift more toward maintenance of already approved activities. 
Thue a mechanism which provides for a periodic overview of the family 
of CGIAR centers, can identify new needs, monitor gaps and overlaps in 
CGIAP activities, can establish fiscal requirements and availabilitiee, . 
and assign priorities wlthin and between programs ie very important. 
Cur analyris ie that, to date, TAC has done a good job in its asuigned 
taskn and we see no reason why TAC cannot continue to provide einilar 
services to the CGIAR. 
It may, however, be appropriate to spell out in more detail 
the mechanisms TAC might use to maintain an overview of the activities 
of the CGIAR family in the broader contwt of food research needs. 
These mechanisms are: (1) r&view of proposed inttiativee, (2) quin- 
quennial. reviews, (3) “strlpc” analysis, (4) review of indicative plans 
of centers, (5) periodic priurity reviews, (6) continuing interaction 
with center programs. 
TAC should continue to play the major role in reviewing pro- 
posed initiatives. These wuld include completely new proposals that 
could involve establishrng new research activities ami reviews of new 
or large initiatives within existing center programs. All new cr large 
activities being proposed by centers, regardless of the source of funds, 
should be reviewed by TAC regarding their appropriateness to the center 
mandate, implications for administration, and implications for future 
commitment of CGIAR resources. 
The quinquennial reviews initiated this past year show much 
promise. With experience it may be appropriate to sharpen the deflni- 
tlon of the purpose of the revfews. The revlewcl should be concerned with 
three principal tasks: (1) to evaluate the scientific quality of current 
programs, (2) to comment on the scope and balance of current programs, 
and (3) to evaluate future plans including the explicit review of center 
proposals to continue projects of long standing. Clearly, the onus 
should be on centers to justify continuance, This latter function of 
reviewing future plans is particularly important for TAC and the CGZAR. 
The quinquennial reviews should be planned well in advance, giving the 
TAC time to establish a high quality review committee which can be 
briefed well in advance and allow centers time to carefully develop 
their long-range future plane. The re’riewe should be analytic and prob- 
ing in their treatment of programs , particularly regarding the relative 
distribution of efforts within center programs. A concise summary of 
the report should be prepared for the CGIAR. To date, reviews have 
tended to focus on current programs and generally have recommended more 
of everything. In addition to these main areas of investigation, common 
to all centefe, specific questions for review could be posed by TAC, the 
CGIAR, or individual donors. 
TAC should continue periodic acroee-center analysis of par- 
ticular internal program components such as training, documentation, 
cropping systems research, etc. These “stripe” analyses would be useful 
to TAC and the CGIAR In maintaining an overview of the system and also 
would provide a useful mechanism for centers to compare their dieferent 
program components and learn from each other. They are termed analyses 
rather than reviews because we would not like to see .them become mecha- 
nisms that encourage conformity. 
In the next Eizctfoar,.a longer term budget cycle is proposed 
including two-year (biermial;’ budgets and an additional two-year indic- 
ative or perspective program plan, TAC’s role would be to review the 
indicative plans in the coatsxt of budget proposals, modify them if 
necessary after diecueslon with the centers and reco;;rmend to the CGIAR 
for approval the center’s budgetary growth path. Each center would 
develop its next biennial buGget within that plan. 
Using the above preycedures, TAC in time could be in an excel- 
lent position to reassess th rf program of the CGIAR periodically (every 
five years) and to recommend priorities for the future. 
Finally, TAC ceeds to have members who are k.nowladgeabXe 
about particular center programs. one possible approach TAC my want 
to consider would be if eubeete of TAG nmmberr were rprcifically reapon- 
eible fbt knowing about gartiaulrr Centats, Xf TAC member A wete 
aarigned aprcific rerponrlbilitlee FOP center8 I, 3 end 5; 8 for centere 
1, 2 and 41 etc., then three umbera of TAC would be particularly frmil- 
iar with three cmtere, but no two member8 would have cemum trrpotiai- 
hilitirr for mote ChAn one tantet. TAC members oouln devolop thir 
knanled&e by attmding in-home program development reviewr and poeribly 
participating in Quinquennial rrvietie, 
The redefinition of TAC’ri role apparently implies an expanded 
set of raep~aeibifitles. HotieVet, TAG i6 already involved in ptiofitiea, 
quinquenniti ?miewe, l tripe analysie,tevicwe of propo8ed initiatives, 
and reviewe of center budgets, With effective rtaff work f ram more 
closely coordinated‘aecretarlate, we believe the task is manageable, 
Tn addition to reviews undertaken by the TAC, there it3 need 
for periodic review of the overall CGIAR program arid of the mechanisms 
and management of the CGIAR by the CGIAR itself. The current ap;xoach 
of constituting a review committee tithin the CGIAR has merit. A elmi- 
lar review ehould be conducted within three to five year intervals. 
The review committee could have the option of commissioning a study 
team or teems, if it saw the need. TAC’e recooPmendatione on future pro- 
gram priorities would be a major input into that review. 
donclurion. We conclude that TAC with an appropriate 
redefinition of its role should provide the mechanism’ 
for continuing review of ongoing programs in the con- 
tut of changing broader needs. TAC should be asked 
periodically (every five years) to produce an updated 
btoad’program perspective for the CGIAR. This reviev 
ar a part of a quinquennial review of the CGIAR itself 
would provide adequate mechanisms for long-range plan- 
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Review Procedures 
7.29 In the absence of strong centralized management, the System relies 
heavily on a range of review procedures, not only to monitor the quality of 
the work but also to test its relevance and to help in the formulation of 
policy. Valuable contributions to the review process are made by the internal 
reviews of the Institutions mounted by the Boards of Trustees. Nonetheless 
the need for independent review was recognized by the Group from the outset in 
the creation of its Technical Advisory Committee. Although TM is part of the 
System, it Is independent In the sense that It is not subject to the direct 
influence of the donors or of the beneficiary countries. 
7.30 External reviews have traditiotially been of two types: reviews 
of the Institutions commissioned by TAC, and reviews of the ~~cnmmissioned 
by the CGIAR. In addition, some aonors conduct their own external reviews. 
7.31 As the Institutions have evolved towards more integrated activities, 
the requirements for external review have changed and are likely to continue 
to change in the future. These changing requirements were recognized by the 
1977 Review Committee in the proposal to establish “Stripe Analyses”. It was 
suggested that these analyses would be primarily for providing information and 
would be useful “in maintaining an overview of the System and also would 
provide a useful mechanism for Centres to compare their different programme 
components and learn from each other”. In our opinion, the concept of Stripe 
Analyses should be extended to include a review of the work of the System on a 
major commodity or activity. Accordingly, we suggest that the term “Stripe 
hnalpsis” should be discontinued aud replaced by “Commodity Review” or “Activity 
Review”, as appropriate. 
7.32 According to some donors, the greatest deficiency in the review 
process is the need for more penetrating reviews of the administration and 
management of the Institutions, particularly in relation to cost-effective- 
ness and accountability. The questions to be resolved are the extent to 
which management reviews should be combined with programme reviews, and 
whether they should be the responsibility of TAC or some other component 
of the System. 
7.33 The requirement to examine management effectiveness has already 
been built into the terms of reference dravn up by TAC for external review 
panels. The thoroughness of these management reviews has varied widely, 
however, and in only one instance has the panel penetrated deeply into 
adminis.trative procedures. What many donors would like to have included 
in the review process would be a thorough audit of management, organization 
and operating procedures in order to give greater “transparency” to the 
operation of the Institutions. 
7.34 We therefore propose that, in addition to external financial audits, 
review procedures in the System should comprise the following elements: 
Internal Reviews of the Institutions, 
commissioned by the Boards of Trustees; 
Management Reviews of the Institutions, 
counniseioned by the CGIAR Secretariat; 
Commodity and Activity Reviews of the System, 
conaaissioned by ‘MC; 
External Reviews of the Institutions, 
commissioned by TAC, and 
Reviews of the System, commissioned by the 
CGIAR. 
7.35 Internal reviews of the Institutions. Internal reviews of the 
Institutions are conducted annually and are the responsibility of each 
Director General and Board of Trustees. Although the form of- these re- 
viewe aay vary widely, they afford a valuable means of scrutinizing, on 
a regular basis, the planning and execution of the programmes on which 
the success of the System ultimately depends. Consequently, it is essen- 
tial that they should be conducted in an atmosphere that will allow maxi- 
mum opportunity for critical analysis and frank discussion. 
7.36 Raving regard to the need for efficiency in the use of staff 
time, it is cornDon for a Board-8 Programme Committee and advisers to parti- 
cipate in the review. We consider that this practice is entirely appropriate 
for an internal review. For the same reason, there might well be occasions 
when it would be appropriate for members of TAC and its Secretariat, as well 
as members of the CGIAR Secretariat to be invited to be present, in order to 
give them a greater background of knowledge for their own work. The attendance 
of such individuals might not invariably be appropriate, however, and should 
always be subject to the invitation of the Institution a Furthermore, it 
would not be appropriate for donors to be present either as participants in 
the review or as observers. Their presence would create a different environ- 
ment for the review and might inhibit mutual criticism by staff members, 
which can be such a valuable feature of internal reviews. 
7.37 Management Reviews. With growing pressures on the availability 
of funds, the donors have been increasingly concerned that all funds should 
be used as effectively as possible. Furthermore, as individual donors have 
contributed progressively larger amounts to the System, questions of accounta- 
bility have arisen. Although financial audits of the Institutions may be 
regarded as part of the process of external review, they do not provide 
an adequate assurance to donors that funds are being used efficiently in 
relation to the purposes for which they have been allocated. Additional 
mechanisms are therefore required. 
7.38 The Institutions have been able to seek expert advice on financial 
and budgetary problems through the CGIAR Secretariat, a service that was 
augmented in 1980 by the appointment of a financial officer to its staff. In 
our view, the CGIAR Secretariat should be in a position to offer similar help 
and advice to the Ipstitutions on administrative and management matters. 
Accordingly, we consider that a senior management specialist should be appointed 
to the staff of the Secretariat to fulfil this function. The Study Team found 
considerable support for these Ideas among Controllers and senior administrative 
staff at the Institutions. Advice on administrative matters would normally he 
by request from the Institution and should be regarded as a consultancy 
service offered by the Secretariat, rather than as an “Inspector General’* 
function. Nevertheless, in exceptional circumstances, the Secretariat might 
have to play a more active role in exercising this function. 
7.39 We further suggest that future external reviews,of Institutions 
should include a management audit to be commissioned by the CGIAR Secretariat 
and to be conducted sometimes by the proposed staff member, sometimes by 
an external consultant and, where necessary, by a combination of both: For an 
effective management audit, we consider that a minimum period of six weeks 
would be required, of which the final two weeks would be combined with the 
normal,external review (paragraph 7.46). The findings and recommendations 
of the management consultant would be discussed by the review panel and 
incorporated into its report. 
7.40 For each review, details of the requirements of the management 
audit.should be worked out jointly by the management specialist, the CGIAR 
Secretariat and TAC but, in many instances its main functions would, be: 
(i) to appraise the organizational structure of the 
Institutioa in relation to control and co-ordi- 
nation at the senior management level; the con- 
trol exercised by supervisors at successive levels 
in the management structure; lines of authority 
and communication; delegation of authority; clarity 
of duties and responsibilities; 
(ii) to review the suitability of the organizational 
structure in relation to programme requirements; 
(iii) to review the.princlpal operating procedures and 
supporting services including financial account- 
ing , budgeting , expenditure control, procurement 
methods, and contracting; to identify opportunities 
for simplification or uniformity, the application 
of mechanical or automatic equipment, where appropriate, 
and ,other Improvements in operating procedures; 
(iv) ,to examine the standards of personnel use and to 
suggest methods for increasing staff productivity, 
where necessary; 
(v) to review personnel policies and practices as to 
their adequacy and suitability, including recruit- 
ment and promotion standards, the employment of 
women (see paragraphs 7.114 to 7.115), compensation 
levele, fringe benefits, retirement systems and 
work rules; to analyze personnel policies for their 
effectiveness in maintaining a corps of competent 
personnel with high morale, and to proposepeasures 
for improving personnel management, as necessary; and 
(vi) to recommend or confirm optimum levels of manpower 
and equipment by programme or function, consistent 
with programme needs and available resources. 
We consider that if more thorough reviews of the management of Institutions 
were conducted along these lines, it would then not be necessary for 
donors to mount their own reviews. This would help to relieve the 
Institutions from the burden of reviews by concentrating the main work 
into a single period. 
7.41 Commodity and activity reviews. Reviews that focus on a single 
commodity or activity could supplement external reviews of the Institutions in 
several way8. As we have seen (paragraph 7.31), they would provide opportuni- 
ties for reviewing, more completely, programmes that have common elements in 
the work of two or more Institutions. Moreover, they could examine the 
mechanisms for co-ordinating work in the same region, both administratively 
and scientifically (see paragraph 6.12). In addition, they could play a 
significant part in reviewing programme relevance and could provide a better 
basis for planning the level of support to be accorded to a particular com- 
modity or activity within the System as a whole.. 
7.42 Some donors consider that external reviews ‘of Institutions should 
now be as much concerned with the relevance of programmes and their future 
direction, as with the quality of the work currently in progress. In our 
opinion, however, to attempt to meet both needs adequately is not always 
possible. For example , a reasonable assessment of the quality of a breeding 
programme in pearl millet could be made by any plant breeder with a record of 
achievement in breeding cross-pollinating annual crops. Assessment of the 
relevance of a pearl millet programme, however, would require detailed know- 
ledge and experience of that particular crop, its current and future place in 
the diet of people’in the developing countries, as well as knowledge of 
national development policies s institutional frameworks and research capabili- 
ties. With some programmes, tRe considerations to be taken into account are ,, 
even more complex and it would be difficult to assemble panels of reasonable 
size with all the required expertise to assess the relevance of all the 
programmes of an Institution. 
7.43 Consequently, there may well be occasions when it would be desirable 
to examine the relevance of a programme by means of a commodity or activity 
review either as an addition to an external review of an Institution, or as 
an alternative. We consider that commodity and activity reviews could play an 
important part in reinforcing TAC’s assessment of the continuing appropria- 
teness of the. mandates of Institutions, leading to recommendations from TAC to 
the Group for specific changes in mandates and corresponding changes in the 
levels of financial support. 
7.44 External review8 of Institutions. An occasional external review 
of an Institution is important as an independent check on its effective- 
ness, and provides informatioa that is essential for planning the work of the 
System. The Study Team encountered no opposition to the principle of external 
reviews; only encouragement to find ways of making them more effective, and 
fears that they already place too heavy a burden, both on.thoee subjected to 
them and on those doing them. . 
7.45 External reviews of Institutions at five-yearly intervals were 
initiated by TAC in response to the recommendations of the Bell Report. 
They have become widely known in the System as “Quinquennial Reviews” and have 
come to be regarded an an essential part of the management of the System. 
Since their initiation, TM has developed more precise guidelines for cow 
ducting them and, although the standard has varied, it is generally agreed 
that their value has increased. Even if some quinquennial reviews have left 
something to be desired, the preparation for an external review and the’ 
discussion it generates, have often had a significant impact on the operation 
of an Institution. 
7.46 We suggest that quinquennial reviews should concentrate on aaaeaaing 
the continuing suitability of the mandate of an Institution and its effecti- 
veness in terms of the professional ability of its staff, the quality of the 
work, the suitability of its operational procedures, its linkages with other 
institutions, its relations with the developing countries and the impact of 
its work. Future external reviews should incorporate a management audit (see 
paragraphs 7.38 to 7.40) and should assess the-appropriate level of funding in, 
relation to the work undertaken. To the extent that TAC has a continuing role 
in the analysis of priorities and the annual assessment of programme changes, 
we do not consider it necessary for external reviews to cover the same ground. 
Rather, TAC’s assessment of priorities and relevance, together with the 
reports of commodity or activity reviews, should be provided as background 
inputs to the members of the review panel. 
7.47 Owing to the importance we attach to developing collaborative 
programmes and networks, as well as to forging links with other institu- 
tions involved in basic and strategic research, these aspects of the work 
of the Institutions should continue to be subject to external review. 
Furthermore, future external reviews should pay particular attention to 
the arrangements made to foster good working relations between the CGIAR 
Institutions and government officials in the developing countries. Such 
reviews should include, when appropriate, the institutional mechanisms in- 
volved, as well au operational procedures and the adequacy of methods of 
communication among all concerned. 
7.48 While some flexibility should be permitted in the frequency of 
external reviews, we consider that the present quinquennial basis should be 
regafded as the norm. We’ also consider that, in order not to present the 
Institutions with an unreasonable burden of reviews, donor agencies should 
refrain from conducting their own reviews that simply duplicate the agreed 
machanisms in the System. 
Reviews of the System 
7.49 The concept of reviews of the System arose from the Bell Report. 
They have been arranged by the CGIAR Secretariat acting on the advice and 
approval of the Group. They are conducted by a Committee appointed by the 
Chairman of the'Group from individuals within the System. The Committee 
is assisted by a small Study Team of external consultants. The first such 
review produced its final report in 1977: the report of the present Com- 
mittee will be submitted to the Group in November 1981 and published in 
1982. 
7.50 The terms of reference of these reviews have been very wide, 
raising the question of whether it is possible, in a sufficiently peae- 
trating manner, to undertake all the work required in the time available. 
With more precise terms of reference, it should not be necessary for future 
reviews to cover the same ground as that covered by other mechanisms for 
review. Rather, the findings of other reviews should provide basic infor- 
mation for the Review Committee and Study Team so that they can concentrate on 
the broad strategy of the System, its resources, organization operational 
procedures, linkages with other institutions, relations with developing 
countries and the impact of its work. Future reviews of the System should, 
like the present one, include regional symposia (paragraph 7.68) as well as 
extensive visits to developing countries to sample the opinions of senior 
administrators and scientists. Furthermore, the work of the Review Committee 
should be phased so as to allow opportunities for interaction with all com- 
ponents of the System during the review process. 
7.51 To summarize, this analysis of the,requirements for review in 
the System and how requirements can best be met, suggests that the present 
mechanisms for review, could be strengthened. The guiding principles of 
reviews should be to avoid duplication of effort, to waste as little of 
the staff's time as possible, to produce recommendations for maintaining 
or improving the efficiency of the System and its components; and thereby 
to give continued confidence to the donors in the effectiveness of the 
System in fulfilling the purpose of the CGIAR. The mechanisms we propose 
are largely consistent with those currently in use, but they include several 
important changes. Our proposals are summarized in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 External Reviews of the System 
Requifement 
Mechanism for Review, 










Financial accountability of 
the Institutione 
Administrative efficiency Management Audits, using Inputs 
of the Institutions from 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 
Programme relevance and 
co-ordination of common 
programme elements within 
the System 
Suitability of mandate ) 
Scientific quality : 
; 
Links with other Institu-) 
tions inside and outside ) 
the System 
; 
Relations with ldeveloping) 
countries 
; 
Impact of the work > 
Strategy , organization 
and operation of the 
System; Its resources, 
linkages with other 
institutions, relation 
with developing countries 
and imnact of the work. 
Financial Audits . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Commodity and Activity Reviews. . . . 3 
External Reviews of Institutions 
using inputs from 2 and 3 . . . . . . 4 
Reviews of the System, using 
inputs from 2, 3, and 4 
Appendix 4.0 
Center Staff Evaluations of the Review Process* 
4.1 Analysis of Staff Response to Questionnaire 
4.2 Staff Perspectives 
4.3 The Time Cost of Reviews 
4.4 Questionnaire Design and Response 
'k This appendix was prepared with the assistance of Keith Fuglie, Research 
Assistant, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of 
Minnesota. 
4.0 
The success of any research system such as CGIAR depends on the 
effectiveness of the research staff in advancing knowledge and technology, 
A critical test of any system of research organization and management is 
its ability to mobilize staff energy and capacity, Systematic external 
program, management and donor reviews along with internal reviews are 
important instruments for assessing the performance and directing the 
energies of the CGIAR Centers. 
When I accepted the assignment to conduct a study of the external 
review process of the CGIAR Centers I insisted that an important element 
in the assessment should be the eliciting of staff perspectives on the 
effectiveness of both the external and internal reviews that are conducted 
by the CGIAR, TAC, individual donors, and individual Centers. 
In the spring of 1986 a short questionnaire was transmitted to the 
Director-Generals of the several centers. (See Section 4.4 for details of 
the questionnaire design and response.) The questionnaire was distributed 
to Center staffs by the offices of the Director-Generals. Responses were 
received during the summer of 1986 and the data were analyzed in the early 
Fall of 1986. 
The results obtained from the analysis of the questionnaires are 
presented in this Appendix. Section 4.1 contains a detailed analysis of 
the staff responses. Section 4.2 presents selected staff perspectives on 
the review process. Section 4.3 represents an attempt to estimate the 
time cost of the review process. Section 4.4 describes the design of the 
questionnaire and the method of coding and analysis. 
1 
4.1 
4.1 ANALYSIS OF STAFF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES 
The questionnaire responses indicate the attitudes of the CGIAR 
Center staff toward the review process. Four types of reviews are 
compared: external reviews; other CGIAR/TAC reviews, such as system or 
Stripe reviews; internal reviews; and donor reviews. External Management 
and External Program Reviews are treated as one-kind of review, since many 
respondents used one critique for both reviews (as these reviews are 
usually conducted at the same time). 
Respondents were asked to evaluate whether the reviews have given 
adequate attention to the issues facing the Center, whether the reviews 
have (not) been critical in their coverage of these issues, and whether 
the reviews influenced the institute's activity. 
The analysis of the questionnaire data focuses on the following 
questions: 
(1) Which reviews have had the most effect on the Centers' research 
direction and design? 
(2) Which reviews have been most attentive to the Centers' various 
programs? 
(3) Which reviews have been the least or most critical in their analyses 
of the Centers' programs? 
(4) What are the differences in staff attitudes toward reviews in Centers . 
that have had strong internal review mechanisms and in those that have had 
weak internal review mechanisms? 
(5) What are the differences in attitudes toward reviews among management, 
program leaders, and scientific staff members? 
2 
4.1 
4.11 Intertxeting the Tables 
The tables presented in section 4.12 show the average responses of 
Center staff members to the questions on their attitudes toward the 
different kinds of reviews, The topics covered by the reviews were given a 
value of 1, 2, or 3. A score of 1 meant that too little attention or not 
enough criticism was given by the review to this topic. A score of 2 
meant that the review was "about right" in its attention or criticism. A 
score of 3 meant a topic received too much attention or too much 
criticism. 
The impact of a review on the Center or institute's activity was 
rated on a scale of 1 (no impact) to 5 (very much impact). 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the mean 
responses for the tables in section 4.12. These give an indication of the 
variability.of staff opinion on the topic. These standard errors have not 
been corrected by the finite population correction factor so they 
overestimate the population variance. 
The precise significance of the scores is difficult to determine, 
though the response rate was fairly high. Nevertheless, these results do 
provide a measure for ranking the reviews, 
4.1 
4.12 Overall Attitudes 
Table 4.12A presents the overall attitudes of the respondents toward 
the reviews. It shows how the respondents rated the reviews on attention 
to various topics. Table 4.12B shows the ratings of the respondents on how 
critical the reviews were in coverage of these issues and how the reviews 
impacted on the institute's activities. The nine issues that are scored 
correspond to the issues listed under questions 5 and 6 of the 
questionnaire (see page 40 of this appendix). In Table 4.12B, the tenth 
issue is listed as question 7. 4 
Some types of review appear to have been,more effective at 
investigating certain issues (see Table 4.12A). Internal reviews were most 
effective in paying attention to disciplinary research programs (i.e., 
peer, reviews). Their score is 1.88, compared to 1.83, 1.71, and 1.73 for 
the external, donor, and other CGIAR/TAC reviews, respectively. 
Internal reviews, however, have not been so effective in evaluating 
management or the Board of Trustees. They scored only 1.62 in attention to 
management and 1.55 in attention to the Board, where as the external 
reviews scored 1.85 in coverage of management and 1.74 in coverage of the 
Board. 
External reviews also have been the most effective in evaluating 
training programs and off-campus activities. They scored 1.84 in 
attention to training programs and 1.82 in attention to outreach 
activities. Stripe reviews, internal reviews, and donor reviews scored 
lower on these issues. 
4 
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Other CGIAR/TAC reviews (e.g., system reviews) have been most 
effective at evaluating the impact of technologies. Their score is 1.96 
for attention to this issue, compared to 1.80 or lower for the other 
reviews. 
External reviews, internal reviews, and donor reviews have all 
contributed about equally to evaluating the institute's goals and 
strategies, each scoring 1.87 or 1.88. Other CGIAR/TAC reviews, with a 
score of 1.76, were rated as least effective. 
No striking trends in the standard deviations of scores are apparent. 
However, there seems to be some tendency for the deviations of the scores 
for other CGIAk/TAC and donor reviews to be somewhat lower than the 
deviations of the scores for external and internal reviews. This 
observation suggests that the opinions of other CGTAR/TAC and donor 
reviews are somewhat more uniform. 
On the question of how critical the reviews have been toward 
institute programs (Table 4.12B) donor reviews score as most critical 
(though not too critical) while internal reviews score as least critical. 
External reviews also score substantially below the donor reviews in level 
of criticism. The mean scores are 1.85 for donor reviews, 1..77 for other 
CGIAR/TAC reviews, 1.75 for external reviews, and 1.70 for internal 
reviews. This result supports the contention of several donors that 
external and internal reviews have not been critical enough in their 
analyses. The responses of institute staff members indicate the same 
evaluation. 
4.1 
External reviews have had the most impact on the institute's 
activities (Table 4.12B), scoring 3.24, followed by internal reviews 
(3.08), other CGIAR/TAC reviews (3.00), and, lastly donor reviews (2.88). 
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Table 4.12A. Attitudes of Institute Staff on the Coveraae of Topics 
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A score of 1 means too little attention was given to this topic, a 
score of 2 means the attention was "about right" and 3 means that too mucll 
attention was given to this topic. 
The standard errors are give" in parentheses 
Table 4.128. Attitudes of Institute Staff on how Critical the 








Goals and strategies 
Managevent 
Board of Trustees 
MEAN 
Type of Review 
(scale is 1 to 3) 
external other CG:IAR/TAC internal 
1.71 1.73 1.74 
c.526) (.647) (.540) 
1.78 1.92 1.78 
(.562) (.277) (.539) 
1.77 1.71 1.74 
(.502) l.469) C.569) 
1.76 1.55 1.72 
C.511) (.510) C.497) 
1.69 1.60 1.73 
c.563) C.507) C.492) 
1.75 1.87 1.74 
c.586) c.516) C.530) 
1.80 1.93 1.74 
t.526) C.616) (.490) 
1.70 1.93 1.60 
c.607) C.458) C.519) 
1.71 1.69 1.55 
C.569) t.480) c.528) 





















A score of 1 means too little criticism was given to this topic, a 
score of 2 means the criticism was "about right" and 3 means that too much 
criticism was give" to this topic. 
The standard errors are given in parentheses 
Table 4.12C. Imoact of The Reviews on the Institute's Activitv 
Type of Review: 
Level of Impact: 
(scale is 1 to 5) 
external other CGIAR/TAC internal donor 
3.24 3.00 3.08 2.88 
A score of 1 means the review had no impact on the institute's 
activity, 2 means the review had little impact, 3 means some impact, 4 
means much impact, and 5 means very much impact. 
4.1 
4.13 Differences in Attitudes Toward the Reviews Between Institutes With 
Strong and Weak Internal Review Mechanisms 
Some institutes have had strong internal review mechanisms with the 
active involvement of scientific staff in program and management decisions 
whereas others institutes have not. It is likely that this difference will 
have implications for the overall effectiveness of the whole review 
process. 
The strength of the internal review mechanism was based on an 
analysis of the external review documents, especially the management 
reviews. Factors such'as the level of involvement of center staff in 
management and policy decisions, the role of social scientists in research 
planning, the coherence of the research program structure, the use of 
outside consultants for program evaluation, and the age of the institute 
were considered when evaluating the strength of the institute's internal 
review mechanism. 
Institutes we regarded as having a strong internal review process 
(Group I) are CIAT, CIMMYT, CIP, and IRRI. The institutes regarded as 
having a weak internal review process (Group II) are ICARDA, 'ICRISAT, 
IITA, ILCA, ILRAD, and WARDA. The remaining institutes (IBPGR, IFPRI, and 
ISNAR) are newer and apparently have had little internal review experience 
as well as being subjected to few donor or other CGIAR/TAC reviews. Thus, 
only limited information is available on these institutes (external 
reviews only) and they are grouped separately (Group III). 
The comparison of attitudes toward the different reviews between 
staff members at institutes with strong internal review mechanisms and 
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those at institutes with weak internal review mechanisms are presented in 
Tables 4.13A and 4.13B. Because of the similarities of scores within each 
group the first three issues (disciplinary research, applied research, and 
technology development) were averaged together under the category "center 
research." 
Strong internal reviews appear to have been an effective mechanism 
for evaluating most issues. They outscored external reviews and other 
CGIAR/TAC reviews in their attention to center research programs by 1.89 
to 1.81 and 1.70, respectively, Although donor reviews scored 1.92 in this 
category, it may be because typically they only focus on a single program 
or project and, thus, are not an effective mechanism for systematic 
program evaluation. 
Strong internal reviews also have been very effective at evaluating 
technological impact. They and other CGIAR/TAC reviews (e.g., the recent 
system review) were both given high marks (1.97 and 2.00, respectively) 
in evaluating technological impact. These scores are noticeably higher 
than the scores achieved by other reviews on this issue (1.85 for donor 
reviews and 1.73 for external reviews). 
In addition, the strong internal reviews gave significant attention 
to the institute's goals and strategies. They were scored 1.93 on this 
issue. 
Nevertheless, strong internal reviews were rated as less attentive to 
the role of management than were external reviews (1.76 to 1.91). Donor 
and other CGIAR/TAC reviews scored even lower on this issue. External 
reviews also were rated as best at evaluating the Board of Trustees. 
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The external reviews for Group I scored high in their attention to 
training and off-campus activities: 1.95 in attention to training programs 
and 1.87 in coverage of off-campus activities. These scores are noticeably 
higher than those given to the other reviews on these topics. 
Even strong internal reviews scored low on how critical they have 
been toward evaluating their own programs and management. The centers with 
strong internal processes (Group I), nevertheless scored higher on 
self-criticism than the centers with weak internal reviews (Group II). The 
mean score on how critical strong internal reviews have been is 1.74, 
compared to 1.59 for weak internal reviews. 
External reviews also have been more critical (though not too 
critical) in appraising institutes with strong internal reviews than 
other institutes. The mean "critical" score in Group I for these reviews 
was 1.81 but only 1.66 in Group II, The external reviews of the Group II 
institutes have been noticeably less critical than the donor reviews (1.66 
versus 1.86). 
Strong internal reviews have had a significant impact on institute 
activities, about equal to that of external reviews (3.36 and 3.34, 
respectively). Weak internal reviews have had less impact on institute 
activities (2.75). Donor reviews also have had relatively little impact on 
the activities of both Group I and Group II institutes (2.86 and 2.89, 
respectively). 
In Group II, nevertheless, the weak internal reviews appear to have 
been fairly effective at evaluating the institute's own research program 
(i.e., peer review). Respondents scored 1.82 on this issue, compared with 
10 
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1.81 for external reviews. But weak internal reviews were seen as quite 
inadequate at evaluating the institute's management (1.36) or Board 
(1.32). 
Among the Group III institutes (Table 4.13C) the external reviews 
appear to have been fairly effective at evaluating the center research 
programs and the institute's goals and strategies but have been somewhat 
uncritical of management. Furthermore, the external reviews appear to have 
had quite a bit of impact on these centers. Unfortunately, the lack of 
data prevents a comparison among the different types of reviews for this 
group. 
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Table 4.13A. bttitudes Toward the Reviews at Centers With Straw Internal 
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Goals and strategies 
Management 
Board 
1.80 1.74 1.76 1.89 
1.89 1.50 1.76 1.68 
1.80 1.55 1.82 2.00 
1.84 1.83 1.80 1.68 
1.84 1.91 1.80 2.00 
1.92 1.80 .1.65 1.94 
1.60 1.50 1.61 1.70 
MEAN 1.81 1.69 1.74 1.84 
IMPACT (scale is 1 to 5) 3.34 2.75 3.36 2.86 
Table 4.138. Attitudes Toward the Reviews at Centers With Weak Internal 
Review Mechanisms (Group, 111 
Topic 
Type of Review 


















IHPACT 2.94 3.40 2.75 2.89 
(scale is .L to 5) 











(scale is 1 to 5) 
Type of Review: externaL only 
(scale is 1 to 3) 










eXteKna1 other-CGIAR/TAC internal donor 
1.81 1.94 1.82 1.67 
1.78 1.86 1.60 1.73 
1.72 1.71 1.61 1.90 
1.13 1.83 1.56 1.67 
1.80 2.00 1.80 1.85 
1.79 1.86 1.36 1..67 
1.75 2.00 1.32 1.43 
1.77 1.89 1.58 1.70 
1.66 2.00 1.71 1.82 
1.70 1.80 1.65 1.91 
1.54 2.00 1.60 2.09 
1.65 2.00 1.61 1.69 
1.68 2.00 1.65 2.00 
1.58 2.20 1.48 2.00 
1.66 2.00 1.59 1.86 




4.14 Differences in Attitudes Toward the Reviews Between Management, 
Program Leaders and Scientific Staff 
Tables 4.14A, 4.14B, and 4.14C present the differences in attitudes 
toward the reviews among senior management, program leaders! and center- 
based scientific staff. The attitudes of senior management (i.e., 
Director Generals and Deputy Director Generals) are reported in Table 
4.14A, those of program leaders, in 4.14B, and those of other scientific 
staff in 4.14C. Only staff based at the center are included in this 
latter analysis because off-campus staff appear to have been much less 
involved in the review process. 
According to senior management (Table 4.14A), the external reviews with 
a score of 3.67 have had most impact on center activities. Internal 
reviews, other CGIAR/TAC reviews, and donor reviews, were scored 3.00, 
2.50, and 2.33, respectively, for their respective impacts. 
Management responses indicated that external reviews have not paid 
enough attention to training and to the impact of technologies. External 
reviews scored 1.29 on attentiveness to training and 1.57 on impact, 
compared with scores of 2.00 for these two issues on other CGIAR/TAC and 
internal reviews. 
In addition they indicated that the external reviews have been too 
critical of management but not critical enough of the Board of Trustees 
(2.38 to 1.63). Interestingly, senior management themselves indicated 
that internal reviews had been not sufficiently critical of management, 




Donors reviews have given center research relatively weak coverage yet 
have been very critical of center research, according to senior 
management. These reviews were scored at only 1.67 on level of attention 
to center research but were scored at 2.33 for level of criticalness on 
this topic. Donor reviews also were rated as having the least amount of 
impact on the center of any review, according to management responses. 
Other CGIAR/TAC reviews, such as system or Stripe reviews, were rated 
as satisfactory by management, receiving scores close to 2.00 on most 
subjects. But management also rated these reviews as not having had much 9 
impact. 
Program leaders did not differ much from senior management except in 
a few areas. They rated donor reviews as having more impact on the 
institute's activities (3.29) than other CGIAR/TAC reviews but not too 
different from external reviews (3.34)'and internal reviews (3.27). 
Unlike senior management, program leaders did not rate external 
reviews as too critical of management (1.73). They also felt that 
external reviews have not been critical enough in evaluating the Board of 
Trustees, though their score was relatively higher (1.71 for program 
leaders compared to 1.63 for senior management). Program leaders also 
viewed internal reviews as insufficiently critical of management (1.59) 
and, especially, of the Board (1.47). 
Program leaders rated donor reviews as giving too much attention to 
issues of technological impact (2.13) and goals and strategies of programs 
(2,20), but not giving enough attention to training programs (1.60) or 
off-campus activities (1.71). 
14 
4.1 
For the scientific staff the internal reviews were the most effective 
type of review for evaluating the center's research program but were not 
particularly critical of the program. The internal reviews scored at 1.80 
on "attentiveness" toward center research, but they scored only 1.67 on 
criticalness toward center research, below the scores of external (1.70) 
and donor reviews (1.79). 
Scientific staff ranked the external reviews as being the most 
attentive to training, off-campus activities, goals and strategies, and 
management. External reviews were also ranked very close to internal 
reviews in their attention to center research programs (1.79 for external 
and 1.80 for internal reviews). Both internal and donor reviews scored 
very low in attention to management and the Board (these scores ranged 
from 1.56 to 1.60). 
Again, the scientific staff rated the donor reviews as the most 
critical (mean critical score of 1.77), with internal and other CGIAR/TAC 
reviews the least critical (1.65 and 1.64, respectively). External reviews 
were ranked between the others, with a mean critical score of 1.73. 
Internal reviews were rated by the scientific staff as especially 
uncritical of management and Board. 
15 
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Goals and Strategies 
nanagement 
Board 
Type of Review 
(scale is 1 t0 3) 
other CGIAR/TAC internal 
I 19 1.69 1.80 1.75 
1.89 1.60 1.70 1.71 
1.85 1.56 1.70 1.80 
t.73 2.25 1.79 1.80 
1.91 1.50 1.87 1.85 
1.87 1.57 1.56 1.58 
1.69 1.83 1.56 1.60 
MEAN 1.82 1.71 1.71 
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Critical of: 
Center research 1.70 1.64 1.67 
Training 1.73 1.40 1.63 
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TechnologiceL impact I.77 1.08 1.69 
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4.15 Summary and Conclusions 
4.1 
The preceding results suggest that a strong internal review mechanism 
can fulfill many planning and review functions at CGIAR Centers. External 
reviews are still necessary for management appraisals and are important 
for critical evaluations of programs. External reviews are also important 
for evaluating training programs and off campus activities. A strong 
internal review mechanism and internal program monitoring process, 
however, should be the cornerstone of any effective review and planning 
* process. 
Institute staff members do not appear to feel that reviews are overly 
critical. In fact, the reviews (even donor reviews) have been rated as 
critical enough of most center activities by most institute ,staff. 
Donor reviews have had the least impact on an institute's activities. 
Strong internal and external reviews, consequently, are the most effective 
procedures for influencing an institute's program. 
17 
4.2 
4.2 STAFF PERSPECTIVES 
Selected comments by staff members of the several centers regarding the 
review process are presented in this section. These comments are meant to 
supplement the statistical analysis of the responses to the questionnaire. 
The comments that were selected seem particularly perceptive or 
thoughtful. Not all agree with the recommendations. When necessary the 




4.21 General Persnectives 
-- CGIAR/TAC reviews are essential and welcome. They are here to make 
sure that we are and continue to be on track and that our work is 
relevant. At *La ^^-- c:-- *L- - - -__.-- L‘le: b cu‘le L Illlt: , LII~ CG iiiSiiiberS are T~.assurad that tht2i.r 
investment in our center is paying off. There was a time (prior to 1985) 
when there were simply too many reviews. CGIAR/TAC reviews are important 
and are an-integral part of the process. However, donor reviews-- 
especially donor reviews that do not have to do with special projects--are 
rather pointless. 
-- If the system is to stay healthy, some branches will need pruning 
over the years. The review process should be such as to allow for 
recommendations that a center, or a major division of a center, be phased 
out or transferred to national .programs. 
-- Reviews should concentrate on examining research priorities and 
resource allocation within and between programs and reconsidering whether 
the area/environment/crop mandate is being properly addressed or whether 
it is still sensible and achievable within the resources projected in the 
near future. It is not possible to review all the scientific detail in 
the short time usually available. 
-- A good review should contain specifkc objectives and all the parties 
to the review should be aware of them. I feel there should also be a 
personal dimension to the review process which allows one-on-one 
interaction between the reviewer and the staff member being reviewed. 
Only one out of ten reviews have explicitly provided this type of format. 
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Most are formal presentations with minimal time allocated for a genuine 
exchange of ideas. 
-- Our EMR did not address the issue of board strategy and policy. 
-_ Improvement would lie in the direction of more emphasis on the big 
ideas (priorities, resource allocations, quality of effort with less 
attention to detailed study of operation issues. The "X" review was a 
relative standout but even here I feel there was insufficient attention to 
the priorities. 
-- CGIAR/EMR reviews should concentrate on overall center strategies 
and ways in which the efficiency of the centers as a whole can be 
improved. CGIAR/EPR reviews should concentrate on the technical 
strategies of the centers vis a vis their mandate and comparative 
advantage. Internal reviews should concentrate on the working strategies 
of the programs within the centers. 
-- I was generally very impressed with the courteous and inconspicuous 
way the panels conducted the reviews. However, the importance of the 
review caused the center to disrupt its normal schedules. For this 
reason, and also because the consequent actions require time to implement 
and evaluate, I would not want major reviews of this sort to occur more 
frequently. . 
-- EPR/EMRs should resist temptation to deal with details. The 
external review process should deal more with the major issues and future 
plans of an institute, and how these related to the wishes of the System. 
-- The major credit for the success of the External Program Review goes 
to the chairman and members of the review team. The team saw the field 
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work being done, talked to policy makers in selected developing countries, 
and observed the interaction between the Board of Trustees and the center 
staff in one of the annual meetings of the Board and had intensive group 
and individual discussions with the research staff. The team's approach 
was critical but constructive. The team members were accessible and 
showed evidence of an "open" mind, On the whole the review team was 
excellent and the review was also excellent. 
-- The separation of EPRs and EMRs is artificial. Both management and 
program are inseparable aspects of organizational performance. There 
should be one review, an EMR as the term "management" incorporates all 
aspects of an IARC's activities. Such a review should focus exclusively 
on evaluating whether or not the organization is permeated with the 
unwavering and determined pursuit of realistic and relevant research 
objectives. It should cover all organizational aspects (fiscal, 
personnel, etc.) and all levels of management, including the Board of 
Trustees. 
As a start, a special review should determine how an IARC's top 
managers including its director general are rewarded with salary increases 
and continued tenure. On the basis of this review, a management 
evaluation and reward system based exclusively on the achievement of 
objectives should be instituted. Thereafter an overall management review 
should take place every three years to ensure there is a single-minded, 
disciplined pursuit of the organization's research objectives. 
The initial management review and every other management review 
thereafter, should include an impact study. The impact study would start 
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with two brief and succinct reports from the IARC being evaluated, one a 
report listing the IARC's specific research objectives, and the other a 
list of the specific recommendations the IARC has made to the national 
research programs of its client countries, the dates these recommendations 
were made and the means of communication used to convey these 
recommendations. The impact study would be charged with evaluating the 
feasibility and relevancy of the IARC's research objectives and with 
recommending such modifications to these objectives as deemed necessary. 
In addition, the impact study, by polling and visiting client-research 
organizations and other collaborators, by examining germ plasm 
correspondence and records, and by other means, would assess the impact of 




4.22 Suggestions for ImprovinF the Review Process 
-- I have several suggestions: First, keep the teams small, i.e., 
probably not more than 7 or 8 people. The selection process is key. The 
success of the review stands or falls with the quality of the 
chairman/chairwomen. Make sure that the panel members have a chance to 
.get to know the center and its work before they arrive at the center (even 
if only through publications). Second, external reviews should be 
scheduled more flexibly, i.e., reviews should coincide with natural phases 
that any center goes through, instead of scheduling them mechanically 
every five years or so. This applies especially to EMR. Third, it would 
be nice if donors could agree amongst themselves that they will all go 
along with the EPR/EMRs instead of doing their own reviews (this does not 
apply.to special projects). 
-- A negative aspect of'our.review was that there was no participation 
of scientists on general subjects like the center's goals and strategy. 
-- Management reviews must consider how to more effectively involve the 
trustees in the review process. 
-- The review I participated in was very effective and'improvements 
would be difficult. 
-- More time should be taken by the review panel to familiarize 
themselves with research activity of specific programs. They should not 
limit themselves to annual reports and other publications of the 
institute. Other publications which are more critical of the institute 
should be studied, in addition to scientific research publications. This 
would enable the panel to, perhaps, get a better view of the institute, 
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both positive and negative. The end result would be a report which, while 
being more critical would enable the institute to adjust research and 
development plans as benefiting current needs. 
-- The review process should make more use of questionnaires and 
relevant information supplied by centers. Visits related to the review 
could then concentrate on points needing clarification and visits to 
physical facilities that may be necessary. Since program and management 
of a center are closely related, probably a single panel, with members 
having diverse experiences and expertise could be used, rather than two 
independent panels. 
-- Combine management and program review into one team but two 
components. 
-- Separate review of scientific activities from policy issues unless 
teams have a composition that enables them 'to cover both. 
-- Review team should agree on an evaluation framework. We had been 
preparing for TAC reviews for months and I considered it an anticlimax. 
-- Reviewers should be at the top of their profession so they 
contribute professionally to research expertise of the reviewed staff. 
-- I think it would be helpful to all institute staff not to have to 
cope with both the program and management reviews at the same time. The 
reviews require that the institute compile a great deal of information and 
take up a great deal of institute staff time in general. Separating the 
times of each review would help a great deal. 
-- Combine the periodic long-range planning exercise now done in some 
manner within each XC with that of the present external review panel. 
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-- Management should let program staff present their views on 
significant issues that affect the overall direction of the center, rather 
than trying to railroad the programs or put a taboo on some issues for the 
purpose of impressing the review committee. The 1986 internal review was 
a marked improvement because the programs presented their views on the up- 
stream/down-stream issue. The question is whether the 1986 process 
represents a permanent change or only a one-time deviation in management's 
programming of the internal review process. If the latter is the case, 
"internal" should be eliminated from the review title. 
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4.2 
-- The review process was viewed by management in a totally defensive 
way. Staff were not allowed to see the questions posed to the review team 
and were told not to discuss the reviews with each other. We missed the 
opportunity for open discussion and debate and to reformulate goals and 
strategies drawing fully on the considerable expertise available on our 
own staff. The review process should be a learning and growing experience 
for all of us- -instead it was a traumatic period to live through, save 
face and hopefully go on later with business as usual. 
-- The reviewers should first meet with the administration and heads of 
divisions and departments. Next professionals and last the senior 
research' staff. There should be a general assembly with all staff to 
report on results of the review. 
-- One of the best review procedures from my point of view is the use 
of good consultants. They have had much more impact on the direction and 
quality of our program than the formal reviews. 
-- I recommend jeer reviews, wherein a reviewer (or.a team of 
reviewers) spends time in the departments, thoroughly studying the 
programs. In this way he/she can be objective, and can detect obvious 
areas where change is needed. Reviewers should also discuss matters with 
junior staff, some of which have interesting and valuable ideas and much 
experience. They would welcome involvement in such reviews. Naturally, 
reviewers should not come from within, but should be seconded (or invited) 
from another institute of excellence. Such persons would have no "axe to 
grind." 
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4.2 
-- I have reached the rather unexpected conclusion that our external, 
review was probably of "lower quality" than the internal reviews but it 
h5e-l IOUY a greater ime.¶nt mm ch.r. - * ru&ycLb’c “&I L&I-z LiXtitUtiO~. I have always found our internal 
reviews to be extremely useful and stimulating but major changes (like 
reorganization of the thrust/department matrix) are not produced by the 
internal reviews. 
-- Annual internal reviews become nothing more than "show and tell." 
Meaningful and probing questions are to be avoided and it is easy "to pull 
the wool" over the eyes of the Board of Trustees, many of whom are 
technically limited. 
-- The annual internal review is like a short course about what is 
happening on the edge of science. 
L- The internal review in 1985 was a positive experience; the reviewer 
was of the highest calibre, the visit was short, and his program was 
fairly well defined/agreed upon before his arrival. I would find regular 
reviews (say once a year) of that type helpful. 
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4.25 Donor Reviews 
-- It is better to have an in-depth evaluation done with less 
frequency, than to have too many evaluations at a superficial level. It 
is better to have one evaluation done on the behalf of all the donors, 
rather than all donors evaluating the same organization independently. 
-- The duplication of review requests by different donors and, at 
times, the CG secretariat and TAC makes it very difficult for me to 
justify this use of the time of key staff. And it falls on the directing 
staff to a large degree. During 1983/85 a constant series of reviews and 
studies seriously affected work and tempers of both international and 
national scientists. 
-- The donor reviewed our project for one week in May 1984. It was not 
an overly satisfying experience, though I guess there are a few lessons to 
be learned. First, the two members of the review team were, in my 
opinion, less than well-suited to the task. -The chief of mission 
confessed he knew nothing'about agriculture, and while the other team 
member was a general agronomist, as far as I would tell neither knew 
anything about farming systems research. 
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4.26 Other Comments 
4.2 
-- Most of the reviewers are not qualified to make the judgments they 
are asked to make in the time frame available. 
-- We did not see the specific recommendations (only the general 
recommendations) in the provisional EPR report. 
-- There was insufficient perception of the intangibles of close 
collaboration with client governments and NARS. 
-- Finally, the field team felt that three reviews in the first half of 
1984 was excessive. 
-- For an effective review policy there may be a post-review process to 
see the progress of implementation of the recommendations. 
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4.3 THE COST OF REVIEWS 
In addition to the monetary costs involved in conducting a review, there is 
also a substantial cost resulting from diverting scientific and management 
staff-time away from research and other activities. Survey results are used in 
this section to illustrate the burden of the review process on institute 
staff-time. 
First, it is necessary to identify the number and type of reviews that an 
institute is likely to face in a given period of time. Survey results and 
correspondence with institute administrative officers provide the information. 
Five categories of reviews were identified: 
(1) External Program Reviews (EPR). 
(2) External Management,Reviews (EMR). 
(3) "Other CGIAR/TAC". reviews, such as system or Stripe reviews. 
(4) Internal Reviews. 
(5) Donor or special project reviews. 
Crop or livestock research institutes are reviewed substantially more than 
the service institutes (ISNAR, IFPRI, and IBPGR). Service institutes are rarely 
subjected to donor reviews and "other CGIAR/TAC" reviews, and they have not 
always had an annual internal review process. For these institutes, the 
external program and management reviews have been a major source of planning, 
though these institutes may be in the process of developing a more formal 
internal review mechanism. 
For a crop or livestock research institute, the review burden is 
quite substantial. In a typical five year period, one of these institutes 
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can expect to undergo one EPR, one F.MR, two to three "other CGIAR/TAC" 
reviews, five internal reviews, and from two to ten donor reviews. 
Although the external and internal reviews involve the entire research and 
management staff stationed at the center, the "other CGIAR/TAC" and donor 
reviews usually focus on one program or selected projects within a 
program. 
The time involved for an institute staff person depends upon his or 
her position and the type of review. Table 4.3A gives the average number 
of hours spent by staff members preparing for and participating in a 
review. These are average values reported by the staff members. 
To illustrate the time cost of the review process more fully, the 
average time required from various staff.members is calculated in Table 
4.3B. In as much as the review burden varies substantially from year to 
year, the time requirements in a typical "heavy" year, a typical 
"moderate" year, and a typical "light" year are shown. It is assumed that 
a donor or "other CGIAR/TAC" review will involve the DG but only the staff 
of one program, and that an institute has four programs. Thus the time 
requirements reported in Table 4.3B are divided by four to reflect the 
average time per program leader or scientific staff member ner Year (not 
just those participating). 
These figures may overestimate the actual time requirements in that 
overlap occurs in the preparation for reviews. Time spent preparing for 
one review may also be applicable to another review. However, these 
figures do not include the time required for less formal "familiarization" 
visits by donor representatives and other interested parties which often 
take the form of a review. 
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The opportunity cost of the time indicated in Tables 4.3A and B is 
the value of foregone research and training. The benefits would include a 
more appropriate research design and direction. 
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Table &.3A. Ume SDMW. Pre'w&.e for and ln Re ie . VW = 
Tlrpe of RevLaw (hours par review) 
Staff EPR EMR other tncernal donor 
Xembers CGIAR/TAC 
DC and DDC* 281 250 102 125 25 
Program leaders 76 21 37 40 32 
Scientific staff 65 16 52 b3 39 
*Director General or Deputy Director General 
Table 4.38. w in the Review Process Ln a Twical Yeu 
A. Heavy Year (external review. Lncamal review, 1 other TAC review. 
2 donor reviews) 
type of Review (hours) 
Staff EPR/FXR other intama1 donor TOTAL 
CCIAWTAC hours weeks 
DC 531 to2 125 50 a08 20.2 
Prog leader 95 9 CrO 16 160 lb.0 
SC1 staff 81 13 Ir3 20 157 3.9 
B. %oderate Year (intwnal rwFw, 1 other TAC review. 1 donor review) 
Type of Revlsv (hour;) 
Staff EPR/W ocher fncemal donor TOTAL 
CCIAR/TAC hours weeks 
DC 0 102 125 25 252 6.3 
Prog leader 0 9 GO 8 57 1.L 
sci staff 0 13 43 10 66 1.7 





Type of Rwisv (hours) 
EPR/WR other Lntemal donor TOTAL 
CCIAR/TAC hours weeks 
0 0 125 25 150 3.5 
0 0 60 a La 1.2 
0 0 &I 10 53 1.1 
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4.4 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND RESPONSE 
To obtain the views of scientific staff members toward the reviews, a 
questionnaire was mailed to the Director Generals (DG) of the CGIAR 
Centers in April 1986. Copies were then distributed by the DG offices to 
the institute managements and scientific staffs, Completed questionnaires 
were mailed directly to the University of Minnesota. Responses received 
prior to September 1 were coded and analyzed using the SPSS computer 
package. 
Table 4.4A shows the number of completed questionnaires and the 
number of critiques of reviews that were received from each Center. Of the 
330 completed questionnaires, only 292 contained enough information to 
warrant coding. Those that were rejected were from scientists who had, not 
participated in any review. Response rates tended to be higher at those 
centers that had most recently gone through an external review. 
The major fields of research of the respondents are given in Table 
4.4B. Plant breeders and geneticists make up about a fifth of the total 
and social scientists (mainly agricultural economics) account for about 
another 16 percent. 
Finally, Table 4.4C gives the breakdown of questionnaire responses 
according to the position of the respondents at the centers. Categories of 
positions are senior management (Director Generals or Deputy Director 
Generals), program leaders, scientific staff based at the center, regional 
or off-campus staff members, and administrative staff. 
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A copy of the questionnaire and the coding format used to organize 
the data follows the three tables. The first page of the questionnaire 
elicits general background information from the respondents. Respondents 
1 J -*,#I -^-A*,, IL3LCU &CUCLcLI coiiiients on the i.~"AczWJ "&I we...: _..TC CI- the last page of the 
questionnaire. 
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a/ The number of scientists who sent in questionnaires 
b/ Scientists often critiqued mope than one review. Some filled in 
separate criclques for the EPR and EHR reviews whereas others used one 
crlclque for both the EPR and EHR reviews. The cases in which the 
criclques were combined are included vich the EPR reviews in the ‘EPR/ENR” 
C0LUMl. 










Ocher Natural Sciences 
(chemistry, biology. virology 
horticulture, botany. ecology, 
tWEit01Clgy, l=wology, physics) 
Others 
(administration, education. 
-WWniCationS, and others) 
TOTAL 
Tdblr 4 4C. Pesoondenrs Accordine to Position at Institute 









Kag1onal Staff 73 25.0 
hdministrative Staff 21 7.2 

















Name of Your Organization 
Yocr Name: 
Your Position: 
Your Address : 
Today’s Date 
Telephone: 
What 1s the highest degree you obtained 
in school? (check only one at right) 1 High School 
2 1-3 yrs. College or 
Technical School 
3 Bachelor’s degree 
4 Master’s degree 
5 Doctoral degree 
Name of school you last attended and major field of study. 
School Major 
Yeazs of working experience in 
your major field of specialitatiba. years 
‘Please indicate the last CGUR/TAC external program CEPR) and management (GIR) 
reviews that you were involved in. 
‘Please indicate all the other donor and internal reviews that you have been 
involved in since January 1, 1985. 
For whom was the review conducted 
Name of Review (name of organization)? 
Each of the following pages ask you questions about one of these reviews. 
--------------------------------------------~---------------------------------- 
Computer Processing Ll-l_l,l_l_l-l_l_l_Ll-I LLl 
c01uulns 1 2 3. 4 5 6 7 a 9 to 1112 -E 14 L5 
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please write the name of one of the reviews you listed on page 1 and 
answer the following questions on this page about this review. * 
Name of Review: 
Date(s) of RevFew: 
1. Please indicate the names and positions 2. Check which review team members 
of review team members for this review. you met ;rith individually 
or in a small group situation, 
Reviewer Name Position 






participating in this review? 
Overall, what percent of this time did you 
feel was unnecessary? 
How much attention did the review team give to 
institute program areas? 
How critical was the report of the review team 
institute program areas? I 
- hours 
- %  uaaecessary 
time 
each ,of the following 
in each of the following 
(5) Attention I (6) Critical 
Tao About Too 1 Not Too About 
Little Rinht - ?!uch lEGah Rizht Crltical 
- quality of disciplinary research? 1 2 3 I 1 2 
I 
- qualrtp of applied research? 1 2 3 I l 2 
I 1 2 - technology development? 1 2 3 
I 
I 1 2 - technology impact? 1 2 3 
I 
2 3 
- outreach activities? 1 2 3 
1 2 3 
/ 1 2 
I 1 2 
I l 2 
I l 2 
I 1 2 
- institute goals and strategies? a1 2 3 
- role of institute board? 1 2 3 
How much impact did the review team None Little 
visit or report have on the Institute’s 
acitivity? (circle best number oa right) 1 2 
Some- Much 
j 4 
Overall, what is your assessment of Lov Fledium 














- training programs? 
- institute management? 





I. Looking back over the past five 
years, to vhat extent has the 
Much Somewhat Remained Somewhat Much 
review process gotten better 
Worse Worse the same Better -m Better 
or vorsa? 
(a) CGIARITAC Reviews 1 2 (b) Donor Reviews 3 4 1 5 
2 
(c) Internal Reviews 
3 4 
1 2 3 4 5' 
2. Specifically, Please list the major positive and negative aspects about the 
review process. 
Negative Asvects Positive Aspects 
3. Please lrst the specific suggestions you have on how the review process 
might be improved. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 





' !&INK YOU VERY MUCR FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVFI. 
39 
4.4 
4.42 Coding Information 
QUESTIONNAIRE CODING FORMAT 










FIELD Major field of study l-(ag) education 2 
219animal science 2-plant breeding/genetics 
22=zoology 3-agronomy 
23-library science 4=horticulture 
24=math 5-crop physiology 
259geography 6-(ag) economics/rural devel 
260communications 7-soil science 
27-political science 8-accounting 
28-public health 9-microbiology 
29-veterinary science lo-statistics 
30-immunology ll-chemical engineering 
319ag engineering 12-plant pathology/entomology 
32-physics 13-biology 





















2-l to 3 years college 






FIELD . 34=MBA U-general administration 
35-ag extension 16-virology 
36-nematology 17-anthropology 
379general ag science 18-computer science 
38-plant ecology Is-botany 
20-xxx 
EXPl Years of experience 




Experience in CGIAR l-experienced (3+ years) 
system O-new to CGIAR 
Have CGIAR/TAC reviews l-much worse 
gotten better or worse? 2-somewhat worse 





Have donor reviews 
gotten better or worse? 
Have internal reviews 
gotten better or worse? 
Negative Aspects of Reviews 
(Code: l-respondee listed this aspect, O-did not list this aspect) 
NT1 Panel selection: some fields unrepresented, 
incompetent members, lack of diversity in 
group 
NT2 Panel selection: unfamiliar with IARC, CGIAR, 
or geographic setting of research 
NT3 Panel selection: members bring along own 
biases, not open-minded 
NT4 Panels too large 
NF1 Review too short: superficial discussions on 
research program 




NF3 Panels have unknown (or "hidden") agendas 
XF4 Reviews are poorly focused/too broad 1 



















Too many reviews, preparing/participating takes 1 
too much time 
Reviews have limited impact: recommendations are 1 
too general, no follow-through mechanism, centers 
react negatively to criticisms 
Honest discussion is inhibited, presentations 1 
controlled by management, center emphasizes 
appearance over substance 
Panels are too pro-management, by-pass management 1 
deficiencies 
Off-center programs are inadequately covered 1 , 
Center program achievements .inadequately measured 1 
(under estimated) 
Reviews emphasize quick payoff research, 1 
don't give enough value to long-term research 
Donor reviews interfere with program 1 
Lack of continuity between reviews, 1 
no monitoring between reviews 
xxx 1 
Reviews not critical enough 1 
Reviews too critical 1 
Scientists not involved in strategic planning 
discussions 
1 
Panels give bad or misinformed recommendations, 1 
center programs misrepresented in reports 







NI4 Internal reviews: too broad, insufficient depth 
N15 Internal reviews: internal/external review held 
concurrently interferes with quality of review 
Internal reviews: too frequent and take too much 
time 
Internal reviews: discussions not frank, 
criticisms not constructive 
Internal reviews: neglect long-term research, 







Positive Asnects of Reviews 
(Code: l-respondee listed this aspect, O-did not list this aspect) 
Pl Reviews focus and improve program (eg peer review) 1 
--receive constructive criticisms, force scientists 
to justify their research, identifies problems, 









Reviews promote strategic/long-term 'planning and 1 
thinking 
Reviews,measure impact and progress of research 1 
Reviews facilitate research collaboration and 1 
teamwork, scientists learn about other programs, 
helps build a consensus 
Reviews improve organization and structure of 1 
program 
Reviews improve management style and policies, 1 
chance to air staff concerns, make management more 
open, force management to confront neglected issues 
Increases outside (eg donor) awareness and 
confidence in institute 
1 
Promotes linkages and cooperation between center 1 
and outreach staff/programs 







Increase awareness and cooperation between IARCs 1 
Some panel members are highly competent 1 
Good diversity in panel membership 1 
3x 
Maior Suggestions for Reviews 
(Code: l-respondee listed this suggestion, O-did not list) 
Sl Improve Dane1 1 
--more preparation of panel, more knowledge of 
CGIAR system and region, more open-minded, from 
outside of 'old-boy' network 
s2 More indenth studv 1 
--more interaction with staff and in smaller groups, 
less formality, more attention to off-center 
activities, more input from NARPs 
s3 
s4 
Use outside experts/consultants for peer reviews 
Reduce frequency and number of reviews , 
(especially donor reviews) 
s5 Conduct fewer internal reviews 
--every 2 to 3 years instead of annually 
S6 Improve feedback mechanism to get review results 
to staff and program, recommendations should be 
within institute means, more continuity between 
reviews 
s7 Reviews should concentrate on strategic issues, 
timing should coincide with life of institute, 
should prioritize research programs 
S8 Reviews should be more focused, 
should select a few issues for in-depth analysis, 
objectives and terms of reference should be made 
clear, use more stripe reviews 
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Critioue of Specific Reviews 
(this section is repeated five times, once for each type of 3x 
review) 
REVIEW(A..E) Type of review 
MEMBERS(A..E) Number of review l-99 2 
panel members (not applic to internal rev) 
MEETING(A..E) Number of panel members 
respondee had indiv or 
small grp meetings with 
o-99 2 
TIME(A..E) Number of hours 
respondee spent in 
prep/partic in review 
o-999 3 
UNNEC ' % of TIME respondee 
felt was unnecessary 
O-100 3 













Attention of review to 
quality of disciplinary 
research 
Attention to quality 
of applied research 
Attention to technology 
development 
Attention to technology 
impact 
l-EPR (or EPR/EKR) 
2=F&MR 
3-other CGIAR review 
4-internal review 

































Attention to training 
programs 
Attention to outreach 
programs 
Attention to institute 
management 
Attention to institute's 
goals and strategies 
Attention to role of 
institute board 
How critical was review l-not critical 
toward quality of 2-about right 
disciplinary research? 3-too critical 
How critical toward 
quality of applied 
research? 
How critical toward 
technology developm&t?- 
How critical toward 
technology impact? 
How critical toward 
training programs? 
How critical toward 
outreach programs? 
How critical toward 
institute management? 
How critical toward 
goals and strategies 
How critical toward role 
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Appendix 5.0 
ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL AND STRIPE REVIEW REPORTS* 
Outline 
5.1 Comparative Analysis of Review Reports 
5.2 The CIAT Reviews 
5.3 The CIMMYT Reviews 
5.4 The CIP Reviews 
5.5 The IBPGR Reviews 
5.6 The ICARDA Reviews 
5.7 The ICRISAT Reviews 
5.8 The IFPRI Reviews 
5.9 The IITA Reviews 
5.10 The ILCA Reviews 
5.11 The ILRAD Reviews 
5.12 The IRRI Reviews 
5.13 The ISNAR Reviews 
5.14 The WARDA Reviews 
5.15 Stripe Review of Farming Systems Research 
5.16 Stripe Review of Off-Center Activities 
5.17 Stripe Review of Training 
*This appendix was prepared with the assistance of Keith Fuglie, Research 




The permanent record of the External Review Process at the CGIAR 
Centers is incorporated in the reports of the EPR, EMR, and special review 
teams. These published reports clearly are no more than a distillation of 
the findings and evaluations of the review teams. The oral presentations 
by the teams often provided much richer insights into the strengths and/or 
limitations of Center policies and programs than did the written reports. 
For the staff members of donor organizations, however, the review reports . 
are often the primary source of information and must be analyzed as such. 
As part of the study of the review process I conducted a content 
analysis of the review reports. One objective of the content analysis was 
to determine what information about program strengths and limitations 
might be obtained from a study of the review documents by a staff member 
of a.donor agency. Another was to compare the reports for individual 
centers over time and to compare the reports of the several centers with 
each other. 
In interpreting the review reports I also drew on other published 
documents, such as Center annual reports, long-range plans, and available 
system reviews. Although it somewhat contradicts the spirit of the 
content analysis, I also used the insights of staff surveys (see Appendix 
4.0) in order to "read between the lines" of the review reports.' The 
lFor an introduction to the literature on the methodology of content 
analysis see the following books: 
(a) Content Analvsis: An Introduction to its Methodology. Klauss 
Krippendorff. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980. 
(b) Content Analvsis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. 0. R. 
Holstri. Reading, MA: Addision-Wesley Publishers, 1969. 
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initial drafts of the sections on the individual institutes were sent to 
the Center Directors for their comments, and reactions were received from 
all but two Centers (ICARDA and WARDA). I took these reactions and 
suggestions under consideration when I wrote the final version of this 
appendix. 











presented,under nine general headings: 
panel membership; 
panel itineraries; 
impact of reviews; 
criticisms in reviews; 
staff concerns expressed in reviews; 
research organization; 
planning processes; 
relations with national research systems; and 
relations with other institutions. 
The first section of this appendix (5.1) summarizes and compares the 
results of the EPR, EMR, and Stripe reviews. The next several sections 
(5.2 to 5.14) deal with the reviews of individual institutes. The last 
three sections (5.15 to 5.17) present material from the Stripe reviews. 
Had I had just wanted to summarize the findings of reviews I simply 
would have reprinted the executive summaries. That, I felt, would have 
violated my responsibility. My objective was to assess what can be 
learned from the review reports that is relevant to the functioning and 
performance of individual centers and the CGIAR system. 
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5.1 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE REVIEW REPORTS 
There are summarized in this section the findings of the content analysis 
of the external review reports of the thirteen IARCs and the Stripe reviews 
conducted by the CGIAR system. References to the Stripe reviews are made in 
discussing the impact of the reviews on Center programseL 
(a) Panel Membership 
Membership of the review panels appears to be quite well balanced 
among the representatives of developed and developing countries and academic 
disciplines. Panels almost always include representatives of developed 
countries and developing countries. Often, but not always, the panels include 
members of National Agricultural Research Programs (NARPs) from the country in 
which the institute under review is based. The disciplines of the panel memb.ers 
generally span the areas covered by Center research activities; however, several 
respondents to the questionnaire (i.e., scientists at the institutes) complained 
that their discipline was unrepresented in the review of their Center. This 
criticism apparently reflects a perception that the external review is primarily 
a peer review rather than a strategic planning review. There were also concerns 
expressed about the adequacy of panel members knowledge about or 
experience with the CGIAR system. The data available to us on the panel 
2Some abbreviations used in this and following sections are as follows. 
EPR = External Program Review; EMR = External Management Review; 
NARP = National Agricultural Research Program; 
DG = Director General; DDG = Deputy Director General. 
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members' previous experience or association with the CGIAR system, 
however, are incomplete. 
(b) Panel Itineraries 
In addition to visiting the institute's off-station activities and 
meeting with NARP representatives, each panel held extensive meetings with 
Center staff members and management. Usually, meetings were scheduled 
with Board members as well. Panels often split into two or three 
subgroups to visit off-station activities. 
The panels almost always prepared drafts of their reports at the 
Centers and presented them to Center managements and/or Boards before 
leaving. Scientific staff members sometimes were not present at these 
presentations. 
One common complaint of the respondents to the questionnaire tias that 
the panels did not spend an adequate amount of time in small-group 
discussions with the scientific staff. During some reviews, interactions 
between panel and staff members were restricted to presentations before 
large groups; and little informal discussion was possible. During some of 
the more recent reviews the panels or panel chairpersons attended the 
institutes' annual internal review sessions before embarking on their own 
scheduled activities. This participation familiarized the panels with 
staff members and programs. 
The scheduled activities of the more thorough reviews consisted of two 
parts. In the first, the panel members familiarized themselves with the 
Centers, reviewed the impact of past research, and identified the 
strategic issues facing the Centers in the coming decade. During the 
4 
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second part of the review the panel members focused on the strategic 
research issues facing the Centers. They formulated research strategies 
and interacted closely with Center staffs and management. Judging from 
the review documents and staff comments, an ideal review might involve a 
sequence of nine steps. 
Part 1: 
(1) Review background briefing papers and attend orientation 
sessions with CGIAR or TAC Secretariates (begins before panel 
arrives at Center). 
(2) Hold initial meetings with Center management and subsequent 
meetings with Center Board and program leaders. 
(3) Attend internal review to get to know staff members and become 
familiar with programs. 
(4) Visit selected off-Center activities and NARPs. 
Part.2: 
(5) Hold meetings with Center staff, including small-group 
sessions with research staff members. 
(6) Prepare draft of report. 
(7) Conduct additional staff sessions (to get reactions to draft). 
(8) Make oral presentation of findings to Center staff management and 
Board. 
(9) Prepare final report including recommendations for monitoring 
implementation of review recommendations. 
(c) Imnact of Reviews 
Centers have responded to recommendations in the reviews in various 
ways. Usually, the Centers make a serious attempt to consider and, if 
appropriate to implement program recommendations although they are at 
times constrained by financial considerations. 
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In some cases recommendations have not been adopted. For example, IRRI 
did not change its off-Center personnel policy, despite recommendations to 
do so in both the first and second external reviews. The failure to adopt 
recommendations does not imply, however, that they were not considered. 
For example, the first external review of CIAT recommended that the Center 
develop a veterinary research program. This was considered by CIAT 
management but rejected in favor of expanding its forage research program. 
In another case, the first review of CIMMYT recommended that CIMMXT 
concentrate on breeding programs at the expense of adaptive research. 
CIMMYT decided instead to expand its on-farm trials program in order to 
get more data on farm-level yield constraints. In both these cases, the 
second external reviews concurred with the Centers' decisions. 
Occasionally, some institutes have defensive reactions to some review 
recommendations; ICRISAT, for example, did not feel that the criticisms 
of its research program structure in a review were justified. 
In some cases, recommendations have been rapidly adopted. The first 
review of CIP recommended that better quarantine procedures be developed 
before cross-country plant material transfers were continued. CIP devoted 
significant research resources to this issue in order to develop safe 
procedures. When the review of ICARDA found the training program to be 
deficient, ICARDA agreed with this finding and took steps to increase its 
commitment to training. 
External reviews seem to be most effective at identifying the more 
obvious program and management deficiencies. The criticisms seem to carry 
more weight than do the internal criticisms, especially those concerned 
6 
5.1 
with management issues. Centers often respond, for examp'le, to suggested 
changes or modifications in organizational structure. However, examples 
of such suggestions having major impact on research program content are 
rare (the first review of ILCA may be an exception). 
An external review sometimes has served as a third party to-evaluate an 
issue involving two or more institutes (e.g., the CIAT-IITA dispute over 
cassava research) or between an institute and TAC. For example, the 
second review of IBPGR recommended that the relation between IBPGR and FAO 
be reevaluated. In addition, the first review of ILRAD supported the 
institute's request for funds for the acquisition of a livestock ranch. 
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of a review on a program because 
(1) in many cases it is likely that institutes themselves would have 
adopted a recommended line of research with or*without the review report 
and (2) the nature of many recommendations makes evaluation of impact open 
to arbitrary judgement (i.e., if recommendations used words like 
"strengthen" or "increase" in reference to a particular program or 
policy). 
Review recommendations on program are almost always "positive" in that 
they suggest adding a particular line of research to existing efforts. 
Rarely has any panel recommended the curtailment orelimination of research 
program except in cases where the activity appears to be stretching the 
institute's mandate (e.g., IITA's involvement with "development" 
projects). There are some examples of review teams having recommended 
priorities for a research program (e.g., Second EPR of IRRI) but there is 
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little evidence that the rankings have been adopted by the Board or 
management. 
Of the three Strine reviews carried out in the CGIAR, the first two 
apparently had very little impact on Center activities. The main value of 
the reviews was descriDtive in that they provided a broad overview of the 
topic at hand. They were not critical of programs at any individual 
Center and their recommendations were very general, but they may have 
served to initiate further discussion on the issue among IARC scientists 
(e.g., the Farming Systems Research Review). 
It is too early to judge the impact of the third Stripe review. This 
review on training was much more extensive. It addressed an issue of 
global concern (i.e., human res.ource needs in agricultural research 
programs in developing countries) and then considered the role of the 
IARCs in meeting this need. Many of its recommendations were quite 
specific. The cost of this study was several times higher than the 
previous Stripe review (on off-Center activities). 
(d) Criticisms in Review Reoorts 
A few trends appear to have developed in the contents of the review 
reports. Three main trends have shown up in the analysis. 
(1) The first round of the external reviews tend to be less critical 
than the second round of reviews. This apparent difference seems to arise 
from several factors: (a) Early in an institute's life noticeable research 
progress is very rapid; (b) the development of new technology and the 
impact of the new technology emerge more slowly than advances in 
scientific knowledge; and (c) review teams usually exhibit strong sympathy 
a 
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for the objectives of an institute's research program: they want the 
institute to succeed. 
In the second round of reviews the teams tend to be more frank in their 
critiques. Aithough they stiii show the same sympathy for program 
objectives (evidenced by the high praise for successful efforts), more 
emphasis is placed on results and impact. The inclusion of management 
reviews probably has also added to greater frankness in the review reports 
because the EXRs tend to be more direct in their criticisms. 
(2) Reviews of highly regarded institutes tend to be more forward 
looking and to place less emphasis on the evaluation of past or current 
research. Reviews of newer institutes or of institutes whose reputations 
are not yet well established, however, place more emphasis on evaluating 
the quality of on-going research. 
(3) Review teams show some tendency to bypass criticisms and to move' 
directly to recommendations for program or policy changes. Direct 
criticisms of individuals or programs are often softened (or only vaguely 
referred to); the nature of the recommendations., however, may imply strong 
criticism of existing programs (e.g., IITA-CIAT cassava dispute, IITA 
labor relations, and the general research program at the first ILCA 
review). Sometimes it takes several readings to ascertain the nature of 
the criticisms, which may be passed over at first glance. 
(e) Eliciting Staff Concerns in Review ReDorts 
The review panels seemed able to elicit major staff concerns and to 
judge staff morale effectively. In cases where major problems were 
identified, concrete recommendations usually were made. 
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The participation of staff members in management decisions seemed to be 
an important factor determining staff morale. It is interesting to note 
that the Centers characterized as having strong leadership at the DG level 
(e.g., CIP and CIAT) also had participatory forms of management. But 
authoritarian leadership styles did not always translate into poor staff 
morale. There is some indication, nevertheless, that review teams felt 
authoritarian management did have an adverse effect on overall program 
performance, 
One staff problem faced by several institutes relates to policies 
toward off-Center staff. When these staff members were funded only 
through short term contract funds, the effect on morale was usually 
negative because of the isolation and insecure career prospects. This 
problem was lessened in institutes that funded its off-Center staff 
through core funds (e.g. ) CIP). 
Finally, some institutes established discriminatory salary scales 
between international and regional staff members (i.e., ICRISAT and 
ICARDA). This practice was a potential source of friction among staff 
members and another source of morale problems. On the other hand, CIAT 
employed an innovative non-hierarchical personnel structure for its 
scientific staff that was quite popular and contributed toward staff 
cohesion. 
A frequent concern expressed by staff members was the lack of 
opportunities at the Centers for career development. Occasionally, 
recommendations were made to lengthen contracts or to create more 
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personnel grades. The external reviews were sensitive to the need to 
maintain flexibility in staff composition. 
The reviews also took some interest in the concerns of lower level and 
support staff members. 
(f) Commoditv Research Oreanizational Structure 
The organization of research within an institute in the CGIAR system is 
quite diverse. Determining factors are the number and nature of the crops 
being investigated, the heterogeneity of the environment in which these 
crops are grown, the presence of a farming systems program, and the age of 
the institute. 
Single commodity institutes seem to have developed greater focus in 
their research structure, CIP and.IRRI are two such institutes. 'I'hey 
structure their programs around a series of identified "problem areas" by 
. 
forming multidisciplinary teams of scientists to investigate each area. 
The development of biological technoloeies is the key component of the 
research strategy. IRRI, however, places an increasingly greater emphasis 
on the development of informatfonal technologies (i.e., soil, water, and 
crop management, cropping systems, climatic environmental 
characterization, and "constraints" research). The development of 
mechanical technoloPies is only a small part of the research program at 
any IARC. The following table lists the research "thrusts" at IRRI and 
CIP and categorizes them according to the type of technology they 
. ._ 
encompass. 
Note that a greater number of "thrusts" is devoted to informational 
technology development at IRRI whereas CIP places more emphasis on 
biological technology development. 
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Table 5.11: & Comparison of the Research Organizations at CIP and IRRI 
********************************************************************* 
Type of Technology IRRI (rice) CIP (potatoes) 
******************************************************************* 
Biological 
-genetic resources 1. Evaluation and 
utilization 
-pest control 2. Control and management 
of pests 
1. Collection, maintenance 
and utilization 
2. Seed production and 
distribution 
3. Seed production technology 
4. Control of bacterial and 
fungal diseases 
5. Control of virus diseases 
6. Integrated pest m.anagement 
Informational 
3. Irrigation water 7. Warm climate production 
management 8. Cool climate production 
4. Cropping systems 9. Food systems research 
5. Climatic environmental 
characterization 
6. Soil and crop management 
7. Constraints and conse- 
quences research 
************************************************************************ 





The multicommodity institutes usually organize their research 
activities around crop "programs" and then try to link them with a farming 
systems research program. In practice, however, such linkages have often 
been difficult to estabiish and the farming system research activities are 
usually carried out separately from the commodity research programs. The 
result seems to be a series of "mini-institutes" within the Center. This 
type of organization has characterized IITA and ICRISAT. 
An alternative multicommodity structure has been used at CIAT. CIAT 
does not have a separate farming system research component but, instead 
forms teams from a number of disciplines under each commodity program. 
CIAT also integrates economic research within its commodity research 
. programs, apparently quite effectively. Thus multidisciplinary approaches 
to research on a single commodity are promoted. However, there does not . 
appear to be deliberate structural linkages across commodities. Some 
review reports suggest that specialized disciplinary units should be 
established for some cross-commodity problems to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of expensive research facilities (e.g., for future research on 
tissue culture at CIAT). Some such units have been established. 
In the review reports, commodity programs generally fared better than 
farming system programs in terms of effectiveness, focus, and 
organization. 
Two service institutes (ISNAR and IBPGR) lacked a well defined formal 
structure, and authority and management responsibilities were reported to 
be too centralized around the DG. The management reviews presented 
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alternative organizational structures to decentralize management activities. 
(g) Research Planning Processes 
A wide range of research planning mechanisms has been employed by the 
IARCS. The more mature institutes (CIP, IRRI, CIAT, and CIMMYT) appear to have 
strong internal planning mechanisms in place. The Board of Trustees and the 
social sciences have played quite strong roles in the planning process. CIP 
seems to have involved representatives of National Agricultural Research 
Programs in its planning activities more effectively than other institutes 
through its use of Regional Planning Conferences. 
Planning Conferences 
The trend at these mature institutes is to place more program emphasis on 
basic research and to leave technology development to the NARPs. This tendency 
is evident in the lung-range plans of these institutes and it has been 
encouraged by the reviews. In the case of CIP, however, continued reliance on 
contract research is envisioned to meet basic research needs. 
The role of the social sciences in the planning process has been slow to 
evolve and is explicit only in the more mature institutes. It is most evident 
at IRRI through its "Constraints and Consequences" research focus. When used, 
social science research appears to be a very effective means of influencing the 
direction of an institute's research program. A good example is the long-range 
planning report of CIAT. It utilized the production and nutrition studies 




The role of the Board of Trustees has varied considerably among 
institutes. Some Boards, with active program committees have played a 
strong and constructive role in research policy and program development. 
At most Centers,Board members participate in the internal review sessions. 
Boards have, however, not always found it easy to distinguish between 
their own responsibilities for Center policy and program direction and 
managements responsibility for progam implementation and operation. 
In the life of an institute the role of the Board appears to be 
constantly evolving. Initially, the main task is the selection of the DG 
who then is given a great deal of freedom in getting the institute 
established. As the institute matures, the participation of the Board in 
research policy increases. The recent financial stringencies faced by 
most institutes has been another factor leading to greater involvement of 
the Board in strategic planning. Several second external review reports 
have advocated a greater role for the Board. In a few cases there have 
been periods of detrimental and long-standing friction between the DGs and 
Boards. 
Some institutes (ILCA, ILRAD, IITA, WARDA, and ICRISAT) did not appear, 
from the review documents, to have very effective long-range planning or 
research evaluation mechanisms. In some of these cases (e.g., ICRISAT) 
questionnaire responses confirmed a dissatisfaction with the internal 
review process. The usual criticism is that internal reviews are too 
superficial or have had limited influence on program direction. 
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(h) Relations with National Proprams 
Perhaps the principal mode of nuturing relations with NARPs is a 
Center‘s trainine nrozram. Over time, the Center builds up a cadre of 
scientists in the NARPs who are familiar with and usually sympathetic to 
the Center. These relationships between Center and NARP scientists often 
form the basis for future collaborative research with the NARPs. Most 
Centers also post renional staff to facilitate relations with NARPs. At 
least one Center also has relied on Board members to help establish 
relations with NARPs (e.g., ICARDA). 
Collaborative projects usually focus on varietal testing and adaption. 
But some Centers also move toward collaborative projects in crop 
management and farming systems research. Center staff are often assigned 
directly to the NARPs in these cases. 
Centers employ NARP representatives in planning on-station programs to 
varying degrees. According to the reviews, CIP is at one end of the 
continuum; it uses reBiona1 olannine conferences with NARP, CIP, and other 
invited participants to plan and coordinate CIP and NARP research 
programs. At the other extreme are ICRISAT, which was criticized for not 
involving NARP representatives in program planning, and IITA, where 
involvement in development projects was criticized for displacing NARP 
activities. Some centers had intern nrozrams employing NARP members for a 
one-year period (e.g., IBPGR). 
(il) Interactions AmonF IARCs 
Reviews spent a fair amount of time investigating relationships among 
IARCS. In most cases the reviews seemed able to identify problems and to 
provide recommendations for their resolution. 
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The record of relations among IARCs is mixed. In several cases, 
cooperation was deemed inadequate by the reviews. In some instances, it 
appears that "turf battles" may have prevented resolution (e.g., IITA-CIAO 
on cassava, CIMMYT-ICARDA on barley, and CIMMYT-IITA on maize). The 
increased financial competition among IARCs may be a contributing factor in 
the cases of limited cooperation. However, in most instances the record of 
cooperation appears to be quite good. 
In some external reviews, the recommendations delineating 
responsibilities between institutes went unheeded. For example, the second 
external review of IITA recommended that its mandate be extended to include 
sweet potatoes. Instead, responsibility for sweet potatoes went to CIP 
although its second review had made no mention of sweet'potato research. 
(12) Involvement with the Private Sector 
This topic is almost absent in the reviews. Among the few references 
to cooperation with the private sector were IRRI's program of machinery 
development, ICRISAT on seed distribution, and CIAT on seed industry 
development (CIAT'S involvement with the private sector in this area was 
not mentioned by the reviews but was indicated in CIAT's long-range 
planning document). In only a few cases has there been a representative 
from the private sector on a review panel. Nor did I find any mention of 
collaboration on research with the private sector. 
(13) Other Interactions 
CIP has been aggressive in its use of contract research with research 
institutions in developed countries. ILRAD engages in collaborative 
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research with other advanced institutes, as does IBPGR, although to a 
lesser degree (it currently has no research facilities of its own). Other 
institutes use collaborative research on an & hoc basis for very specific 
tasks (e.g., IRRI). ICARDA plans to seek relations with southern European 
research institutions that are located in similar climatic zones. CIAT 
initially planned to rely on basic research institutions in developed 
countries for research on emerging biotechnologies, but it has recently 
begun to acquire internal capabilites in this field. CIMMYT is involved 
in significant germplasm exchanges with some North American institutions. 
Other institutes, however, claim to have had difficulty generating 
interest in their reseach programs (e.g., ICRISAT) among developed 
country institutions. 
Some institutes also collaborate in training programs with universities 
in developed countries (e.g., IRRI., IBPGR) by providing facilities for 
the research components of advanced degrees or supporting curriculum 
development. 
Another major area of interaction is with United Nations organizations. 
IBPGR has been located within FAO, but this association was identified as 
a significant structural problem in the second external review. ILRAD 
reportedly coordinates its livestock research with FAO and WHO. In 
addition, some evidence of competition and overlap between FAO and ISNAR 
was noted in the review of ISNAR. 
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5.2 THE CIAT REVIEWS 
Reviews: First EPR,1977 
Second EPR, 1984 
EMR, 1984 
(a) Panel Membershin 
First EPR: 11 members 
UK (2) NARP 




W Germany academia 
CGIAR/TAC (3) 
Second EPR: 11 members 








EMR: 3 members 
(b) Panel Itinerary 
First EPR (1977) 
Apr 12-15: visits to NARP and field activities in Brazil and 
Guatemala 
Apr 17-22: at CIAT Center for staff briefings 
Apr 17-29: at CIAT Center for report writing and presentation 
Second EPR (Nov 84 - Mar 85) 
Nov 28-Jan 18: visited NARP in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Thailand, 
Indonesia* 
Jan 23-Jan 27: meetings in France with key scientists* 
Jan 29-Feb 3: at CIAT Center to attend internal review session 
Feb 4 -Mar 3: visits to CIAT activities in Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria 
Mar 4 -Mar 12: at CIAT Center for staff briefings 
Mar 12-Mar 24: at CIAT Center for report writing and presentation 
*just one group member involved in these activities 
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(c) Impact of the Reviews 
(ref: appendix V, Second EPR; CIAT report of "Action Taken To Date (May, 
1986)" on the EPR recommendations) 
All recommendations listed in the First EPR were acted upon or achieved 
except two pertaining to the animal programs in swine and beef and one 
pertaining to long range planning. These are described below. But note, 
the First EPR was essentially an endorsement of CIAT's research program 
and strategy. Most recommendations were fairly broad in scope or of minor 
significance. One exception to this was a recommendation by this panel 
that CIAT conduct imuact studies of its research. This has since become a 
major activity at the Center. 
The First EPR, the Farming Systems Research Stripe Review, and a TAC 
committee report on upland rice (1980) encouraged CIAT to initiate work on 
agrosystem characterization. This led to the creation of an Agroecological 
Studies Unit, begun in 1978 and expanded in 1983 and 1984. 
The First EPR recommended that all programs be continued without 
interruption and that CIAT devote more resources to cattle disease 
research. But CIAT eliminated the swine program when budgets became tight 
and cut out all its cattle disease research to concentrate on pastures 
improvement. The results of its own internal planning mechanisms found 
"growing evidence that poor nutrition rather than animal diseases 
represented the.key constraint to improved livestock production" '(Annex V, 
P 5). See section G below for a detailed account of' the evolution of beef 
production systems research programs at CIAT. 
The First EPR also felt strongly enough about the direction of CIAT 
research at the time that it recommended that resources not be devoted to 
long range planning. But pressure from donors in 1978 overrode this 
recommendation (Annex V, p 1). 
A recent CIAT report (May, 1986) reviewed the action taken by CIAT in 
light of the recommendations of the Second External Review. CIAT has made 
significant progress in implementing these recommendations. 
For example, CIAT has taken significant steps to increase its 
commitment to basic research. In 1985, it established the Biotechnology 
Research Unit. It has also considerably increased the number of 
collaborative research projects with universities and specialized research 
institutions. It has responded to the panel's concerns on staff 
development by commiting more resources to sabbatical leaves for senior 
staff and by developing an explicit policy to encourage staff to publish 
research results in scientific journals. 
Also, CIAT has responded favorably to most of the panel's 
recommendations aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the cassava 
research program. In early 1985 it implemented a large-scale cassava 
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demand study to assess the potential demand of cassava as a human food and 
other uses in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Furthermore, it reached a 
new agreement with IITA defining working relationships and 
responsibilities and on guidelines for the safe interchange of cassava 
materials. Good rapport between the DG's of IITA and CIAT were reported. 
IITA is collaborating with CIAT on the economic studies and on other joint 
research projects as well, 
Finally, CIAT has been able to identify and solicit resources for 
several new staff positions and research facilities that were recommended 
by the Second EPR. 
The progress made by CIAT so far in implementing these recommendations 
indicates the flexibility of CIAT staff and management in pursuing 
promising new lines of research and the commitment of the management to 
the planning mechanism. 
(d) Handling Criticisms in the Reviews 
All the review reports have been strong endorsements of CIAT's program 
and strategy. Most comments by the reviews are for program expansion -- 
more scientists, more projects and facilities. 
Two criticisms in the Second EPR are: 
(1) The relationship between CIAT and IITA on cassava research 
collaboration is described as "unsatisfactory". See the abstract on IITA 
for a detailed exposition of this issue. 
(2) The number of scientific publications is described as 
"disappointing". The review urges CIAT to devote more resources to such 
studies so as to build up CIAT's international reputation and to force 
scientists into more careful assessment of their results, 
The panel expressed concern about the long run efficacy of cassava 
research. They suggested that background studies be undertaken "to better 
understand the markets for human food and animal feed . . . help determine 
the shape and direction of the cassava program" (p 49-50). This was not a 
criticism of CIAT's cassava research program, however, but seems to stem 
from the panel's concern that cassava may be an area to deemphasize (in 
the long run) as its demand potential may be limited. 
Item (2) indicates a desire of the panel for CIAT to move more into 
basic research areas from applied technology development, The previous 
section on "Impact of the Reviews" indicates the positive response of CIAT 
to these criticisms. 
(e) Eliciting Staff Concerns 
The Second EPR recommends more resources be devoted to scientific staff 
develooment in the form of sabbatical leaves and additional time alloted 
for scientists to publish in scientific journals. 
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The EM.R praises the leadership of the DG and his unique management 
style. The DG actively seeks out individual scientists concerns in 
one-on-one meetings in addition to monthly staff meetings, There is also 
an active committee structure to elicit participation in management by the 
scientific staff (p 12-13). 
The EMR also notes the heavy reliance on the post dot pool for senior 
scientist recruitment (p 147). 
(f) Research Organizational Structure 
CIAT has responsibilities for three main crops, cassava, beans, and 
rice, and has an active Tropical Pastures Program. The CIAT research 
strategy is to form multidisciplinary teams to conduct research on each of 
the commodity areas. An economic component is an integral part of each 
commodity research team. The economic component is responsible for (1) 
evaluating macro production and marketing trends in the CIAT commodities; 
(2) identifying constraints to productivity; and (3) evaluating proposed 
technologies using experiments and farm level data. 
The cassava and bean programs emphasize research on biological 
technologies whereas the pastures program employs about an even mix of 
biological and informational technologies in its research program (see 
table 1 in the summary section for an explanation of these categories). 
The Second EPR pointed out the possibility of using specialized 
disciplinary units (across commodities) for specific problems. For 
example, it proposes a Science and Germplasm Resource Unit (SGRU) to 
conduct research on tissue culture, a need of all the commodity programs. 
The advantage of this structure would be that it (1) requires a minimum 
amount of reorganization, (2) recognizes future limits on staff, (3) would 
generate a critical mass of scientists working in advanced research, and 
(4) could accommodate the addition of new disciplines (e.g., nematology). 
(g) Research Plannine Process 
The First EPR reported a fairly passive role of the Board of Trustees 
and strong leadership on the part of the DG and program leaders. But the 
Second EPR and the EMR give evidence that the role of the Board has 
increased in research strategy formulation. For example, the Second EPR 
reports that the changes that occurred in the Animal research programs at 
CIAT were "thoroughly debated and agreed upon by the Board" (Annex V, p 
5). 
Furthermore, the Second EPR reports that long range planning has been 
"institutionalized" at CIAT (p 147). The long range plan that was 
developed in 1980 underwent thorough revisions in 1984 and is "clear, 
concise, and adequately detailed“ (p 147). 
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As an illustration consider the developments in the beef production 
systems research program that have occurred at CIAT. This program has 
undergone major changes since its inception in 1969, as a result of the 
internal planning process at CIAT. These changes sometimes ran contrary to 
the recommendations of the external reviews. 
In 1973 CIAT initiated a major review of its research program in Beef 
Production Systems, inviting prominent scientists from outside CIAT to 
participate in the review, This panel recommended that the program be 
concentrated on a few priority areas. Forage quality was established as 
the primary limiting factor to beef production in the region of CIAT'S 
concern. 
Even though the First EPR (1977) was amply represented in the livestock 
area, it recommended that CIAT place more emphasis on animal disease. But 
CIAT's own evidence demonstrated that animal nutrition was the key 
limiting factor to beef production (and that research on animal disease 
was already well represented in the IARC system by ILRAD). It rejected 
this recommendation of the EPR, eliminated what remained of its animal 
disease research program, and in 1979 renamed this program the "Tropical 
Pastures Program" to better reflect its principal thrust. The Second EPR 
fully endorsed this action taken by CIAT. 
A second example of how the planning process at CIAT has'been effective . 
is in the establishment of the Seed Unit in the late 1970s. In 1977, CIAT 
management recognized the need to assist Latin American countries in 
developing domestic seed industries. Within a year it had identified 
additional funding sources to establish a Seed Unit with the following 
objectives: 
(1) to increase the availability of improved seed; and 
(2) to provide assistance to develop domestic seed industries. 
It has accomplished the latter through extensive training programs, both 
at CIAT and within client countries; hosting workshops; and through 
cooperation with institutions in developed countries (e.g., with 
Mississippi State). 
The lack of an effective local seed industry is identified as a common 
constraint to technology diffusion in developing countries. CIAT 
recognized this problem and took initiatives to overcome this constraint. 
There was no mention of this issue in the First EPR of CIAT in 1977. 
(h) Interaction with National Program 
CIAT uses an extensive system of regional organizations as its 
fundamental tool in its relations with NARP's. CIAT outposts staff in 
appropriate regions.' 
CIAT courses are taught in-country as well as at the center. The Second 




Also noted in the Second EPR was the fact the CIAT graduates are now in 
leadership roles in several NARP's, and that this facilitates CIAT/NARP 
cooperation. 
CIAT's philosophy is to move more into basic research areas as the NARP 
capabilities develop. However, there was an indication in the Second EPR 
of some paternalism on the part of CIAT in its relations with NARP's. 
(i) Relations with Other Institutions 
There are several examples of CIAT collaborating on research projects 
with institutes in developed countries. But this is not done on a 
systematic basis but only as special needs and opportunities arise. 
The Seed Unit cooperated with the private sector in assisting the 
development of domestic seed industries (CIAT in the 198Os, the institutes 
long range planning document). 
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5.3 THE CIMMYT REVIEWS 
Reviews: EPR, 1976 
EPR, 1982 
(a) Panel Membership 
First EPR: 9 members 
UK (2) NARP 
Australia academia 
Canada academia 




Second EPR: 9 members 
Australia academia 




(b) Panel'Itinerarv . 
First EPR: Mar 21 to Apr 4, 1976 
Mar 21 - 30: meetings with CIMMYC staff at El Batan, Obregon and 
Poza Rica. 
Mar 31 - Apr 4: at CIMMYT (El Batan) for report preparation and 
presentation of results. 
Second EPR: Sep 4 to 24, 1982 
Sep 4 - 15: meetings with CIMMYT staff at El Batan and Poza Rica. 
Sep 16 - 17: visits to on-farm research and NARPs in Mexico, 
Guatemala. 
Sep 18 - 24: at CIMMYT for report preparation and presentation of 
results. 
(c) Imnact of the Reviews 
Recommendations from the First EPR,to (1) provide core support for the 
triticale research program, (2) expand relations with other research 
institutes in both developing and developed countries, and (3) expand the 
economics program; were implemented. 
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However, a recommendation to concentrate more on breeding research was 
rejected in favor of more emphasis on farm trials. CIMMYT felt this was 
necessary to reduce the site specificity of its breeding program, The 
Second EPR endorsed this decision. There were also a series of 
recommendations in the First EPR to expand the training program and 
communication services. But CIMMYT was unable to implement these 
immediately due to financial constraints. A recommendation to make the 
regional programs part of the core also was not completely implemented, 
though regional programs were increased. 
The following recommendations in the First EPR received no comment in 
the later review. But CIMMYT documents show that work has been carried 
out in the first three areas: 
(1) to identify disease resistant genes in durum and breadwheat; 
(2) to breed dry area varieties; 
(3) to verify that daylength neutrality is a desirable characteristic in 
the Meditarranean region; 
(4) to conduct socio-economic studies of hulless barley. 
(d) Handling of Criticisms in the Reviews 
Both reviews were strong endorsements of the CIMMYT program and 
strategy, No major weaknesses were reported. There is a notable 
difference, however, in the content of the First EPR and the S.econd.EPR. . 
The First EPR was basically a summary and endorsement of the past research 
program and method.. The Second EPR, however, contained more indepth 
analysis.. It contained a more detailed description of the research program 
structure and management policy. More attention was given to directions 
for future research but this discussion was in fairly broad terms. There 
was more discussion on the role of CIMMYT vis a vis other IARC's and 
NARP's. 
The Second EPR did criticize, however, what it felt was an over 
reliance on the pool of post dot researchers for senior research staff 
recruitment. This may lead to isolation and staff "inbreeding". This 
practice received praise in the First EPR, however. 
(e) Eliciting Staff Concerns 
The high quality, dedication, and morale of the research staff was 
noted in both reviews. 
(f) Research Organizational Structure 
Research at CIMMYT has three major components: the wheat program, the 
maize program, and the economics program. The CIMMYT program is highly 
focused on the breeding of maize and wheat. It collects germplasm 
material, produces new plant genotypes, and distributes these through 
NARP's. Historically, it has emphasized developing aoolied technology, but 
the Second EPR suggested that more resources be devoted to basic research 
and more staff time be devoted to scholarly publications. 
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The economic research program carries out micro studies, to identify 
farm level production constraints, and global studies to evaluate world 
production and price trends of CIMMYT crops. 
(g) Research Allocation and Planning 
CIMMYT has established an active internal planning process. It carried 
out major planning excercises in 1966, 1970, 1973, 1976, and in 1979-80. 
Prominent scientists from outside CIMMXT were invited to these sessions 
(Second EPR, p 30). 
The Board of Trustees became more active in planning and setting 
research priorities as financial stringencies became more acute. It 
carries out this role mainly through its Program Committee. 
The economics program had just been established at the time of the 
First EPR. At that time the objectives of this program were to (1) help 
determine research priorities; (2) evaluate the impact of research 
programs; and (3) collaborate with NARP's on economic studies. However, at 
that time, there wasn't much need to prioritize research projects because 
there was a rapid and continued growth in financial resources. But even 
though research funds have leveled off in recent years, the economics 
program apparently has not been very active in the research policy area 
(according to the review). 
(h) Interaction with National. Programs . 
CIMMYT interacts with national programs both through renional networks 
and through bilateral orograms. The regional programs are the main tool 
for disseminating, testing, and evaluating new varieties. CIMMYT posts its 
own staff directly in these regions, with representatives.in South 
America, Asia, and Africa. 
Bilateral programs are used to address specific research problems. 
Training programs, opportunities for thesis research, publications, 
staff visits to the field, and visits by NARP representatives to the 
Center are other modes of interaction. 
(i) Interaction with Other Institutions 
CIMMYT works closely with certain institutions in developed countries 
on certain tasks. For example, it has developed a maize germplasm 
classification system with the University of Colorado and has collaborated 
with the University of Manitoba on its Triticale program. There is also 
extensive germplasm exchange between CIMMYT and these institutions. 
The relationship between CIMMYT and the other IARC's received 
considerable attention in the reviews. 
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5.4 
Reviews: First EPR, 1977 
Second EPR, 1983 
EMR, 1983 
(a) Panel Membershio 
First EPR: 8 members 
Netherlands academia, plant science 
USA (2) academia, economics and ? 
UK NARP 
India NARP, potatoes 
Peru NARP 
CGIAR/TAC (2) 





UK academia, plant pathology and entomology 
Canada IDRC 
CGIAR/TAC (2) 
EMR: 2 members 
(b) Panel Itinerary 
First EPR (1977) 
Aug - Ott: 







visit to contract research institutions in US and Europe 
visits to off-station activities and NARPS in Mexico, 
India and Kenya 
at CIP Center for staff briefings 
at CIP Center for report writing and presentation 
(1982-83) 
at CIP Center to attend Internal Review 
5: visit to contract research institutions; 
visit to off-staion activities and NARPS in India, 
Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, Mexico, Costa Rica, and 
Columbia 
at CIP Center for staff briefings 
at CIP Center for report writing and presentation 
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(c) Imoact of Reviews 
A recurring theme of the First EPR was the need to develop safe 
quarantine proc'edures for germplasm material transfer between countries. 
In response to this concern, CIP curtailed its material transfers until 
safer procedures could be developed (Second EPR, p ix). 
The Second EPR also noted a marked improvement in the role and focus of 
the social science research program at CIP (p ix), another concern of the 
First EPR. 
The First EPR also included a list of recommendations for future 
research directions. The Second EPR does not analyze these individually 
but states that "CIP has responded quickly, though not precipitously, to 
recommendations of both Quinquennial Reviews" (p x). 
The Second EPR recommended that the social sciences be more integrated 
into the research program. Some thrusts had social science involvement but 
much of the work of the social science department was outside of the 
thrusts. As indicated in the Profile Uodate (a redraft of the CIP long- 
range plan, completed after the Second EPR), the thrusts were reorganized 
and the social science research program was fully integreted into this 
structure. 
(d) HandlinP Criticisms in the ReDOrt 
The First EPR'contained few, if any, direct program or management 
criticisms. Essentially, the report was an affirmation of CIP's progress 
and program. The social science component appeared to lack firm direction, 
however, and the panel made several recommendations about getting a better 
program underway. 
The Second EPR was somewhat critical of research organization at CIP, 
claiming that the research "thrusts" had become too singledisciplinary in 
their operation (p 60). It suggested a reorganization of the research 
program according to agroecological zones. 
The EMR expressed concern that the management structure was too loose, 
especially with regards to attention to detail at lower management levels. 
Methods of accounting for research expenditures were considered untimely 
and of insufficient detail (p 15). Information on research expenses is 
critical for ongoing evaluation of cost effectiveness of research 
program. But the Second EPR praised the loose management structure: 
11 . . . the loose management structure... has ensured the sense of freedom and 
independence of individual scientists" (p 62). 
(e) Elicitine: Staff Concerns 
Staff morale at CIP is characterized as very high and the staff feel 
they are a part of the management and policy determination process 
(reported in all review reports). 
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(f) Research Oreanizational Structure 
Three main focuses characterize CIP research structure: 
(1) contract research with institutions in developed countries; 
(2) centerbased research organized into ten "thrusts"; 
(3) regional research networks with developing countries. 
This structure has enabled CIP to maintain a strong research program 
while developing only a modest center research facility. It relies heavily 
on contract research (in 1982 there were 35 separate projects in this 
category) for many of its research needs. This also serVes to build 
interest at these institutions in CIP program and objectives, facilitating 
a wider range of contact and exchange. Use of contract research to this 
degree is unique in the IARC system. 
"Thrusts" are defined as "problem areas" with multidisciplinary teams 
formed to carry out research projects within the thrust. In practice, 
however, the research is usually singledisciplinary (Second EPR, p 60). 
Before the Second EPR, Social Science research was organized outside of 
the thrusts, though one or two thrusts had social scientists working with 
them. After the EPR, however, an additional thrust was created (and the 
other thrusts were reorganized) to fully integrate social science research 
into the research program. See the table in the summary paper for list of 
the separate thrusts. 
CIP has very effective relations established with national programs, 
through a system of regional networks. CIP'provides technical and 
financial support to the regional networks. It assigns core staff to work 
directly within national programs as part of the networks. These field 
staff facilitate the work of "technology groups" of Center and NARP 
scientists assigned to evaluate technology packages developed by thrusts 
under local conditions. 
The Second EPR attributed program effectiveness to: 
(1) simplicity of management structure; 
(2) concentration of effort, i.e.,a minimum critical mass of scientists 
working on a relatively small number of problems: 
(3) concentration on utilizing imDroved aermDlasm as the principle 
technology. 
(g) Research Plannine Process 
CIP has an active annual internal review program and a participatory 
management style. 
CIP uses RePional PlanninP Conferences, involving CIP scientists, NARP 
representatives, Board members and prominent scientists from developed 




CIP produces and periodically updates a long range plan called 
Profiles, which looks ahead to 2000 A.D. 
But the Second EPR recommended greater involvement of social scientists 
to help guide biological research in identifying production and 
consumption constraints, Integration of social science disciplines in the 
planning process had been poor so far (Second EPR p 41, p 60). 
The leadership of the DG is praised as a key to the effectiveness of 
CIP. There is little mention of the role of the Board of Trustees in the 
review reports. But other sources suggest that Board members are actively 
involved in internal reviews and planning conferences, and regularly visit 
regional programs. 
(h) Interaction with National ProPrams 
CIP devoted 40% of its budget to regional activities, as of 1982. The 
system of regional networks represented the main thrust of these efforts. 
15% of CIP's core staff were posted directly in regional locations in 
1982. There were seven regional headquarters. 
These regional staff were considered the key ingredient to the success 
of the regional programs. The Second EPR noted that the success of the 
regional networks "... is the result of the, detailed knowledge of the 
problems and difficulties of their individual client countries, built up 
by their regional scientists ,in the field" (p 42): 
In developing national research capacities in potato research, CIP (1) 
contacts countries and identifies human resources in each country; (2) 
forms research priorities with that country that can be accommodated by 
existing national expertice; and (3) assists in approaching donors for 
additional financial support for facilities, training, and consultancies 
for that country. 
CIP also carries out a relatively high proportion of its training 
programs in the host countries, often employing host country instructors. 
CIP attempts to transfer activities to national programs as their 
capacities develop, 
Essentially, CIP's theme is to maintain a low profile, utilizing 
contract research to maintain a low center overhead, and putting national 
programs at the forefront. 
(I) Interactions with Other Institutions and Private Sector 
No references were made to any involvement with the private sector. See 
references to contract research in section f above. 
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5.5 THE IBPGR REVIEWS 
Reviews: 
1st EPR, 1979 
2nd EPR, 1985 
EMR, 1985 
(a) Panel Membershio 
1st Review (3 members, including 2 who joined on short notice) 








(b) Panel Itinerary 
1st Review 
Phase I: summer and fall of 1979 
Reports.prepared on regional activities (for Latin and North‘ America, for 
Southwest Asia and Mediterranean, and for South and Southeast Asia). Visit 
to the IPBGR program in Boulder, Colorado and to Birmingham University, 
U.K. 
Phase II: December 3-8, 1979 
Meetings with IBPGR and FAO staff at Rome headquarters office. 
2nd Review 
Phase I: Sept 4, 1984 to Jan 26, 1985 
Panel representatives visited NARPs, IBPGR field units, and three IARCs in 
Hungary, Philippines, USA, Thailand, Pakistan, Peru, Brazil, Nigeria, and 
Ivory Coast. IARCs visited were IRRI, CIP, and IITA. There was also a five 
day session at the IBPGR Secretariate during this time to discuss 
management issues. 
Phase II: Jan 27 to Feb 9 
Panel at IBPGR Secretariate for discussions with Board, staff, and FAO 
representatives, report writing, and presentation of main conclusions to 
IBPGR Board and senior management. 
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(c) Impact of Reviews 
The 1st review had very minimal impact on the IBPGR program and 
activities. Last minute panel membership changes resulted in a weak 
report. The panel made no recommendations for any substantial changes at 
IBPCR _-__, It did recommend a continuation. It apparently avoided a key issue: 
tension in the relationship between IBPGR and FAO (see below). 
The 2nd review has potentially substantial impacts on IBPGR. It called 
for significant changes in the organizational structure of the institute 
and for a stronger research component to the program. Most significantly, 
it suggested that IBPGR be separated operationally from FAO. IBPGR's 
current relationship with FAO was identified as a major constraint to 
program implementation. 
Areas needing additional research identified in the 2nd review are: 
(1) conservation methods (i.e. storage of genetic materials); 
(2) collection methods (such as genetic sampling,methods to determine 
genetic distribution and diversity); 
(3) plant health in germplasm movement (especially in preventing the 
spread of pests and diseases), 
The 2nd review took the view that while many of these research needs could 
be met.through contract research, IBPGR also needed its own research 
capacity in order attract high level staff and to remain fully abreast of 
scientific development.in these areas: 
The 2nd review envisioned a restructed institute that would be more 
similar to the structure of other IARCs. It would be independent of FAO, 
its Board would no-longer be involved in operational matters, and it would 
add a research component to its current program of activities. A change of 
venue would also be necessary. 
The 2nd review also presented some less radical options for changes in 
IBPGR management and structure if the preferred proposal proved 
unfeasible. The 2nd review developed these proposals in close consultation 
with IBPGR Board and management. 
In this regard, the 2nd review was a forum for the Board and management 
to present its view of a significant structural issue facing the 
Secretariate. The panel served as an independent third party to assess the 
various views and make recommendations to TAC. On this issue the 
recommendations of the panel concurred with the views of the Board and 
management. 
(d) Handling Criticisms in the Reviews 
The 1st review contained no criticisms of IBPGR. It strongly endorsed 
and reaffirmed the program and direction of the institute. 
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The 2nd review also commended IBPGR progress, program, and management, 
but identified several areas needing attention: 
(1) an inadequate internal review process; 
(2) poor recruitment and promotion policy; 
(3) poor internal communication; 
(4) overly centralized management; 
(5) insufficient genetic resource evaluation and utilization efforts; 
(6) apparent poor quality of some training activities (actually, this was 
a point made by the Board itself, p 44, EPR). 
The source of the tension between IBPGR and FAO appears to be both 
structural and attitudinal. As a part of the FAO organization, IBPGR must 
follow FAO recruitment and promotion regulations, which severally 
constrains IBPGR options. Also FAO has been unable to provide IBPGR with 
sufficient office space at its headquarters. But the problem goes beyond 
these structural matters. An indication of the FAO attitude toward IBPCR 
(and toward the CGIAR in general) is given on page 65 of the 2nd EPR. The 
Director of FAO is quoted as saying the CGIAR system is "without legal 
personality or legal structure". Apparently, FAO questions the legitimacy 
of the international status of the CGIAR institutes. 
(e) Staff Concerns in the Reviews 
The 2nd external review identified significant morale problems among 
the staff at IBPGR. The causes of the problem were identified as (1) lack 
of internal communication; (2) lack of access to and prompt decisions from 
the Executive Secretary (due to his excessive management burden); (3) 
recruitment and promotion policies; and (4) the isolation and insecurity 
of regional staff. 
(f) OrFanizational Structure 
IBPGR's structure is quite unique in the CGIAR system. Two main factors 
distinguish the institute. First, it has had an operational board with a 
secretariat. Initially, FAO was to provide staff and support services, but 
in practice the Board had to develop its own operational capacity, Thus 
the Board has served a dual role as Trustees and as managers/staff, though 
in recent years the Board has devolved much of its responsibilities in 
operations to the Executive Secretary. Second, IBPGR has a special 
relationship with FAO. It is housed in FAO facilities and is a part of the 
FAO organization: IBPGR is also known as the Crop Genetic Resource Center, 
a line unit in FAO. 
The EHR judged that the dual role of the Board has led to poor 
accountability of management to the Board and to poor planning. It also 
felt that the organization of the secretariat was too centralized around 
the Executive Secretary, with poor internal communication between staff. 
Finally, the lack of autonomy from FAO was seen as a significant 
constraint on IBPGR's ability to carry out its mandate. For example, the 
expanded research role envisioned by the 2nd review panel would be 
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unworkable in the present arrangement, due to lack of facilities and lack 
of FAO support for such a role. 
IBPGR has had a very loose organizational structure, with no 
middle-level management positions. Management activities rested with the 
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him. There are five major types of activities: 
(1) Collection 
IBPGR has organized expeditions to collect various species. 
(2) Conservation 
IBPGR sets standards for seed storage and exchange and provides some 
funds for facility improvement at seed storage centers. It designates one 
or two centers for storage responsibility for each major crop. 
(3) Evaluation and Utilization 
Only a small portion of the existing collection of germplasm has been 
evaluated, and a huge backlog exists on characterizing the content of 
these collections. IBPGR has developed descriptor lists and prepared some 
publications of existing data. It has not seen utilization of genetic 
resource material as its responsibility, since others fulfill this role. 
The panel disagreed on this point, however. Breeders tend to only use 
material that is similar to existing cultivars. For radically different 
cultivars, pre-breeding and evaluation of interesting agronomic 
characteristics, are necessary. The panel saw a significant role for IBPGR 
in this area, especially for crops not covered by IARCs. 
(4) Documentation 
IBPGR has sought to get genebank curators to use workable data 
management systems. It has supplied hardware and software, trained 
personnel, published directories, and compiled data bases. Progress in 
this area has been very slow. 
(5) Training 
IBPGR works with the U of Birmingham on an MS program in Genetic 
Resource Conservation. This program was criticized in both the first and 
second review as lacking an applied component to the degree. IBPGR also 
conducts some short courses. Fellowships are also provided for advanced 
study. Finally, there is an intern program at IBPGR which employs several 
scientists from developing countries each year. 
IBPGR also employs several regional staff. Their role is not clearly 
defined. They are supposed to "encourage, support, and coordinate genetic 
resource programs" in that region. They operate in an "opportunistic" 
manner to carry out this function. They try to establish contacts with 
genetic programs in the region, identify the status and needs of these 




(g) Plannine Processes 
Cron Advisor-v Committees and ad hoc Working GrouDs are used by IBPGR as 
planning mechanisms. IBPGR invites outside scientists to serve with IBPGR 
staff on these committees. These committees formulate plans and priorities 
(i.e., a conservation strategy) for a specific crop. 
Furthermore, IBPGR's StratePv ReDort is an operational guide for the 
institute's activites. It was prepared by a committee of Board and 
non-Board members. It prioritizes crops and guides the allocation of 
resources between collection, conservation and other activities. 
Each year an operational plan is developed, depending upon 
opportunities thatexist (based on contacts with NARP's and other 
institutions that have been established). 
Review and evaluation of activities had been ad hoc and superficial. It 
basically consists of an annual oral report of the Executive Secretary to 
the Board. IBPRG has not felt a need for a formal evaluation exercise, 
given the small staff. The EMR, however, recommended that a systematic 
annual review process be implemented. 
(h) Interaction With NARPs 
Modes for interaction with NARPs are through: 
(1) regional staff and national coordinators; 
(2) representatives' from NARPs serving on Crop Advisory Committees and 
Working Groups; 
(3) interns from NARPs working at IBPGR; 
(4) interaction on a project basis with NARPs for genetic resource 
facility improvement. 
One key concern with national governments and IBPGR is the "free flow" 
of genetic resources. There is a motive for individual countries to try to 
restrict access of outsiders to this material and thereby capture the 
value of their natural genetic resources. IBPGR has always pursued a "free 
flow" policy for unimproved genetic resources in principle, but has tried 
to adopt an apolitical stance on this issue (2nd EPR, p xix). The FAO now 
is heavily involved in this matter. 
IBPGR involvement with NARPs is described as "opportunistic". In other 
words, IBPGR has few funds available for research programs or 
collection/conservation activities. It helps establish crop strategies 
(using the Crop Advisory Committees) and then encourages NARPs to adopt 
them and to modify their programs to comply with these national 
imperatives. 
IBPGR's overall objective is to establish a,global network, linking and 




(i) Links with Other Institutions 
1. With FAO. 
The key link is with FAO. The benefits and costs from this relationship 
were oiitiiried iii the 2nd external review. Tinis review judged that these 
costs outweighed the benefits and that it would be more appropriate for 
IBPGR to be structured independently from FAO while retaining some 
important links (like having a permanent FAO representative on the Board), 
2. With other IARCs. 
There has been in the past some confusion over respective roles. Some 
IARCs reduced their support of their own genetic resource units when the 
IBPGR was established, thinking that IBPGR would take over these 
responsibilities. This was not the function of IBPGR, however. The 2nd 
review reported that this misunderstanding had been clarified. 
IARC's and IBPGR cosponsor Crop Advisory Committees. 
The 2nd review visited three centers and conducted a written survey of 
Genetic Resource activities at the centers. In addion, some panel members 
had direct experience with IARCs. The panel claimed there was close 
cooperation and no overlap between IBPGR and other IARCs. 
But'the. review made no attempt at a'system-wide or global review of 
genetic resource activities. It rather .focused on IBPGR program and 
structure, 
3. Private Sector 
Private sector breeding programs and "breeders rights legislation" are 
areas of interest to IBPGR. But there is very little or no interaction 
between the private sector and IBPGR reported in the reviews. 
IBPGR concentrates on unimproved germplasm. 
The panel discussed breeders rights legislation but did not express or 
comment on IBPGR views on this issue. The panel seems to downplay the 
concern that this type of legislation might bar access to or flow of 
genetic resources. But the panel suggests that IBPGR might want to monitor 
penetic diversitv trends to quantifiy the impact of public/private 
breeding programs on the genetic diversity in use. 
There is a concern that plant breeders use only a narrow set of,genetic 
material and that this practice threatens to diminish the genetic 
diversity in use. But this problem is indicative of both public and 
private sector breeding programs. The panel recommended that IBPGR pl,ace 
more attention on pre-breeding and characterization/description efforts. 
Thus more material can become available to applied breeding programs. 
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5.6 THE ICARDA REVIEWS 
Reviews: EPR, 1984 
EMR, 1984 
(a) Panel Membership 
EPR: 11 members 
us IADS 
Australia (2) academia: economics,? 
France NARP 
WFJt academia: economics 
UK NARP: plant breeding 
W Germany NARP: animal science 
Italy academia: plant breeding 
CGIAR/TAC (2) 
EMR: 3 members 
(b.) Panel Itinerarv 
Feb 11-13: visit to field activities and NARP in Egypt 
Feb 15-20: at ICARDA Center for staff briefings 
Apr 7 -14: visit to field activities and,NARP's.i.n Morocco; Tunisia 
Apr 15-21: at ICARDA Center for staff briefings 
Apr 22-May 2: at ICARDA Center for report writing and presentation 
(c) Imoact of Reviews 
There appeared to be a positive relationship between the panel and 
ICARDA management with open and frank discussion of several current issues 
facing ICARDA (see the next section for a discussion of these issues). 
The Board of Trustees, management, and staff all endorsed the panel's 
recommendations (p vii-ix of the EPR), with the exception of the panel's 
recommendation to shift emphasis in the pasture program from fallow lands 
to marginal lands, The Board's rationale for this was that (1) research on 
marginal lands would duplicate work being carried out by other research 
institutes in the area (i.e., ACSAD), and (2) there was a promise of early 
adoption of c%rent technologies under development in replacing fallow 
lands with pas$ure forages. ICARDA also recognized that its training 
programs had been inadequate, a major criticism of the EPR. 
Cd) Handline Criticisms in the Reviews 
The panel was sensitive to the difficulties faced in the establishment 
of ICARDA due to the political instability of the region. For example, 
original plans called for the establishment of a decentralized center with 
major facilities in Lebanon, Syria and Iran, including its headquarters in 
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Beirut. The main station is now in Syria, along with its headquarters, and 
only a small sub-station is maintained in Lebanon. 
In addition,' ICARDA is still in a developmental stage, testing the 
"fit" of its mandate. Much of the EPR is devoted to discussion of several 
key issue= facing TCARllA* - ------. 
(1) whether to include research on supplemental irrigation (rather than 
stay strictly with rainfed agriculture)? 
(2) what should the role of livestock research be in the farming systems 
research program? 
(3) should research be expanded into high altitude areas? 
(4) what should the relation be between ICARDA and other IARCs involved 
in the region (e.g. should the mandate for barley research be transferred 
from CIMMYT to ICARDA)? 
(5) where should new substations be developed? 
In general, the panel endorsed the views of ICARDA's management, with a 
couple of exceptions, namely (1) ICARDA's current emphasis on livestock 
research was deficient, and (2) its training program had not been' 
adequate. 
This first EPR also refrained from any evaluation of research results, 
recognizing it was too early to be able to appropriately judge ICARDA in 
this area. 
'(e) ElicitinP Staff Concerns 
The EPR and EMR commented on the high morale and dedication of the 
research staff. 
Salary discrimination between international and regional staff was 
noted as a potential (or existing) area of friction, and the panel 
endorsed the position of ICARDA's management to move in the direction of a 
uniform personnel policy. ICARDA also operates a primary school for staff 
children (the lack of which was a concern of expatriate staff at IITA). 
(f) Research Oreanizational Structure 
Research is organized similarly to ,IITA, but with what appears to be 
better multidisciplinary integration and a more focused farming systems 
research program. The research program is divided into four major areas: 
(1) CIP Cereals (barley, durum, breadwheat, triticale) 
(2) FLIP Food Legumes (fava beans, lentils, chickpeas) 
(3) PFIP Pasture and Forages 
(4) FSRP Farming Systems 
In addition, there are a few "supporting scientific disciplines" and a 
genetic resource unit that cut across the four programs listed above. 
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The research program on each food crop is organized around four main 
project areas: ' 
(1) germplasm evaluation 
(2) breeding 
(3) agronomy/physiology 
(4) disease and pest control 
Some food crop programs also include a aualitv evaluation section. 
The pasture program is organized mainly around problem areas: (1) 
fallow replacement forages and pastures, and (2) marginal land 
improvement. 
Unlike IITA, farming systems research at ICARDA is integrated with the 
other program areas. FSR now includes agronomic, livestock, and economic 
research components. Initially, the primary activity was village-level 
studies of six villages in northern Syria. This provided a base of 
agricultural and socio-economic data with which to diagnose production 
constraints. As of 1981, FSR was reorganized around six project areas, 
each (except project V) collaborating with one or more of the other 
programs (CIP, GLIP, or PFIP): 
Project I barley production 
II BNF'and water use of forage legumes 
III crop rotation 
IV role of livestock in farming systems 
V environmental zoning 
VI FSR outreach - extend and duplicate FSR to a new 
region (Tunisia) 
Agronomic research is the main focus in the FSRP. 
The panel noted that FSR at ICARDA had given the scientific staff in 
all programs a solid appreciation of'the farm level constraints to 
agricultural productivity in the region. 
(g) Research Allocation and Planning 
The DG has pursued a participatory management style, with scientific 
staff at all levels involved in program and budgetary planning. In 
addition, ICARDA has*a computerized Management Accounting and Information 
System which provides timely information on budget expenditures. ICARDA 
uses it extensively as a reseaqh management tool. 
The F,MR noted that this management style had resulted in a strong staff 
loyalty to the research program (p 5). 
In addition, ICARDA developed a long range plan (called Pathwavs to the 
1990s). But the EPR panel noted that this report was basically an 
extension of current research programs (i.e., not taking into account 
changing circumstances in the region over time), was overly optimistic 




One critical constraint to long range planning was the uncertainty of 
funding. 
The Board of Trustees at ICARDA apparently plays an active role in 
management and planning (EPR p 9). 
(h) Interaction with NARPs 
Training activities, an important tool of most institutes in developing 
good relations with NARP's, has been weak at ICARDA. ICARDA has used 
Board members as one means to facilitate contacts with NARP's. 
ICARDA also established collaborative research projects with some 
NARP's in its region, allocating u funds to these projects (in addition 
to other funds). These projects involve scientist exchanges. 
ICARDA's long range plans include establishing sub-region stations, in 
concurrence with the original concept of ICARDA as a decentralized 
research center. Currently a high altitude research project is being 
started in Baluchistan using and expanding existing NARP facilities. 
Eventually another sub-region station will probably be initiated in North 
Africa, most likely in Morocco. 
(i) Interaction with Other Institutions 
ICARDA has a formal agreement to collaborate on research with ACSAD 
(Arab Center for Studies of Arid Zones and Dry Lands), a regional research 
and development institute located in Syria. But at the time of the review, 
little in the way of concrete cooperation had taken place. 
ICARDA plans to establish linkages with agricultural research 
institutions in Southern Europe located in similar agro-climatic zones. 
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5.7 THE ICRISAT REVIEWS 
Reviews: First EPR, 1978 
Second EPR, 1984 
EMR, 1984 
(a) Panel Membership 


























EMR: 4 members 
(b) Panel Itinerary 
1st Review: Sep 23 to Ott 14, 1978 
Sep 23 - 24: initial meeting with Board of Trustees (Paris) 
Sep 25 - 28: visits to West African Prbgrams (Burkino Faso and 
Senegal) 
Sep 30 - Ott 14: at ICRISAT Center (Hyderbad) for meetings with 
staff, report preparation, and pzesentation of results to 
senior management 
2nd Review: Aug 15 to Sept 14, 1984 
*Feb 6 - 17: at ICRISAT to attend internal review of Sorghum and 
Millet Programs 
*Mar 29 - Apr 4: visit to ICRISAT programs in Mexico 
*Jun 23 - 24: visit to ICRISAT programs in Syria 
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Aug 15 - 29: visit to ICRISAT programs and NARPs in Burkino Faso, 
Niger, Pakistan, and India 
Aug 28 - Sep 14: at ICRISAT Center (Hyderbad) for meetings with 
staff, report preparation, and presentation of results to 
senior management 
*An-Iv one or &To panel "L*LJ members participated in these events 
(c) Imoact of Reviews 
The first EPR suggested several new research endeavors for ICRISAT and 
made a host of recommendations concerning staffing and facility needs of 
the institute if it were to accomplish its research objectives. 
,Three main issues seem to emerge from the review. First, there was a 
lack of convergence between ICRISAT's "croptl and "geographic" mandates. 
ICRISAT's mandated crops are grown in a wider area than the areas 
classified as "semi-arid". This apparently led to some confusion amongst 
staff concerning the appropriate areas in which to concentrate research 
efforts. The panel referred this issue to further study. Additional 
research in climatic classification at ICRISAT later clarified this issue. 
But more important, both the first and second external reviews confirmed 
ICRISAT's philosbphy of developing technologies targeted toward resource 
poor farmers in rainfed areas. 
A second main issue addressed by the first review concerned the 
relevance of pigeon pea research at ICRISAT. The first rev'i.ew,took the 
position that since pigeon peas were most important to India, this 
research effort should be integrated with the Indian national agricultural 
research program. But ICRISAT 'decided to maintain its own pigeon pea 
research program, because it concluded that this crop held promise in many 
areas of Africa as well. In the second external review, it was noted that 
the main benefactors of ICRISATs pigeon pea program outside of India had 
been Australia, and called for a reassessment of this program. 
A third main recommendation of the first review was that ICRISAT's 
African research program be substantially expanded. The nature of this 
research effort (whether to be organized around one or more "subcenters" 
or whether to be based on mobile regional networks of scientists working 
directly with national programs) was subject to some discussion. The first 
' review recommended the first model, though conceded that an experiment 
station might be needed for a millet research and farming system research 
program. After the first. review, debate continued on the model for 
ICRISAT's African program. ICRISAT's Board found it necessary to balance 
its own objectives with funding opportunities and the desires of specific 
donors. A subcenter was established in Niger and a several individual 
country projects were carried out. The second external review called for a 
major reassessment and consolidation .of ICRISAT's research efforts in 
Africa. There also appeared to be a consensus that the appropriate model 
for the African program should consist of a mix of several components: a 
regional center a base for the West African efforts, additional 
43 
5.7 
experimental site(s) for sorghum and groundnut work, and a regional 
network model for activities in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
The second external review was in a position to evaluate the impact of 
ICRISAT's program in addition to reviewing the basic research strategy. 
The second review concluded that the crop research programs were 
basically on track and that the institute had begun to make a substantial 
impact on productivity in several regions through the development of new 
varieties. The review also carried the theme that ICRISAT should move more 
toward basic research activities, especially in the understanding of the 
basis of pest and disease resistance and on the climatic tolerance of 
crops. 
The second review felt that the Farming Systems Research Program (FSRP) 
needed to be consolidated and more focused and yet at the same time 
suggested additional areas for research. The Board pointed out this 
apparent contradiction. TAC's view was that the FSRP needed to place more 
emphasis on the development of methodologies that could be transferred to 
national research programs. The location specificity of FSRP work on 
component technology development was viewed as a major limitation of this 
program. 
A third key issue addressed by the second review was the African 
program of ICRISAT. The review felt that this program needed to be 
reassessed with regard to the balance of activities in various parts of 
Africa and the need to place additional emphasis on Africa was stressed. 
The panel felt that the African program needed to be consolidated. 
Finally, the external management review recommended that the structure 
of decision making at the institute be modified. Though the review 
characterized ICRISAT as a well-managed institute, it felt that management 
could further be enhanced by the further delegation of authority from the 
director general to other staff.. 
(d) Criticisms in the Review ReDOrts 
Both reviews characterized ICRISAT as a well-run institute that was 
effectively pursuing its mandate. 
The most significant criticism of the second review was direct\ed at the 
management of ICRISAT. The JZMR criticized the lack of staff input'into 
decision making. But the Board felt that the EMR had misrepresented this 
issue. 
The EMR also suggested that representatives from national agricultural 
research programs be more involved in the planning of ICRISAT research 
programs and policy making. 
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Another criticism of the second external review was the organization of 
the research program. The panel felt that 400 separate research projects 
were too many to be effectively managed, focused, or coordinated. The 
Board disagreed, however, considering that this issue could best be 
determined by management. 
The second review also criticized some projects that it thought were 
too "development" oriented, rather than research oriented. The Second EPR 
thought that the production of large quantities of seed for "minikit" 
trials in India was an inappropriate use of ICRISAT resources. But the 
Board felt that the institute needed to maintain program flexibility in 
order to be most effective, and did not seem to view these efforts as 
displacing national programs. 
(e) Eliciting Staff Concerns 
The dedication and competence of the staff were noted in both reviews. 
The EMR noted a problem of status and salary distinction between 
national scientists and international scientists, which it described as 
"not healthy" and poor for morale (p 21-22). Poor communication between 
. national and international scientists was also mentioned. The EMR made 
some recommendations to address these problems, but recognized that 
solutions may be difficult to implement in.the short run. 
‘(f) Resea-rch Orzanizational Structure ' 
There are four commodity programs at ICRISAT: sorghum, millet, pulses 
(chickpeas and pigeon peas), and groundnuts. Each of these programs has 
scientists from several biological disciplines working under it. Both 
single and multi-disciplinary projects are carried out, with a 
predominance of the former. 
The Farming Systems Research Program had six sub-divisions: 
(1) Agroclimatology 
(2) Land and Water Management 
(3) Soil Management 
(4) Farm Equipment 
(5) Cropping Systems 
(6) On-Farm Research 
The economics program has four main study areas: (1) evaluation of 
resources (e.g. village and watershed studies); (2) technological 
assessment; (3) institutional appraisals (e.g.,research allocation, 




(g) Research Planninn Process 
The'primary planning document is the ICRISAT 10 Year Plan, which was 
praised by the 'second external review as a comprehensive plan that 
effectively rationalizes and sets priorities for research. However, it 
felt that this plan did not adequately address management aspects of 
implementing these programs. 
It was not clear from the reviews to what extent the economics research 
program had been involved in research resource allocation, though this is 
a specific part of their research program. 
ICRISAT also carries out annual internal reviews for each of its main 
research programs. But from the questionnaire responses it seems that the 
internal review process may not be particularly effective. 
The reviews noted excellent working relations between the director 
general and the Board of Trustees. The Board has been apparently quite 
active in research policy making. But also in the second review there is 
reference to short and superficial staff presentations on research 
programs at Board meetings. The Board had already noted this problem and 
planned to adjust its agendas appropriately to allow more indepth 
treatment of these issues. 
(h) Interaction with National Programs 
ICRISAT uses a host of tools'to develop links with NARP's, including 
workshops, joint research projects, material and publications exchanges, 
and training. The closest linkages have been with the Indian NARP and 
with Indian Universities. 
ICRISAT also enters into bilateral projects with individual countries. 
For example, a USAID supported bilateral project between ICRISAT and Mali 
involves the following activities: 
(1) testing of new varieties; 
(2) improving sorghum and millet based farming systems; 
(3) developing agricultural research stations; 
(4) training Malian scientists. 
Two scientists from ICRISAT, a breeder and an agronomist, are assigned to 
Mali. 
(i) Interaction with Other Institutions 
On some specific projects there is research collaboration with 
universities in developed countries. For example, ICRISAT collaborates 
with millet BNF research with the University of Marburg and with 
Rothamsted Experiment Station (Second EPR, p 20). 
ICRISAT has been involved with the private sector in the area of 
technology dissemination. This has occurred mainly with seed companies, 
but entirely within India (Second EPR p 16, 24). There was no mention of 
research collaboration with the private sector in the reviews. 
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(a) Panel Membershiu 
EPR: 7 members 
EMR: 2 members 
(b) Panel Itinerary 
EPR (1984) 
Feb 6 - Feb 20: field visits to Philippines, Zambia, Kenya 
Feb 23 - Mar 30: at IFPRI Center for meetings with staff and 
report preparation 
(c) Imoact of Review 
Since there has only been one review,, it is difficult to judge its 
impact. 
The response of the Board of Trustees to the EPR and the EMR 
recommendations, however, expressed no disagreements with the external 
review. The Board committed itself to try to implement almost all of the 
recommendations. One exception to this concerns a recommendation to form a 
new research "thrust" on Development Strategies. The Board agreed with 
this recommendation in principle, but felt there was a need to further 
clarify and define the research bounds of such a thrust before it could be 
created. 
From questionnaire responses it is evident there was a high degree of 
satisfaction on the part of the scientific staff toward the review. 
The overriding issue confronting IFPRI, according to the external 
review and reiterated by the Board, is the need for additional core 
funding to bring the size of the research staff up to the planned level 
and to reduce the reliance on insecure project funds. The external review 
strongly supported the institute's position in this regard. 
(d) Handling Criticisms in the Review 
There were virtually no negative comments in the reports on management 
or policy. The reports were highly complimentary of IFPRI's progress and 
the quality of it's research. The main problem identified was the heavy 
reliance on special project funds. But the source of this problem was 
identified with a lack of adequate core funding support from donors, not 
with IFPRI management. 
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The panel did recommend new directions for research (i.e., the 
formation of a new research thrust) and interacted heavily with staff and 
management on the identification of an overall research strategy. It 
also recommended diversifying the staff into other social science fields 
(currently the staff are predominantly economists). But these 
recommendations did not take the tone of criticisms of IFPRI. 
A couple of areas of potential criticisms are IFPRI’s apparent bias 
toward market forces and its heavy reliance on technical change in 
agriculture as the driving force of development. The panel pointed out 
this bias but explicitly chose not to criticize it. However, the nature of 
some of the recommendations suggests a desire of some of the panel members 
for IFPRI to broaden its scope. For example, there were suggestions from 
the panel for conducting research on institutional reform and on market 
failures. 
(e) Eliciting Staff Concerns 
Personal interviews between EMR panel members and staff addressed this 
issue. Performance appaisal of staff members has been solely the 
responsibility of the DG with little or no feedback provided to staff on 
performance evaluation. Nevertheless, the external review noted excellent 
relations between the DC. and all senior staff. 
Scientific support staff (e.g., research assistants) were less 
satisfied, mainly because they did not feel part of the collegial 
atmosphere and there had been no opportunity for advancement within the 
institute. 
The program of limited tenure opportunities for senior research staff 
was noted but no recommendations for changes in personnel policies were 
made. The panel felt that the advantages of the current system (fixed term 
appointments) outwieghed the advantages of moving to an indefinite term 
appointment. 
(f) Research Organizational Structure 
Research at IFPRI is organized into four “thrusts”: 
(1) Food Consumption and Nutrition Analysis; 
(2) Food Production Policy Analysis: 
(3) International Food Trade and Security Analysis; 
(4) Food Trends Analysis (later changed to “Food Data Systems”). 
The external review recommended that a fifth area, on “Development 
Strategies”, be added. 
Within each thrust are a series of research projects. Though each 
research project is the domain of one or a few individuals, there appears 
to be a fair amount of interaction and discussion among colleagues at all 
stages of the project’s life. 
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The formulation of research topics come from a variety of sources, 
namely: (1) requests from governments and institutions; (2) the interest 
and expertise of staff; and (3) special project contracts. Each project, 
however, must relate to at least one of the food policy "issues" 
developed in IFPRI's long range plan (see section g below for a list of 
these issues). 
The central working hypothesis of IFPRI has been that research drives 
technological progress which is the main force behind increasing food 
production. 
At the time of the external review almost all of IFPRI's senior staff 
were economists and IFPRI's analysis exhibited a noticeable bias in favor 
of market forces. ' 
(g) Research Allocation and Planning 
In 1982 a long range plan for IFPRI was developed. Six "working 
questions" were identified, which IFPRI believed defined the major food 
policy problems. These are: 
What policies are needed to 
(1) respond to the rapid growth in food import'demand in developing 
countries? 
(2) allow technical change to raise food production? 
(3) provide producer incentives that can achieve both growth and equity? 
(4) enable technical change to stimulate growth in income and employment 
necessary to alleviate rural poverty? 
(5) improve food security of the poorest people given income distribution 
problems, large fluctuations in production, and high storage costs of 
food? 
(6) --What commodities should be emphasized? 
The panel commented on the nature of these questions and made several 
suggestions for modifications. It felt some questions were worded too 
narrowly. For example, it suggested expanding 42 to read "what forms of 
public investment are needed to increase food production" rather than 
emphasizing only ag research and technical change. It also thought 46 was 
too narrow, and suggested the question be expanded to include linkages 
between agriculture and other sectors of the economy and consider 
alleviation of urban poverty as well. It felt 46 should not be a separate 
issue but incorporated into Ql, 42, and 43. Finally, the panel thought 
that a question needed to be added that dealt specifically with trade and 
development assistance issues, 
Another issue facing IFPRI is the regional balance of its activities. 
Most of IFPRI's efforts have focused on Asia. The panel encourages IFPRI 
to devote more resources to Sub Saharan Africa. Less emphasis is given to 
Latin American countries. It is felt that these countries have greater 
domestic capabilities for food policy analysis. 
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The Board appears to be heavily involved in planning and in issues 
formulation at IFPRI. This is evidenced by the fact that all Board members 
are members of the Program Committee and there is on going discussion 
among Board members on whether to expand IFPRI's research activities into 
other areas. 
(h) Interactions with National Programs 
The main source of interaction with national ministries is through the 
policy studies that are done at the request of these governments. Several 
such studies have been done and they appear to have been quite 
influential. Such research studies are usually carried out in 
collaboration with national institutions. 
IFPRI views direct participation by developing country professionals in 
collaborative research as the most efficient means available to IFPRI in 
building national food policy research capabilities. It recently developed 
a three year training plan aimed at enhancing national capacities through 
such collaborative projects. This plan gives special emphasis to food 
policy research in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
No formal training program exists at IFPRI. Training occurs informally 
through staff development. The short term nature of most appointments 
ensures a steady turn-over in senior staff, with old staff returning to 
their home countries or institutions.. TAC's 1984 training impact study 
concluded that "the work of IFPRI therefore includes a significant, 
training activity, even though it is informal and cannot be separated from 
the research of the Institute" (Annex 6 - G, p 2). 
IFPRI also conducts several Policy Seminars each year which are held 
either at IFPRI or in client countries. These are used mainly to increase 
awareness of IFPRI's research results. 
The panel does not suggest that IFPRI develop a formal training 
program. The.panel seems to feel that the main responsibility for this 
activity rests elsewhere, such as with the UN University. 
(i) Interactions with Other Oreanizations 
IFPRI appears to be quite active in the CGIAR system. For example, it 
has cooperative research projects with IRRI on rice policy in South East 
Asia and with ICRISAT on policies affecting coarse grain production. 
IFPRI seems to work best with those institutes that already have a 
strong socio-economic component to their research program. 
The panel discouraged the idea of using IFPRI as a research planning 
body for the CGIAR system (e.g., to suggest how to allocate resources 
within the system). Such work would require significant input from 
biological scientists, not currently available to IFPRI. It may also 
inhibit effective collaboration between IFPRI and the other institutes on 
other research projects. 
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5.9 THE IITA REVIEWS 
Reviews: EPR, 1978 
EPR, 1984 
EMR, 1984 
(a) Panel Membershin 















academia: tropical agriculture 
academia 
NARP 
Second EPR: 11 members 
UK NARP 
W Germany (2) academia: ag sci, social sci 





EMR: 4 members 
(b) Panel Itinerary 
First EPR (1977) 
May 12-18 & Ott 16-21: visit to IITA field activities and NARP's 
in Tanzania, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria 
Ott 23-29: at Center for staff briefings 
Ott 30-Nov 4: at Center for report writing and presentation 
Second EPR*(1984) 
Sep 14-16: at Center for orientation 
Sep 16-20: visits to IITA field activities and NARP's in 
Cameroon, Nigeria, and Upper Volta 
Sep 21-30: at Center for staff briefings 
Ott l- 7: at Center for report writing and presentation 
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(c) Impact of Reviews 
Overall, it,appears that the impact of the reviews on IITA management 
and program policy has been limited. There were several major issues that 
were addressed in the First EPR and then again reiterated in the Second 
EPR and the EMR: 
(1) lack of direction and structure to the Farming Systems Research 
Program (First EPR, p 32-33; Second EPR, p 44; EMR, Annex 7); 
(2) IITA involvement in "development" projects (First EPR, p 89; Second 
EPR, p 55-56); 
(3) Personnel management problems at several levels (First EPR, p 83; EMR, 
p 18-22). 
Below, these criticisms are expanded upon. 
Another example of lack of impact concerns IITA-CIAT friction over 
collaboration on cassava research. Both institutes have mandates for 
cassava research, and plant disease problems limit material transfer from 
Africa to Latin America. Nevertheless, to avoid duplication of research 
programs, close cooperation is a desirable objective. There was an initial 
agreement between IITA and CIAT in 1973 defining areas of responsibility, 
but apparently it was not adequate to cover concerns. Both the First EPR 
of CIAT (1977) and the First EPR of IITA (1978) pointed out the need for a 
new agreement and suggested guidelines for such an agreement. This led to 
a 1978 agreement but which again failed to resolve differences. The Second . 
EPR of CIAT (1985) made special note of the friction and recommended 
immediate communication on the matter between the DG's or submission of 
the issue to a third party. But it is interesting to note that the Second 
EPR of IITA, conducted a year earlier (in 1984) made no mention of any 
such friction, despite a TAC request to make inquiries into this specific 
issue and records,of meetings with CIAT cassava researchers in the review 
report. The Second EPR of IITA merely states that CIAT and IITA 
collaborate on cassava research. (ref: First EPR, CIAT, p 24; First EPR, 
IITA, p 47-49; Second EPR, CIAT, p X7-129; Second EPR, IITA, Annex 1, p 
5, question #18 and acknowledgements, p 84, and p 22). 
The impact of the reviews on IITA's program were also limited by the 
severe financial crisis that shook IITA in the early 1980s. Severe 
shortfalls in funds caused major changes in programs and staffing. Some 
recommendations were initially implemented but later had to be abandoned. 
For example, the First EPR recommended agronomic research be transferred 
to the Farming Systems Research Program. This was initially carried out 
but later these agronomy positions were eliminated from IITA (Second EPR p 
45). 
(d) Handling: Criticisms in the Reviews 
The First EPR gave several recommendations for specific program 
directions but generally was very positive toward IITA. It noted some lack 
of structure to the Farming Systems Research Project, but attributed this 
mainly to the newness of the methodology. It suggested several 
organizational options for this program. 
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The Second EPR was more direct with what it felt were some shortcomings 
of IITA’s program (praising what it considered successes as well). 
The Second EPR gave considerable attention to “mandate” issues, 
questioning: 
(1) IITA’s involvement in “development” projects rather than research 
projects, claiming these efforts were not only outside the jurisdiction of 
IITA but that they were displacing, rather than assisting, NARP’s (e.g., 
IITA’s involvement in large scale application of biological pest control 
methods) (Second EPR, p 11, p 55-56). 
(2) IITA’s expansion into research in semi-arid areas, stemming from an 
overlap between its crop mandate (which included cowpeas) and its 
ecological zone mandate (which limits IITA to the humid and subhumid 
tropics) (e.g., cow pea projects in Upper Volta) (Second EPR, p 67). 
(3) IITA’s lack of coordination of maize research with other research 
institutions, and the resulting duplication of efforts (e.g. IITA, CIMM’YT, 
and SAFGRAD all had international maize testing programs operating 
independently in the same regions) (Second EPR, p 17). 
(4) IITA’s failure to decentralize its research program beyond Nigeria to a 
sufficient de.gree and what the panel considered to be excessive overhead 
costs of center. operations. 
(5) IITA’s failure to use core funds for training activities, which the 
panel felt suggested a lacw commitment to this activity. 
Though strongly supporting the role and concept of Farming Systems 
Research at IITA, the Second EPR criticized the program on the following 
points: (1) lack of structure (p 44); (2) lack of interdisciplinary research 
(p 44, 46); (3) lack of appropriate statistical tools (p 45); (4) poorly 
managed on-farm research (p 49); and (5) over concentration on Nigeria 
(P 46). But the panel did not suggest any fundamental changes to the FSR 
concept orcob ject ives . 
The EMR noted that external auditor recommendations for strengthening 
internal financial cont,rol at IITA in its reports for 1977, 78, 79, 80, 81, 
and 82 never received action from the Board or from Center management. The 
external auditors indicated a lack of physical control over stores, 
inappropriate authority for check signatories, etc. The EMR suggests 
possible financial mismanagement at IITA: “the nature and importance of the 
shortcomings noted in the (external auditor) letters make it impossible to 
be assured that no assets of. the Institute have ever been misappropriated” 
(p 33, see also Annex 6, p 32-33). 
The reviews noted the extraordinary circumstances that IITA has faced 
because of its location. For example , the second review justifies a higher 
than normal Center overhead expenses because of the need to provide basic 
services, including electricity, sewage, and water supplies, the need to 
provide housing and recreational facilities for staff, and the need to 
maintain large stores of spare parts and equipment. Financial pressures on 
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IITA were also exacerbated by large exchange rate losses. Lack of good 
' local support staff for research was cited as a serious limitation on the 
research program. 
The EMR, however, goes on to make direct criticisms of management on 
the following: 
(1) lack of adequate internal financial control (see above); 
(2) poor internal communication between scientists (p 23-24); 
(3) poor personnel policies, on senior staff recruitment and on relations 
with support staff (p 18-22); 
(4) autocratic management style of the director general and his failure to 
involve staff in major decisions (p 12-13); 
(5) apparently weak role played by the Board of Trustees (p 5-6). 
The EMR pointed out it was impossible to evaluate the role of the Board 
because the recorded minutes of their meetings were of very poor quality. 
(e) Eliciting Staff Concerns 
The EMR made mention of several key personnel issues: 
(1) It refers to "highly unpleasant" past episodes with local support 
staff (p 18) but does not elaborate. It recommends more deliberate steps 
be taken to improve labor relations, and lists several specific 
suggestions. 
(2) Special needs of expatriate staff were noted, including the need for" 
special recreational facilities, the unmet need for educational facilities 
for their children, and the concerns of spouses (who are often highly 
educated) about lack of productive employment opportunities. But staff 
turnover rates were not judged to be excessive (p 20). 
(3) The EMR also pointed out the autocratic style of the DG, but does not 
indicate that this translates into a staff morale problem. 
(f) Research Orpanizational Structure 
IITA operates four major research programs, each fairly independent of 
one another. There does not appear to be much interaction between the 
programs and the bulk of the research effort seems to be carried out on a 
single disciplinary basis. The four programs are: 
(1) CIP - Cereals (maize and rice); 
(2) TRIP - Tubers and Roots (cassava, yams, sweet potatoes, and 
aroids); 
(3) GLIP - Grain Legumes (cowpeas and soybeans); 
(4) FSRP - Farming Systems Research. 
The commodity programs contain breeders, agronomists, and crop pest 
specialists (entomologists, pathologists, and nematologists) along with 
some chemists and microbiologists. Research work focuses on (1) biological 
technology (e.g., breeding) and (2) crop management (e-g., multiple 
cropping and biological pest control). 
The FSRP consumes about 40% of the research budget and the management 
of this program has come under criticism in all reviews (see earlier 
sections for details). 
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The organization in the FSRP was not clear from the reviews, It is 
subdivided into three subprograms: (1) Soil and Land Management, (2) Crop 
Management, and (3) On-Farm Research. But, according to the Second EPR, 
this organizational structure is "descriptive and has little 
administrative importance" (p 30). More important seems to be the nine 
cat-""%4 PC of rg"L A.-Y "research ZCtiVftieS" T 
(1) regional analysis; 
(2) component technology development; 
(3) land clearing; 
(4) soil management; 
(5) minimum tillage; 
(6) farm machinery; 
(7) multiple cropping; 
(8) alley cropping; 
(9) on-farm adaptive research. 
Each of the four crop Programs contain multiple cropping programs, along 
with the Farming Systems Research Program. The interaction between these 
efforts, if any, was not made explicit in the reviews. 
(g) Research Budget Allocation and Plannine Process 
Program leaders receive annual budgets, determined by,the DG. In this 
sense the budget allocation process has been strictly top-down. Then each 
program develops its research plan. Overall program orientation or 
individual research projects need not be defended. "Planning is heavily 
dependent on individual initiative of unit heads and Program leaders" 
(Second EPR, p 70). 
The IITA Board of Trustees has appeared to play a passive role in 
management and planning. 
Though the ten year plan prepared by IITA (for the 1980s) identifies 
the direction each program plans to follow, it appears that internal 
mechanisms for planning and evaluation have been lacking. (Ref: Second EPR 
p 70-71; EMR p 16-17). 
(h) Interactions with National Programs 
Shortcomings were identified in the reviews concerning IITA's 
involvement with NARPs. The panel criticized the lack of core funds 
commited to training programs and the direct involvement in development 
projects. According to the review, this kind of activity tended to 
displace rather than complement NARP activities. However, pressure to 
generate additional funding sources through special projects and the 
realities of the limited ability of many NARPs to effectively absorb IITA 
generated technologies, were identified as the chief reasons for the 
involvement in development projects. 




It should be noted, however, that even though core funds have not been 
allocated to training programs, these programs are still quite substantial 
and the number of participants increased significantly from the late 1970s 
to the early 19'80s (from around 200 per year to around 400 per year). In 
addition, the total IITA program outside of Nigeria is quite large, though 
again not core funded. As of 1982, 23 scientists were posted in seven 
cooperative projects outside of Nigeria and $8 million in additional 
projects were under negotiation. 
(i) Interactions With Other Institutions and the Private Sector 
No mention of private sector contact or with developed country 
institutions was indicated. 
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5.10 THE ILCA REVIEWS 
Reviews: 1st EPR, 1982 
2nd EPR, 1986 
EMR, 1986 
(a) Panel Membershiu 




W Germany NARP livestock 
Australia NARP livestock 
FAO livestock 
CGIAR/TAC (2) 
2nd EPR: 9 members 








EMR: 4 members 
(b) Itinerarv 
1st EPR 
Phase 1 (1981) 
Sep 22 - Sep 24: at ILCA Center for meetings with staff 
Sep 26 - Ott 8: visit to field activities in Nigeria, Mali 
Phase 2 
Nov 18 - Nov 21: visit to field activities in Kenya 
Nov 22 - Nov 21: visit to ILCA Center and field activities in 
Ethiopia 
Nov 17: meetings with Ethiopian NARP and International 
Organizations 
Nov 28 - Dee 4: report writing and presentation 
2nd EPR 
Phase I (1986) 
Jan-Mar: at ILCA Center where two panel members met with Board 
Mar 28 - 30: visit to field activities in Mali 





May 6 - May 14: at ILCA Center for meetings with staff, further visits to 
Ethiopian and Kenyan field activities 
May 14 - 20: at ILCA Center for report writing and presentation 
(c) Impact of Reviews 
The first external review (1981) identified several serious program and 
management problems at ILCA and made a list of major recommendations aimed 
at focusing the research program, improving staff quality and moral, and 
improving management practices. The review also noted that many of ILCA's 
problems were due to the internal instability in the host country at the 
time. This was still an important consideration at the time of the second 
review (1986) as well. 
The first review criticized what it felt was a lack of direction to 
ILCA's program. The review attributed this to confusion within ILCA over 
the interpretation of "systems research", and as a result of too much 
emphasis being placed on the zonal programs relative to the center 
program. 
The program and management at ILCA underwent significant and generally 
positive changes following the first review, according to the second 
review. The actions taken by the ILCA management during this period were 
. generally consistent with the recommendations, though in some cases the ' 
changes went beyond these recommendations. For example, while the first 
review recommended that six senior staff members be added to the center 
research program, ILCA in fact added thirteen senior research staff 
positions during the 1981 to 1986 period. Also, the reorganization of the 
center research program was more extensive than envisioned in the first 
review. The new organizational structure of the research program is 
reported in part (f) below. 
The first review noted that significant tensions existed between the 
Board of Trustees and the institute DG. This was apparently the result of 
Board interference in center management combined with an authoritative 
management style of the DG. The first review made a series of 
recommendations to improve this relationship, including attempting to 
clarify the appropriate roles of each party. These problems were still 
present in 1986, according to the second review, even though the 
personalities involved had changed. 
Between the reviews, ILCA deemphasized its zonal programs in order to 
build its center program. This was consistent with the recommendations of 
the first review. The headquarter facilities had been successfully 
upgraded, according to the second review. The second review felt it was 




(d) Handlinq Criticisms in the Reviews 
The first review strongly criticized ILCA on several grounds. Most 
importantly, the review felt that ILCA had not adequately identified 
production constraints, and had in some cases moved ahead with 
"interventions" without adequatetly testing them. 
The first review critized both the center and the zonal programs. The 
zonal programs lacked resources and staff quality was often poor. The 
center program was small and also understaffed, unable to provide adequate 
support to the zonal programs. 
The first review, though critical of ILCA, probably understated the 
seriousness of the problems facing the center. In fact, at the time of the 
first review, there were significant frictions within management, a 
serious shortage of qualified scientific staff, and the center was close 
to bankruptcy. The extent of these problems becomes clearer in the second 
review, when the history and progress of the center is traced out. 
These problems had largely been resolved by the time of the second 
review, with two major exceptions. Serious frictions still existed between 
the Board and DG, and the zonal programs lacked adequate facilities and 
leadership, according to the second review, However, the criticism of the 
zonal programs should be evaluated in light of the explicit decision to 1 
concentrate on building the center-based,research program, as recommended 
by the first review. 
The second review (EMR) was especially critical of the Board of 
Trustees. It was dissatisfied in the Board's procedures for selecting and 
evaluating the DG, which they felt was the paramount responsibility of the 
Board. 
The second review was also critical of strategic planning at ILCA. It 
did not feel that the long range plan developed by the DC was of 
sufficient detail to be used‘as a policy and management tool. The second 
review was also concerned that ILCA may be overextended in its program. 
However, the second review concluded that there existed at ILCA a 
viable research process that was capable of developing usable 
technologies. This was not the case at the time of the first review, and 
represents a major achievement of management. 
It is my impression that the standards applied by the reviews to the 
evaluation of African institutes, such as ILCA, have not been as demanding 
as the standards applied to institutes located outside of Africa. This 
would stem from a recognition that problems facing the agricultural 
research community in Africa are more intractable, with less previous 
research to draw upon and with less human capital and infrastructure to 
support technology development and dissemination. 
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(e) Eliciting Staff Concerns 
The first review mentioned a serious problem of isolation felt by 
off-center staff. ILCA was operated in a decentralized manner, with its 
main research programs carried out in several locations in addition to the 
center headquarters (e.g.,in Nigeria, Mali, Kenya, and off-center sites in 
Ethiopia). More recently it has become more centralized, devoting more 
resources to center activities. 
The first review was critical of staff recruitment and promotion 
policies. Lack of staff confidence in personnel policies, resulting in 
poor morale, was cited. 
The second review (BMR) noted substantial improvements in these areas, 
and noted the dedication and high morale of the staff. Recruitment had 
become international, staff policies clarified, and management less 
secretive. 
Insufficient housing in Addis Ababa was noted as a remaining staff 
problem, and housing at field units was of significantly poorer quality 
than center housing. Limited long-term career prospects and a lack of job 
security were also concerns of ILCA staff. 
(f) Re,search Organization 
In 1986, the research programs at ILCA were'reorganized. The Department 
of Research is now comprised of five divisions. The first three are 
center-based research programs. The fourth division consists of supporting 
units for center research programs. The fifth division groups the zonal 
(off-center) research programs, which are located in Mali, Nigeria, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Niger, and Botswana. 
The subject areas of the research divisions are as follows: 
(1) Animal Science 
-nutrition 
-reproduction and health (includes trypanotolerance network) 
-husbandry and breeding 
(2) Plant Science 
-forages 
-soil science and plant nutrition 
-pastoral ecology 
(3) Livestock Economy 
-policy analysis 
-micro analysis 
(4) Research Support 




(5) Zonal Research 
-rangelands, (Kenya, Ethiopia) 
-highlands (Ethiopia) 
-humid zone (Nigeria) 
- s*ub h-lmi ,-I zop.e- (Nigeria) **-a.- 
-arid and semi-arid zones (Mali, Niger, Botswana) 
The try-panotolerance network in the Animal Science division 
was given especially high marks in the second review. This work is closely 
associated with the program at ILRAD. 
Structurally, the research program appears to be single disciplinary 
oriented and the links between center research and the zonal programs are 
not explicit. However, there appears to be significant interaction 
between center staff and the zonal research staff. 
(g) Planning: Process 
The DG prepared a long term strategy report in 1986 which calls for a 
significant increase in ILCA's staff and budget over the next five years. 
The second review (EMR) did not believe that this report was adequately 
focused to be an effective management tool. The EMR stressed the need for 
a clear articulation of the rational for the research program and for a 
strategic plan of sufficient detail to help guide resource,allocation and 
project selec.tion. 
ILCA has hosted annual "Team Leaders Conference" that has functioned as 
an internal review. The EMR criticized the annual conferences, however, 
as being hurried and not sufficiently structured. There was a need for 
more involvement of staff and Board members in strategic planning, 
according to the EMR. The EXR suggested a CIP- or IITA-like annual review 
process be put in place. 
(h) Interactions with NARP's 
The main modes of interaction with NARP's are: 
(1) training programs, including a post dot program; 
(2) zonal stations; 
(3) information services. 
(4) research networks.. 
The second review was especially complimentary of the progress made in 
the quality of the information and documentation services at ILCA. 
Also, some technical backstopping services have been made available to 
some NAKP's, such as Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
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(i) Interactions with Others 
ILCA has been innovative in developing working relationships with some 
private voluntary organizations in technology dissemination. The 
interaction has occurred mainly in Ethiopia. It is viewed as one means of 
overcoming gaps between research, extension, and development efforts, 
especially in pastoral East Africa. 
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5.11 The IIRAD REVIEWS 
Reviews: 
1st EPR, 1981 
2nd EPR; 1986 
EMR. 1986 
Definitions: 
Trypanosomiasis: a tsetse-born cattle disease 
Trypanosome: protozoan parasite causing Trypanosomiasis 
Theileriosis: a tick-born cattle disease 
Theileria: protozoan parasite causing Theileriosis 
(a) Panel Membershio 
1st EPR: 9 members 
France NARP 
U.K. (2) academia, parasitology: NARP 
U.S. academia, medicine 
W Germany ' academia, parasitology 
Nigeria academia 
Belgium academia, tropical medicine 
CGIAR/TAC (2) 
2nd EPR: 8 members 
Belgium academia, tropical medicine 
Nigeria academia, veterinary science 
USA academia, biology 
UK academia, parasitology 
Netherlands academia, veterinary science 
W Germany academia, veterinary science 
CGIAR/TAC (2) 
EMR: 2 members 
(b) Panel Itinerary 
1st EPR 
Ott 6 - Ott 14: at ILRAD Center for meetings with staff; 
also had meetings with Kenyan Ministries, 
ICIPE lab, and visited field sites 






Dee 4: at ILRAD Center for Trypanotolerance Network internal 
meeting--heard presentations on trypanotolerance research 
in 10 African countries 
Dee 5 - Dee 6: at ILRAD Center for Theileriosis program 
internal review 
Dee 7 - Dee 8: visits to ILRAD facilities and Kapiti cattle 
ranch 
Dee 9 - Dee 10: at ILRAD Center for Trypanosomiasis program 
internal review 
Dee 12 - Dee 13: field trips to Senegal/Gambia, Kenya's coast 
province 
Phase II: 
Jan 12 - Jan 14: in Kenya, visits to ICIPE, Kenyan NARP 
Jan 15 - 'Jan 28: at ILRAD for meetings with staff and management, 
report writing and presentation 
(c) Imuact of Reviews 
1st EPR 
Overall, the 1st EPR appeared to have a sienificant and positive impact 
on ILRAD. Recommendations made by the 1st EPR were far ranging and can be 
grouped into 7 categories: 
(1) Research Management; 
(2) Research Priorities for Typanosomiasis Program; 
(3) Research Priorities for Theileriosis Program; 
(4) Supplying Animals for Research; 
(5) Administration; 
(6) Training and Communication. 
(1) Research Management 
The 1st EPR identified the Board-DG conflict as a major problem at 
ILRAD and made a series of recommendations to alleviate this problem. The 
1st EPR called for an end to interference of the Board in management and 
the careful recruitment of a new DC. It laid out guidelines to delineate 
the respective responsiblities of the Board and DG and recommended that 
the Scientific Advisory Committee be abolished. These recommendations 
were implemented. However, it is not clear whether the EPR correctly 
identified the source of this conflict, as another possible source of 
conflict was the, Director's Advisory Committee, which the 1st EPR thought 
should remain in place. 
The 1st EPR also recommended the program structure be changed to a 
proiect basis. This was implemented. A matrix structure was adopted, 
meshing six project areas with six laboratories. Note: the 2nd external 
review recommended another structural change -- seed section f below. 
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A recommendation not implemented dealt with a suggestion to lengthen 
staff contracts. Management considered this recommendation, but concluded 
that the current system was not a constraint to staff recruitment or 
performance. The 2nd EPR concurred with the management's decision. 
(2) & (3) Research Priorities - ILRAD considered each recommendation made by the 1st EPK concerning 
research priorities, but modified its research plan as new knowledge and 
information was obtained. 
(4) Supplying Animals for Research 
At the time of the 1st external review, ILRAD was interested in 
purchasing a large cattle ranch in order to have a regular supply of 
quality livestock for research purposes. ILRAD management used the 1st EPR 
as a way of generating TAC support for the purchase of the cattle ranch by 
explaining the need to the panel, and showing them the proposed site. The 
1st EPR recommended that the purchase be made and TAC subsequently 
approved. 
(5) & (6) Staffing and Administration 
Again, each recommendation was implemented. Some of these dealt with 
adding or filling staff positions. Others dealt with properly maintaining 
equipment. 
(7) Training and Communications 
The bulk of these recommendations dealt with increasing IW's 
attention to training activities, 
ILRAD increased its training budget 10 fold between the 1st and 2nd 
external reviews (from $100,000 to $1 million). However, most of ILRAD's 
training activities fall under the catagory of graduate and post-graduated 
research ($500,000 of the.training budget is for post graduate reaserch 
fellowships), Relatively few resources are devoted to workshops or short 
courses, or to deliberate efforts to build NARP research capacities. The 
2nd EPR reiterated the need to emphasize training activities. 
'2nd EPR 
The Board appeared to have a favorable reaction to most of the 
recommendations made by the 2nd EPR. 
It agreed to diversifv its trypanosomiasis research strategy to include 




It endorsed the 2nd EPR's suggestions that ILRAD continue its 
commitment to both basic and applied research. The 2nd EPR seems to place 
a greater emphasis on basic research, though this is not explicitly 
stated. 
The 2nd EPR also listed priority areas for the the theiliosis program; 
namely, development of sporozite antigen-based vaccine, and igunization 
methods. The Board accepted these program recommendations. 
The Board was hesitant about expanding its training program. It took 
the position that other agencies had greater responsibility in this area. 
The Board was critical of the panel's suggestions for new or expanded 
endeavors without suggesting which part of the existing program should be 
curtailed to free resources for these new activities. For example, the 
panel recommended that research be conducted on heartwater disease, 
another tick born animal ailment. The Board estimated it needed 5 new 
staff positions and $2 million for new lab facilities to implement all of 
these recommendations, including those concerning the proposed heartwater 
program. 
The Board indicated that the institute's long term planning paper 
(ILRAD 1984-1993. The Plan for the Second Decade) would be updated in 
light of the 2nd EPR. 
EMR 
The EMR suggested a new structure for the research program (see section 
f). The Board agreed to implement the new structure over time, after 
further study of procedural details. 
The EMR recommended that the two top positions directly under the DG 
(the Director of Administration and the Director of Research) be selected 
by the DG with Board approval rather than vice versa, as is the current 
practice. The Board flatlv refused to relinquish this power. 
The EMR recommended a staff-based committee structure be adopted to set 
institute policies (i.e., to increase staff involvement in management). 
The Board was cool to this idea and decided to leave this matter up to the 
DG's preference and style. 
The EMR recommendations for new or improved facilities were accepted in 
princinle by the Board but would only be implemented if new funds became 
available. 
The Board also felt that some EMR recommendations (e.g., concerning 
relations with African countries and with NARPs) were not realistic. The 




Questionnaire responses suggested that the report of the second 
external review has not been made available to all of the scientific 
staff. 
(d) Handling Criticisms in the Reviews 
Overall, the 2nd external review reports are more complimentary of 
ILRAD than the 1st review, though the 1st review also expressed general 
satisfaction with ILRAD. Much of the tone of the 2nd review can be 
attributed to the significant progress that had been achieved by ILLlAD 
since the 1st review, especially in overcoming the deficiencies noted in 
the 1st review. 
It is also apparent that the 2nd review panel members were satisfied 
that ILRAD had evolved into a world class research institute, and cited 
its good journal publication record and reputation with outside 
scientists. 
Deficiencies or problems were by and large indicated in a straight 
forward manner. 
From the questionnaire responses, there is some evidence of tension 
between'the panel and the center management. One scientist commented that 
'managementwas highly defensive in its attitude.toward the review and 
discouraged the scientists from discussing issues outside'the research 
program with the review team. Some scientists indicated they felt. that the 
review team had a "secret agenda". There was no evidence of this tension 
in the panel report. 
(e) ElicitinP Staff Concerns 
The problem of recruiting senior scientists and of providing 
opportunities for career advances were only touched upon in the 1st EPR 
but dealt with in depth by the 2nd review. Both of these issues were 
identified as problems needing more attention. These are recurring themes 
in the reviews of the IARCS. Though seen as problems, the external reviews 
usually do not recommend changes in tenure policies because alternatives 
are seen to carry still greater disadvantages. 
Also recommended was a greater use of a committee structure for 
management. Perhaps this reflected a concern among staff of a lack of 
participation in management, though this concern was never explicitly 
stated in the reviews. 
(f) Research Oreanizational Structure 
The research program has a matrix structure around research labs (which 
are disciplinary based) and proiects (multidisciplinary and problem 




The following comprise the six research labs: 
(1) parasitology (trypanosome); 
(2) biochemistry; 
(3) cell and molecular biology; 
(4) immunology; 
(5) parasitology (theileria); 
(6) pathology. 
ILRAD groups its research projects into six "project areas", three of 
which refer to trypanosomiasis research and three to theileria research. 
But the review team felt that this organizational structure was 
administrative in nature, commenting that "project areas accommodate some 
rather illsorted subjects" (p 15) and were "rather diffuse" (p 28). 
The second review suggested several changes in the organization of the 
research program. In addition to recommending a formal structural 
delineation between the trypanosomiasis and theileria research activities, 
the second review suggested increasing the number of project areas to more 
accurately reflect research strategy, Their grouping system more closely 
resembles the problem area "thrust" idea. 
Trypanosomiasis research activities were grouped by ILRAD into three 
"project areas": (1) epidemiology; (2) antigenicity, biochemistry, and 
immuniology; and (3) trypanotolerance. 
The second review suggested regrouping the projects in the 
Trypanosomiasis program into five areas: 
(1) epidemiology studies -- the genetic, biochemical, pathological bases 
of trypanotolerance; 
(2) biochemistry and molecular biology of trypanosomes; 
(3) diagnostic aids; 
(4) chemotherapy; 
(5) factors controlling trypanosome growth and their relevance to 
immunization. 
The first two project areas (or "thrusts") are basic research areas and 
seek to elicit long run solutions to the trypanosome problem. 
The third project area seeks to develop applied technologies that can 
be used in the field to aid in the diagnosis of specific pathogenic 
species. It has a short- to medium-term focus. 
Project areas iv and v represent the two major short- to medium-term 
strategies for controlling typanosomiasis. The chemotherapy thrust 
develops and tests drugs that can kill the protozoan infected animals 
while doing little damage to the host. Thrust v seeks to develop vaccines 
that will render cattle immune to the protozoan. 
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The Theileria program is organized into three major project areas: 
(i) epidemiology studies; 
(ii) sporozoite vaccine development; 
(iii) schizont vaccine development. 
Project area i includes mostly short- and medium-term projects, such as 
field testing the "infection and treatment" method, assessing the extent 
of antigenic diversity, and characterizing theileria strains for their 
immunity properties (important since being immune to one strain does not 
necessarily imply immunity to other strains). 
Project areas ii and iii are the two major areas for medium- to 
long-term solutions to the theileria problem. Sporozoite vaccines induce 
antibody production that attacks the protozoan before it enters the host 
cell. Schizont vaccines induce cell immunity, attacking the protozoan 
after it enters the host cell. 
The panel considered sporozoite vaccine development to be more 
promising that schizont vaccine development and noted that the former was 
receiving less funding than the latter. But the panel stopped short of 
recommending that resources be diverted away from the schizont program to 
the sporozoite program. ILRAD management felt that it had allocated as 
many resources to this program as could be effectively absorbed at that 
time. 
Overall, the panel urged that ILRAD continue to conduct research in 
both short-term and long-term areas. Research on theileria 'tended to be 
more short and medium term, as the possibility of an early breakthrough is 
greater when compared to the trypanosome problem. The panel also suggested 
XRAD expand into some other areas, namely, into heartwater disease, 
another tick born animal ailment. 
Note: all of ILPAD's research projects are focused on the trypanosome 
and theileria protozoans. None look at alternative means of controlling 
these diseases, such as attacking the carrier (the tsetse and ticks). That 
approach to disease control has been the domain of ICIPE, another 
international research institute (also located in Kenya) but outside the 
CGIAR system. The external reviews noted good communication between ILARD 
and ICIPE. 
(g) Research Allocation and Plannine Process 
The main tools for planning appear to be (1) annual internal reviews; 
and (2) outside consultants. 
Previous to the 1st EPR, the role of the Board was apparently quite 
strong. Unhealthy friction existed between Board and management. 
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This problem was identified by the 1st EPR and subsequently the Board's 
role in II&AD strategic planning became virtually nil (in the opinion of 
the 2nd EPR). The 2nd EPR identified two major reasons for an ineffective 
Board in program determination: 
(1) infrequency of meetings; and 
(2) lack of appropriate expertise on the Board. 
At the time of the 2nd external review, no social scientists were 
employed at ILRAD. The 2nd EPR encouraged ILRAD to conduct some imoact 
studies. But the impact research that was suggested tended to be fairly 
technical in nature (i.e., the impact of immunization research on cattle 
productivity and mortality rates). But more recently ILF!AD has embarked on 
a more ambitious "impact" program. By the end of 1986 ILRAD expects to 
have two or three full time scientists investigating the social, economic, 
and environmental impact of animal disease control techniques is Africa. 
(h) Interactions with NARPs 
ILRAD is closely involved with the Kenyan NARP. This occurs mainly 
through the "Nairobi cluster", which includes the University of Nairobi 
and some international organizations as well as Kenyan livestock 
ministries. 
In particular, ILMD collaborates with Kenya's Veterinary Research Lab 
for field testing and sample collection, 
Involvement in The'Gambia occurs through research collaboration with 
the International Typanotolerance Center in Banjul. 
The Trypanotolerance Network links ILRAD to NARPs in 13 African 
countries. ILCA‘is the main coordinating body. The purpose is to study .the 
productivity and health of various breeds of cattle in different locales 
under different management regimes. 
Training programs emphasize individual graduate or post graduate 
research. Candidates are selected jointly with NARPs. But it doesn't 
appear that much attention has been devoted to evaluating long term needs 
of NARPs and of incorporating those needs into its training programs. 
The 2nd EPR characterizes ILRAD's activities with NARPs outside of 
Kenya as "inadequate". 
(i) Interactions with Other Ornanizations 
ILRAD is quite active in collaborative research with institutes in 
develooed countries, particularly with European research institutes. Some 
of these studies appear in practice to be like contract research, with 
funds originating at ILRAD but being carried out entirely at the other 




ILRAD works with FAO on applied research projects on trypanosomiasis 
and coordinates its work with WHO to avoid duplication of efforts. 
ILRAD apparently has had some connections with the private sector. 
ITLEQS has made use of cattle records supplied by May and Baker, Ltd., for 
research on the effect of chemoprophylaxis of cattle productivity. 
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5.12 THE IRRI REVIEWS 
Reviews: First EPR, 1976 
Second EPR, 1982 
(a) Panel Membershin 







Second EPR: 11 members 
Brazil NARP 




" Sierra Leone (expatriate) 
Netherlands academia' 
CGiAR/TAC (3) 
(b) Panel Itinerary 
First EPR (1975) 
Nov 23-29: visits to NARP's in Thailand and Indonesia 
Nov 30-Dee 8: at Center for staff briefings 
Dee 9 -12: at Center for report writing and presentations 
Second EPR (1982) 
Nov, 1981: one member visited IRRI activities at WARDA and IITA 
Jan 3 - 8: visits to NARP and IRRI regional staff in Indonesia 
Jan 11-17: at Center for staff briefings 
Jan 18-23: at Center for report writing and presentation 
(c) Imoact of Reviews 
The First EPR contained many program and staffing recommendations, but 
there are few references to this report in the Second EPR. Undoubtedly the 
Board and management took these recommendations under consideration but 
did not feel bound by them. For example, by the time of the Second EPR, 
IRRI had not hired a nematologist as recommended by the First EPR. The 
Second Review, however, concurred with this management decision (p xxiv). 
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Both reviews take an in-depth look at the research program and 
strategies and are fairly forward looking, especially the Second EPR. By 
far the majority of recommendations deal with additional areas of research 
for IRRI, though some effort is given in the Second EPR to suggesting 
research priorities for programs. 
The Second EPR contains a response from the Board to the Review (p 
ix-xii). The overriding tone of the response is that these additional 
areas for research would be desirable but they would require additional 
funding resources (currently unavailable), suggesting that the Board did 
not see these recommendations as high priority areas warranting diversion 
of existing resources. 
A particular personnel policy was criticized in both the First and 
Second EPR's and received no action from the Board or management (see 
section e below for details). 
In the Second EPR there is also the general recommendation that IRRI 
continue to move in the direction of devoting more resources to basic 
research programs. 
(d) Handling. Criticisms in the 'Review 
Given the secure stature of IRRI as a premier research institute, 
there appeared to be a greater.willfngness on the part of the panel to 
make critical analyses of research programs and activities. Furthermore, 
there is less of a need to evaluate research programs, as international 
credibility has already been established. 
Both reviews are strong endorsements of the IRRI program and 
strategy, and many recommendations are fairly nebulous in that they use 
words like "increase" or "strengthen" in reference to an existing effort. 
It is understandable that there is a reluctance to offer changes in a 
program that has been highly successful. 
However, there are some important exceptions to this in the Second EPR. 
Specifically, it recommends that the International Rice Testing Program be 
curtailed (it is not cost-effective). This is one of the few examples in 
the review of any institute where a panel has recommended program 
curtailment, except in a few cases where a program appeared to fall 
outside of the institute mandate. 
(e) Eliciting Staff Concerns 
The EPR's seemed effective at eliciting major staff concerns. Both 
noted the high morale of center staffs. But both also noted a significant 
problem of off-center staff. Unlike CIP, IRRI does not use core funds for 
salaries and to support its off-center staff but rather uses fixed 
contract funds. Furthermore, off-center staff are not considered members 
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of specific IRRI academic departments. As a result, off-center staff feel 
isolated and insecure in their career prospects. The First EPR was 
especially critical of this personnel policy (p 68), and contained 
specific recommendations for alleviating this problem. The Second EPR 
reiterated this concern (p 111). No explanations from IRRI appear in 
either report, but undoubtedly the policy stems from budgetary expediency. 
(f) Organizational Structure of Research 
The single commodity focus of IRRI enables an indepth description of 
the organization of research by the EPR's. Initially, the key IRRI 
strategy was to use improved germplasm to increase rice productivity in 
Asia. Research "Thrusts" were formed according to identified "problem 
areas", and were matrixed with disciplinary departments (note similarity 
with CIP) to form multidisciplinary teams. IRRI now places greater 
emphasis on crop management research and has integrated the social 
sciences into the research program more effectively than any other 
institute. 
But the Second EPR cautions that this "matrix" style organization could 
become cumbersome if the number of problem areas were to increase (as will 
probably be the case if IRRI assumes a greater role in research on rainfed 
and.upland rice and in rice research outside Asia). 
(g) Research Budget Allocation and Planning Process 
(Ref. Second EPR, p‘ 107-110) 
IRRI uses annual internal reviews involving all scientific staff and 
some consultants to set yearly research agendas. The duration of this 
review has expanded from one to two weeks and each year some programs are 
explored in greater depth. 
The role of the Board of Trustees has significantly increased in the 
planning process from a passive to an active role. This change apparently 
occurred after 1979. Examples of this increased activity include (1) 
establishment of additional permanent Board committees; (2) attendence at 
the internal review sessions by some Board members (this is not 
consistently the case, however); and (3) more involvement by Board members 
in personnel and special project selection. 
The role of social sciences at IRRI in the planning process is probably 
the most deliberate of the IARC's. One of the "Thrusts" is devoted to rice 
production constraint and technology impact research. This information is 
available to and used not only by IRRI's scientists and management, but 
also to policy makers, extension leaders, and other scientists throughout 
Asia (Second EPR, p 63-67). Constraints research focuses on (1) 
quantifying yield gaps; (2) identifying social, institutional and 
environmental constraints; and (3) identifying crop management practices, 
in several Asian countries. Conseauences research employs (1) village 
studies, (2) Philippine country level models, and (3) inter-country 
comparison studies, as tools. 
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But note: IRRI does not appear to employ representatives from NARP's in 
its planning process or deliberately try to coordinate its research 
program with the NARP's. 
(h) Interaction with National Programs 
I?RI employs the following modes of interaction with NARP's: 
(1) involvement in International Research Networks, (e.g., 
IRTP,INSFFER,IRAEN,AMN,ACSN); 
(2) posting of regional liaisons (IRRI staff posted directly in developing 
countries to facilitate relations with those NARP's); 
(3) collaboration with specific countries on research and training 
projects. 
Furthermore, IRRI training programs include: 
(1) the research component of advanced degree programs; 
(2) a series of upper level non-degree programs involving the work of all 
the research "Thrusts"; 
(3) postdoc appointments; 
(4) conferences. 
But the bulk of IRRI's training activities appear to be on-site rather 
than in host countries. 
(i) Interaction with Private Sector and Other Institutions 
One of the few instances of private sector involvement with IARC 
programs is noted with regards to IRRI's Machinery Development Program.. 
IRRI maintains patents on machinery development but gives local 
manufacturers the right to produce equipment (Second EPR, p 74-75). 
Previously, IRRI apparently was involved with some private sector firms 
in pesticide testing (First EPR, p 24) but this was later reduced to a 
minimum level. 
There is also evidence of some research collaboration with institutions 
in developed countries (UK, USA, Japan, W Germany). This collaboration 




5.13 THE ISNAR REVIEWS 
Reviews: 
EPR, BMR in 1985 
(a) Panel Membership 
EPR (7 members) 
USA academia 





EMR (2 members) 
Canada 
U.K. 
(b) Panel Itinerary 
EPR and &lR 
Phase I: Aug 22 to Sep 3, 1985 
A series of country visits by various panel members to Columbia, Dominican 
Republic, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Rwanda, Kenya. 
Phase II: Sep 3 to Sep 20 
Meetings at ISNAR with staff and management, and report preparation. 
Interaction between EPR and BMR panels. 
(c) Imuact of Reviews 
The external review's main conclusion was that ISNAR had adequately 
fulfilled the expectations during its "trial" period and should now be 
considered a full-fledged member of the CGIAR. 
One set of recommendations were directed at the management of ISNAR. 
The aim was to improve the organizational structure of the institute's 
program and to institutionalize long range planning. 
Another set of recommendations dealt with the program content. The 
panel encouraged ISNAR to increase its research program (i.e.,to conduct 
more "research on research") and to increase its commitment to follow-up 
activities in its dealings with NARPSs. 
The Board essentially agreed with the recommendations and remarks of 
the external review. In fact, in the first year following the review, 
almost all of the recommendations have become operational. 
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(d) Bandline Criticisms in Report 
The panel was highly complimentary of ISNAR's progress and the review 
focused on the strategic issues facing the institute. 
The panel endorse, A the strategy followed by ISNAR during its "trial 
period". This was essentially to rely on a staff with significant 
experience in working with NARPs to gain a knowledge base on a wide range 
of national agricultural research systems. A good deal of the success of 
ISNAR was attributed to the strong leadership of the DG who maintained 
centralized control over the program. 
According to the review, it was now appropriate for ISNAR to 
institutionalize its experience and program, and suggested several ways to 
decentralize the organization of the program. 
In addition, the panel recommended that ISNAR should develop a coherent 
long-term plan, something it had not done during the trial period. 
The panel also urged ISNAR to devote more resources to training and 
research. In particular, it suggested-that ISNAR conduct research on 
research management and organization. Its main criticism of ISNAR'.s 
program was that ISNAR was weak on ho? it went about suggesting how NARP's 
set their research priorities and evaluate their programs. Specifically 
the panel felt ISNAR had not made use of economic tools in suggesting how 
to set guidelines for research resource allocation. 
The EMR expressed some concern with the personnel evalutation system, 
since all personnel were receiving the same grade (i.e., "excellent") 
during each annual appraisal. 
(e> Eliciting Staff Concerns 
Both the EPR and F.MR noted the high staff morale and quality of staff 
at ISNAR. 
No staff concerns were indicated, though the F.MR hinted that salaries 
might be too low and suggested that five grades of staff positions be 
established to provide for career development at ISNAR. It is not clear, 
however, whether these concerns expressed in the !ZMR were the result of 
conversations with ISNAR staff or independently arrived at by the panel. 
(0 Organizational Structure 
The EMR suggested some organizational alternatives to decentralize 




(g) The Plannine Process at ISNAE 
A key element of the external review was the need for ISNAR to develop 
a coherent strategy for its efforts, i.e., strategic planning at ISNAR had 
not been formally conducted. 
The external review also envisioned a greater role for the Board in 
setting future policy at ISNAR. 
These recommendations have been implemented by ISNAR, 
(h) Interaction with NARPs 
ISNAR appears to be held in high regard by the NARPs it has dealt with 
and there is a high demand for its services. 
. 
An ISNAR project with a national program begins with a visit from an 
ISNAR team (made up of ISNAR staff and additional consultants) to identify 
program constraints. National scientists are consulted at all stages of a 
project so that real constraints can be identified and viable suggestions 
made. The design and elaboration of a system building strategy constitute 
the "project development" stage; Finally, ISNAR continues to provide 
follow-up advice and assistance during project implementation, which is 
carried out on the initiative of the national program. 
(i) Interactions with Other Institutions 
In ISNAR's initial mandate, a close'working relationship was envisioned 
between ISNAR and other IARC's, FAO, and donors. The external review 
suggested that the mandate be modified to clarify the position of ISNAR 
with respect to these other institutions. 
The initial mandate suggested that ISNAR had certain responsibilities 
toward other IARCs in addition to NARPs. ISNAR did not develop close 
working relations with other IARCs as this proved not feasible in 
practice. ISNAE has focused on the research management process at the 
national level, especially on research policy, research organization, and 
research management. Its role tends to be independent of the activity of 
the other IARCs. The suggested changes to the mandate eliminated the 
references to the relationship with other IARCs and assured that ISNAR was 
an institute of equal standing. 
No clear deliniation of responsibilities existed between FAO and ISNAR 
and apparently some competitiveness has existed in the past. The panel 
felt ISNAR had a clear comparative advantage in assisting in NAEP 
institutional development, stemming from being a part of the CGIAE system 
and being entirely focused on this one issue. In addition, ISNAR has 
recently been collaborating successfully with FAO several projects (e.g., 
planning of activities in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Panama). 
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5.14 THE WARDA REVIEWS 
Reviews: First EPR, 1979 
Second EPR, 1984 
EMR, 1984 
Mid-Term ge.;isw, 1986 
(a) Panel Membership 
First EPR: 5 members 
us academia: economic 
France NARP 
CGIAR/TAC (3) 









academia: plant pathology 
EMR:'2 members 












academia: financial management 
academia: agric policy 
* indicates a TAC member 
(b) Panel Itinerarv 
First EPR 
5.14 
Aug 30 - Sep 1: at WARDA Center for staff meetings 
Sep 2-9: visits to special projects and NARP's in Sierra Leone, 
Mali (and Ivory Coast after.Sep 17) 
Sep 10-16: at WARDA for staff meetings and report writing 
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Second EPR (1983) 
Jun 11 - 15: at WARDA Center for staff briefings 
Jun 16 - Jul 6 '& Sep 9 - 25: visits to special projects, field 
activities, and NARP's in Gambia, Senegal, Upper Volta, Ivory 
Coast, Nigeria, Mali 
Sep 26 - Ott 7: at WARDA Center for more staff briefings, report 
writing and presentation 
Mid-Term Review 
Apr 13 - 21: visit to special projects and field activities in 
Ivory Coast and Senegal 
Apr 22 - MAy2: at WARDA Center for meetings with management and 
report writing 
(c) Impact of the Reviews 
The reviews had limited impact on WARDA management, policy, and 
program. Political and fi,nancial pressures on WARDA management tended to 
dominate program and personnel decisions. Furthermore, management 
deficiencies added to the problem. For example, .the First EPR recommended 
greater attention to long range planning and the addition of economists to 
the special project multidiscipljnary research teams. This was not ~ 
carried out and little in the way of forward planning appears to have been 
initiated. 
Some progress was made implementing the Second EPR and EMR 
recommendations both in the way of a more sharply focused research piogram 
and in more effective management (p viii and x of the Mid-Term review). 
But the Mid-Term review concludes that the most important structural 
constraints to an effective institute remained, and recommended a new 
institutional arrangement for rice research in West Africa be implemented 
(i.e., that WARRI be established). 
(d) Handline: Criticisms in the Reviews 
There is a sharp contrast in the characterization of WARDA between the 
First EPR and the later reviews. 
The First EPR appears to have glossed over some major structural 
deficiencies, though it did point out the serious financial problems 
resulting from a failure of many West African states to live up to their 
funding commitments. In fact the First EPR commends the organizational 
structure to be a success (p 6, p 59). 
The most severe criticism of WARDA came from the EMR of the second 
review. It identified (1) inadequate financial controls and accounting 
systems: (2) politicization of staff recruitment practices; (3) serious 
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management deficiences (unproductive administrative staff, friction 
between anglophone and francophone contingents, poor staff morale) and 
characterized the management as "passive administration" rather than 
"active management". 
See comments in par (d) concerning staff friction and poor staff 
morale. The First EPR made no mention of poor staff morale, instead 
commenting on what it felt was a good quality research staff. 
(f) Research Oraanizational Structure 
WARDA is unique in its structure in that it incorporates both research 
and develooment components, along with training services. Furthermore, 
its research program is highly decentralized with core programs in Liberia 
and four special project stations located elsewhere in West Africa. Each 
of the special project sites is staffed with a small multidisciplinary 
team. 
Association with WARDA probably has given the scientists at these sites 
a greater sense of belonging and more support. But financial strain has 
limited contact,, i.e., travel budgets have been significantly curtailed. 
This research structure was based on the assumption that existing 
technology could be rapidly disseminated in the region without much 
adaptive research being required. The first review recognized that this 
assumption was overly optimistic and emphasized the need for a greater 
commitment to adaptive research (p 10). Later reviews recognized this as 
well and the Mid-Term review recommended a complete overhaul of the rice 
research program in West Africa, creating a regional rice research 
institute without "development" responsibilities and the structural 
limitations of WARDA. 
(g) Planning Processes 
No formal planning process has been in place and research program 
budgeting has been dominated by uncertain and irregular funding, along 
with management deficiencies. 
(h) Interaction with National ProPrams 
The modes employed by WARDA include (1) training activities; (2) 
provision of material for varietal testing; (2) the four special projects, 
which appear to be housed at NARP stations. 
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5.15 STRIPE REVIEW OF FARMING SYSTEMS RESEARCH 
Sources: Stripe Review Report on Farming Systems Research, 1977 
FSR (at the IARCs) Workshop Report, 1986 
Puroose of Review 
The rapid growth in Farming Systems Research at several IARCs in the 
early 1970s was cause for TAC to authorize a critical review of these 
activities. This was the first across-center analysis of a particular 
topic (Stripe review). 
The review was to provide a descriptive account of FSR at four of the 
IARCs (IITA, ICRISAT, CIAT, and IRRI). It was also to review FSR 
methodology at the IARCs and provide appropriate guidelines for the 
conduct of these activities at the centers. 
But before summarizing the content and impact of the Stripe review, it 
is worthwhile to comment on the nature of FSR.within the CGIAR system, as 
discerned from the program reviews, the 1986 workshop report, and other 
sources. 
Two Comoetine Views on FSR in the IARCs 
There appear'to be two competing philosophies concerning the concept . 
of Farming Systems Research in the IARCs. The main distinctions between 
these views are outlined below: 
First View: characterized by programs at CIP, CIAT, CIMMYT, and IRRI 
The focus of FSR is research methodology development. The key component 
of the FSR research program is to diagnose farmers' needs when planning 
research programs and when identifying intervention strategies. A 
secondary component is to strengthen the linkaPes within the research 
program: across commodities, between institutions, and between research 
and extension. Ramifications of this approach are multidisciplinary 
interaction and the use of on-farm trials. 
Second View: characterized by programs at IITA and ICRISAT 
The focus of FSR is to develop new farming systems (technolozies), 
e.g. p the vertisol technologies studied at ICRISAT and the IITA research 
on systems to replace the bush/fallow system. This approach has generally 
been unsuccessful, as it is difficult to transfer prototype technologies. 
ImDact of FSR Strioe Review 
The recommendations tended to be quite broad in nature and appeared to 
have very little or no direct impact on the scope or direction of FSR at 
the IARCs, except to reaffirm the existence of such research in the CGIAR 
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system. It was not critical of FSR programs at any of the institutes and 
at no point questioned the relevancy of FSR. 
The review failed to distinguish between the competing views on FSR 
outlined above. Instead, the review defined FSR in broad terms, attempting 
to be ail inciusive. According to their definitions of FSR, it is 
difficult to think of a research program that could not be characterized . 
as FSR, except perhaps a single-disciplinary basic research program. 
The review's main impact appears to have been to provide an impetus for 
further discussion of FSR among IARC scientists. Since the time of the 
1977 Stripe review, FSR has undergone significant changes at several of 
the institutes and has become more focused. FSR activities have increased 
significantly at CIP and CIMMYT. Though CIAT dropped,its formal farming 
systems program, the methodological characteristics of FSR are fully 
incorporated in its commodity research programs. Most importantly, there 
is a consensus building among most of the IARC scientists as to what 
constitutes the essence of FSR (along the lines of the 1st group's 
philosophy outlined above). ILCA, ICARDA, and the African part of ICRISAT 
are developing their FSR programs along these lines. 
The development o,f this consensus can be traced to a series of meetings 
between IARC scientists. These meetings were probably motivated by the 
1977 Stripe review. The first meetings were informal but they have 
progressed in structure and inclusion. The most important meetings that 
contributed to the consensus building.are given below. 
1979; Canada, at the Int'l Ag Econ Meeting 
--some IARC scientists held an informal meeting on FSR issues 
1980: Mexico 
--IARC economists met to discuss on-farm research 
1984: East Africa 
--IARC scientists involved in African programs met to discuss FSR 
1986: ICRISAT 
--lo IARC's sent representatives to a Workshop on FSR 
Several references were made to the 1977 Stripe review in the 1986 
Workshop Proceedings. It appears that this review report was still used as 
a basic reference for FSR work at the IARCs. So, though the direct impact 
on FSR programs at individual institutes was slight, it appeared to have 
an indirect impact in that it initiated a series of meetings that have 
clarified FSR at many of the IARCs and has provided a common reference 
point on which to base these discussions. 
83 
5.16 
5.16 STRIPE REVIEW OF OFF-CENTER ACTIVITIES 
Report: Stripe ,Review on Off-Center Activities, 1980 
Puroose of Review 
The key issue that led the CGIAR secretariate to commission this Stripe 
review was that the off-center activities of the international centers 
were growing very rapidly, and demands from client countries were 
increasing. The review was to study: 
(1) the rationale for off-center activities, and to identify types of such 
activities; 
(2) the optimal size and duration of off-center activities, and the proper 
balance between off- and on-center programs; 
(3) the views of NARP's and donors toward off-center activities; 
(4) the effect that the establishment of ISNAR would have on the 
off-center activities of other IARCs; 
(5) the collaboration between centers, regional networks, with FAO and 
other organizations on these types of programs; 
(6) possible alternatives to off-center activities. 
Abstract of the Review 
Though the review identified seven categories of off-center activities, 
these can be summarized into the following four areas: 
(1) germplasm collection, preservation, and utilization (including the 
international testing programs); 




The review concluded that these activities were a natural extension of 
center programs and it was often difficult to make sharp distinctions 
between on- and off-center activities. 
The panel felt that an increase in off-center activities is part of the 
natural maturation of an institute, and that these programs could be 
expected to increase further. The review gave no suggestions on what might 
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be an optimal balance. The report only cautioned that the IARCs should 
stick to their mandated topics. 
The demand from client countries for specific services, particularly 
consultancies on NARP management and operations issues, would probably 
decrease -gitk, th,e ----*inn nf IsN-AR~ However, demand for assistance on bL bYIII.1 I- 
technical issues would probably remain strong. 
Imoact of the Review 
The main output from the review was to give a broad overview of the 
type and trends in off-center activities in the CGIAR system. But no 
specific recommendations were made. The issues identified above (Purpose 
of Review) were only addressed in very general terms. Many of these issues 
were not addressed in sufficient detail to be meaningful. It is doubtful 
that this review had much of an impact of the nature or amount of 
off-center activities being conducted by the IARCs. 
The general lack of a critical tone in this review is clearly 
illustrated in its failure to address the significant problems facing many 
of the regionally based scientists employed by the IARCs. Several external 
program and management reviews have cited major morale problems of these 
staff resulting from a feeling of isoiation from the center and from 
insecure tenure. But no mention was made of this problem in the stripe 
review, except for a brief reference that regional staff would like to 
have more visits from center program leaders. 
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5.17 STRIPE REVIEW OF 
Source: Stripe Review 
Purpose of Review 
Several key issues 
TRAINING ACTIVITIES 
Report on Training, 1985 
were identified in the terms of reference that dealt 
not only with the training programs at the IARCs but also with the general 
issue of agricultural manpower needs in developing countries. The team was 
to study and assess the training programs at the IARCs, including an 
evaluation of their content, costs, and impact. They were also to propose 
future directions for these training programs and identify the types of 
training activities that IARCs can best pursue and the optimal size of the 
training component of an IARC program. 
There were two components to the study, The first was a study of the 
IARC training programs. The team visited all centers and 18 developing 
countries and conducted extensive interviews with IARC staff, training 
program participants and NARP managers. The second component focused on 
the training needs of national agricultural systems. Six in-depth country 
reports were preparted for this part. 
Abstract of the Review 
1) 
The study was a thorough descriptive account of past and current 
tra-ining programs at the IARCs. It gave specific recommendations for the 
types of training programs most appropriate for the centers, the conduct 
of training, monitoring their impact and effectiveness, stabilizing the 
funding for training, and the additional capital facilities needed for 
training at the centers. The summaries of the training programs at 
specific institutes in the Stripe review were more detailed than the 
sections on training in the external program reviews. One apparent 
exception was with the training programs at ICARDA. The external review 
had been conducted a year before the Stripe review on training. This 
external review revealed serious deficiencies in the ICARDA training 
program. No such problems were indicated in the Stripe review, although 
the Stripe review did note that a director of training had just been 
appointed at ICARDA. 
The training needs of developing countries were investigated. This 
analysis was fairly cursory except for the six country studies that were 
conducted. It was recognized that' the IARCs can only fulfill a small 
fraction of the manpower needs of the agricultural sector of these 
countries. National Agricultural Programs looked upon the training 
contribution of the IARCs quite favorably, and it was apparent that demand 
for these services greatly exceeded supply. However, there were some 




The training programs were recognized as being one of the key 
mechanisms for establishing links between the centers and the NARPs. 
Center scientis,ts have maintained contact with training program 
participants and these individuals often collaborate later on research 
projects, material exchange, and are an avenue for disseminating research 
rest?lts . 
The review team was critical of the secondary role given to training 
programs, behind the importance attached to research programs, at the 
IARCs. They noted that during times of budget pressures, training programs 
were usually cut first, and training programs often relied more heavily on 
special project funds. The team suggested that a part of core funds be 
restricted to the training program. 
Monitoring of the training programs had been inadequate, according to 
the review. The panel made specific recommendations on how these programs 
could be monitored for effectiveness and impact. 
The review was also forward looking in a broad sense and suggested new 
avenues that training programs at the IARCs could take in the future. The 
panel argued that the training and research programs should be given equal 
.importance, rather than the current policy of always basing training on 
research and dispersing training functions amongst the research staff. 
This position was reflected not only in the recommendations concerning the . 
funding of training programs, but also on the content of training courses. 
The panel urged the centers to develop new, more appropriate curriculum 
materials so as to reduce the West/North bias in current agricultural 
science literature. 
TAC appeared cool to this suggestion, however, reaffirming the centers' 
premier responsibility with research. 
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